Union structure, bounded solidarity and support for redistribution: Implications for building a welfare state

AuthorJae-jin Yang,Hyeok Yong Kwon
Published date01 March 2021
Date01 March 2021
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119887535
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119887535
International Political Science Review
2021, Vol. 42(2) 277 –293
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512119887535
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Union structure, bounded
solidarity and support for
redistribution: Implications for
building a welfare state
Jae-jin Yang
Yonsei University, South Korea
Hyeok Yong Kwon
Korea University, South Korea
Abstract
This study unveils the effects of union structure – national, industrial and enterprise unionism – on the
solidarity and redistribution preferences of workers. We argue that labor unions have varied scope and
levels of solidarity as well as redistribution preferences because solidarity is not naturally given but tends to
be cultivated by labor unions. In order to sustain commitment to egalitarian wages and redistributive social
policies, a spirit of solidarity must be instilled in the minds of members, especially more privileged workers.
Our analysis finds that countries with encompassing unions at national and industry levels have higher levels
of overall support for government intervention to reduce income inequality than countries with enterprise
unionism. It suggests that welfare state building is not just a function of relative power between labor and
capital; union structure and preference formation matter as well.
Keywords
Labor union, labor movement, redistribution, solidarity, social policy preference, welfare state, union
structure
Introduction
It is commonly assumed in most of the literature on the development of welfare states that labor
unions are natural protagonists of the welfare state. They are proponents of solidarity and some of
the most powerful pro-welfare political forces. Unions aggregate and articulate the socioeconomic
Corresponding author:
Jae-jin Yang, Department of Public Administration, Yonsei University, 114 Yonhee Hall, Yonsei University, Seodaemun-
gu, Seoul 03722, South Korea.
Email: jjyang@yonsei.ac.kr
887535IPS0010.1177/0192512119887535International Political Science ReviewYang and Kwon
research-article2019
Article
278 International Political Science Review 42(2)
demands of ordinary people, provide leadership networks in and across industries and, more
importantly, mobilize workers through close alliances with leftist parties (Korpi, 2006).
We do not argue that labor unions are mere interest groups. However, we do challenge the
taken-for-granted assumption in most comparative studies of welfare states that unions seek to
cultivate solidarity among the working class and support public welfare. We posit that scope, level
of solidarity and redistribution preferences vary among unions. Some are close to interest groups,
whereas others are not. We seek to examine the effect of the organizational structure of the labor
movement on preferences for redistribution, predicting that encompassing unions at national or
industry levels are more likely to support redistributive social policies than narrowly organized
unions such as enterprise and craft unions.
We claim that the scope and degree of solidarity vary from country to country according to the
union structure present in that country. The union structure reflects where power lies within the
labor movement, which correlates with the main level of collective bargaining (national vs industry
vs local). In a country where labor movements are dominated by enterprise unions and collective
bargaining takes place at the local level, solidarity is limited to within each company. Because the
focal point of collective action is the workplace, there is no need for union leaders to seek solidarity
beyond the corporate boundary. Accordingly, members have a weak positive attitude toward redis-
tribution, and ‘club goods’ (e.g. job security, higher wages and corporate welfare) are provided
rather than ‘public goods’ (e.g. employment security, tax-based universal programs or industry-
wide social protections for all workers).
On the other hand, in a country where unions with a broad scope, such as national and industrial
unions, are the dominant form of labor movement, solidarity reaches much further, and such unions
seek solidarity wages as well as the universal social policies required to protect less privileged
members, often at the cost of the short-term interests of more privileged members. Protecting less
privileged workers is necessary for leaders to obtain unity in organized labor, a necessary condition
for sustaining the political power of the working class. Cultivating a sense of solidarity is required
to mitigate complaints from privileged members. As a result, even privileged workers are likely to
have more positive attitudes toward redistribution in countries with encompassing unions than
countries where narrowly organized unions are dominant. This effect on pro-welfare attitudes
among affluent workers may help build a welfare state.
We point to the rational actions of union leaders that underpin the creation of solidarity. As
Swenson (1989: 14–15) pointed out, they try to create and sustain a sense of solidarity among
workers to secure organizational unity because it is a sine qua non for effective collective action.
Therefore, this article assumes that solidarity is not naturally given but tends to be cultivated by
labor unions. In order to sustain commitment to egalitarian wages and redistributive social policies,
the spirit of solidarity must be instilled in the minds of members, especially more privileged work-
ers. The need to cultivate this spirit of solidarity increases in moving from enterprise unionism to
industry-based and national unionism because higher-level unions represent more heterogeneous
workers.
To examine whether and how the organizational structure of labor movements affects solidarity
among workers, we assess attitudes of union members toward redistribution using the International
Social Survey Programme: Social Inequality IV data (ISSP, 2009). We use Visser’s (2016) indica-
tor of the predominant level of collective bargaining as a proxy for the organizational structure of
each labor movement (i.e. union structure). Our multi-level analysis finds evidence supporting our
theoretical argument that union member preferences for redistribution are more pronounced under
national-level unionism than other levels.
This article is organized into three sections. The first section reviews existing literature on the
heterogeneity of labor and solidarity, critically examining the basic assumption of the power

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