UNION ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
| Date | 01 July 1982 |
| Published date | 01 July 1982 |
| Author | Ian Roxborough,Mark Thompson |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1982.tb00098.x |
UNION ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY
IN
MEXICO: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE’
MARK
THOMPSON*
AND
IAN
ROXBOROUGH*”
INTRODUCTION
EVIDENCE
of
democratic control
of
labour unions by their members has attracted the
attention of scholars since the beginning
of
their systematic study.2 The most compelling
justification for the existence and legal protection of unions is their role in providing
workers with
a
means to influence decisions that affect the conditions
of
their working
lives. Undemocratic unions may saddle workers with a new master (the union oligarch) in
place of an old one (the employer), thus leaving members with no greater influence than
they enjoyed without a union. However, all formal organisations tend to develop
bureaucratic tendencies and the concomitant separation
of
leaders from the membership.
Unlike most other organisations, unions generally exist in a hostile
or
threatening
environment and rely on discipline
of
their members to withstand pressures from
management and government,
so
they are called upon
to
combine internal democracy
with
a
high degree of discipline.3
Almost all studies have found that the tension between discipline and democracy
is
more often resolved in favour of the former than the latter. As one North American
scholar observed, ‘most unions resemble one-party states more than they do democratic
organisations with legitimate and organised oppositions in office.’“ However, internal
government varies widely among unions studied, within extremes of democracy and
oligarchy, and the behaviour
of
individual unions is not uniform over time
-
the
formation
of
oligarchies is neither inevitable nor irre~ersible.~ The causes of oligarchic
tendencies in unions have been discussed frequently and include: the indifference of
members, the need for
a
bureaucracy to administer the union’s affairs, leaders’ control
over communications, the increase in status that accompanies election to office, pressure
from socioeconomic management
.6
But the complexity
of
union government and variety
in practice has impeded the generation of a general theory
of
union democracy.
The formal study
of
union democracy has been conducted largely at the level of case
studies and almost exclusively in North America and Europe. Both
of
these traits
of
the existing literature limit its utility for cross-cultural comparisons. Case studies have
concentrated on the subculture
of
the workers in a single organisation. the special
aspects
of
their industry,
or
the roles
of
dominant leaders. Given the resources and
access to data necessary for in-depth case studies.
it
is unlikely that research on union
government in Latin America will follow this tradition. In the past decade, however,
scholars have turned
to
a structural approach to the subject. i.e. the study
of
the
formal arrangements that facilitate the rise
of
power bases independent of union
leaders.’
Structural research offers greater possibilities
for
cross-cultural research than case
studies, since it concentrates on variables usually present in labour organisations which
are also likely to be accessible to scholars. While this approach permits researchers
to
put data into standard formats and make statistically rigorous comparisons, these very
qualities create problems for the interpretation of structural research. In general
terms. political form may be mistaken
for
reality. More specifically, behaviour
of
trade
union officers such as the rotation
of
elective offices among members
of
a clique,
*
Faculty
of
Commerce
and
Business
Administration.
University
of
British
Columhia.
**
Department
of
Sociology.
London
School
of
Economics.
20
1
202
BRITISH JOURNAL
OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
manipulation of electoral processes by bargaining behaviour,
or
covert assistance to
candidates by employers, all familiar tactics in union politics, may not be detected in
structural research, especially on a cross-cultural basis. But several studies have
examined the relationship between formal political democracy and the substance of
membership participation and found the two factors to coincide on most occasions.8
Structural research offers special promise in Latin America, where government
records may provide access to data.
A notable example
of
the structural approach is Edelstein and Warner's
Comparative
Union
Democracy,'
which compares samples
of
unions in the United
States and the United Kingdom on several dimensions related to union elections,
supplemented by data on individual unions
or
specific incidents. The authors found
significant differences within and between the two samples. On balance, they
concluded that unions could represent their members effectively and still tolerate
meaningful opposition in countries where democratic norms were present. While
admitting that national characteristics accounted for some differences between their
samples, they further concluded that national characteristics are probably secondary
to
internal organisational factors, 'except where the former grossly interfere with
union political processes or grossly limit collective bargaining initiatives'.
"'
A
modified
structural approach is attempted here, with comparisons
of
electoral data, supported
by other information
to
explain
or
highlight comparisons.
The data in this paper are
from
Mexico, and national characteristics, in the form
of
the political system, certainly influence union political life and bargaining behaviour.
National state and local politics are essentially noncompetitive. The national
government, together with the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido
Revolucionario Institucional,
PRI)
effectively controls political activity. The PRI
is
organised into three sectors, one consisting of labour unions.
Unionism is firmly entrenched in the modern sectors
of
the Mexican economy
-
heavy manufacturing, communications, transportation and mining. Workers in these
industries have utilised protections in a Federal Labour Code and their bargaining
power
to
achieve wages and working conditions considerably above levels in
unorganised industries. They constitute a relatively privileged layer
of
the Mexican
working class, insulated from economic pressures
of
a large
surplus
of
unskilled
labour.
The most common organisational form for Mexican unions
is
a single-plant
or
enterprise local directly affiliated
to
a state federation, which in turn is part
of
a
national confederation. The state federations support the local's bargaining and other
functions, but necessarily to
a
limited degree, due to variety in membership and
scarce resources. Several confederations exist, each seeking
to
represent workers in
unionised sectors. The confederations vary according to ideology, although the major
ones openly support the government.
There are a number of national industrial unions, usually independent of any
confederation, whose legal status entitles them to represent workers in their industry
anywhere in the Republic. This status, granted only when a union already represents
workers in several states, enhances the bargaining power of such unions by encouraging
their growth and enhancing their strategic position vis-a-vis management.
No
comprehensive analysis
of
the Mexican collective bargaining system yet exists.
But despite pervasive government influence over economic decisions, at least the form
of
bargaining is observed. Unions and employers exchange demands, strikes
occasionally occur, and official intervention tends to be concentrated in key disputes,
the results of which set patterns for other negotiations." On the basis
of
available
evidence, the national characteristics do not seem to 'grossly limit bargaining
initiatives' in the manner anticipated by Edelstein and Warner, although restrictions
on bargaining behaviour clearly occur.
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