United Nations electoral assistance: More than a fig leaf?
| Author | Anna Lührmann |
| Published date | 01 March 2019 |
| Date | 01 March 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0192512117740915 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512117740915
International Political Science Review
2019, Vol. 40(2) 181 –196
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512117740915
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United Nations electoral
assistance: More than a fig leaf ?
Anna Lührmann
University of Gothenburg, Sweden
Abstract
Between 2007 and 2014 the United Nations (UN) assisted more than one-third of all national elections
worldwide. Its experts routinely provide substantial technical advice on election management, logistical
support such as the procurement of ballot papers and financial assistance. However, it remains doubtful if,
and under which conditions, such assistance contributes to free and fair elections or has a positive long-term
impact on democratization. This study assesses the impact of UN electoral assistance (UNEA) in Sudan,
Nigeria and Libya. It finds that such assistance contributed to election quality in the presence of regime elites
prioritizing electoral credibility in Nigeria (2011) and Libya (2012). In Nigeria, it seems plausible that UNEA
had a medium-term impact on democratization. However, if regime elites undermine electoral freedom
and fairness – as in Sudan (2010) – such positive effects are unlikely. Furthermore, in such contexts, the
involvement of the UN may legitimize authoritarian practices.
Keywords
Elections, electoral integrity, democracy aid, electoral assistance, United Nations, Sudan, Libya, Nigeria
Introduction
In April 2010, Sudan held its first multiparty elections after 21 years of military dictatorship.
Aiming to push Africa’s then largest country towards democracy, international actors placed high
hopes and enormous resources into the electoral exercise. Funded by the United Kingdom, Sweden
and other donors, the United Nations (UN) advised Sudanese elections officials, airlifted ballot
boxes to remote villages and helped with the registration of voters. In short, the UN provided the
Sudanese government with the necessary resources to conduct free and fair elections. Nevertheless,
elections turned out deeply flawed. According to election observers, results were ‘untraceable’ and
campaign activities ‘restrained’ (EU EOM Sudan, 2010: 5f). Instead of enhancing democratization,
electoral assistance may have helped to legitimize the incumbent Omar al-Bashir, who is wanted
for war crimes by the International Criminal Court.
Corresponding author:
Anna Lührmann, V-Dem Institute/Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Box 711, Gothenburg 405
30, Sweden.
Email: anna.luehrmann@v-dem.net
740915IPS0010.1177/0192512117740915International Political Science ReviewLührmann
research-article2018
Article
182 International Political Science Review 40(2)
Two years later, in neighbouring Libya, the first elections after the fall of the Gadhafi regime
took place. Again, the UN provided large-scale assistance in order to compensate for the lack of
electoral experience after decades of dictatorship. In this case, elections were at least ‘somewhat’
free and fair according to experts from the Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem) (Coppedge
et al., 2016). Likewise, the UN-supported elections in Nigeria in 2011 were largely considered a
success (Lewis, 2011). What explains these divergent outcomes of UN electoral assistance
(UNEA)?
I argue that different strategic interests of regime elites largely account for this variation. In
Libya, after the fall of Gadhafi, the interim government made credible elections a top priority
(Vandewalle, 2012). Conversely, the Sudanese president al-Bashir, who had come to power through
a military coup in 1989, only reluctantly agreed to hold elections in 2010 and restricted credible
electoral competition in order to securely stay in power (Musso, 2012: 61). In Nigeria, President
Jonathan assumed office directly following the death of his predecessor and only one year before
the 2011 election. After mass demonstrations against the election commission, President Jonathan
decided to improve electoral governance in order to gain popular legitimacy for the consolidation
of his rule (Akhaine, 2011: 650).
Against this background, I argue that the Libyan interim authorities and the Nigerian regime
elites were inclined to cooperate with UNEA, while the Sudanese authorities were rather reluctant.
Thus, regime compliance seems to have enabled UNEA to play a positive role for the elections in
Libya and Nigeria while the lack of compliance undermined the UN’s contribution to elections in
Sudan.
This notion builds on prior studies pointing to the importance of a conducive political context
for the effectiveness of democracy aid. For instance, Carothers (1999, 304) argues that democracy
aid is only able to ‘speed up a moving train.’ Bush (2015) warns that democracy aid does not neces-
sarily challenge authoritarian regimes. Tolstrup (2014) identifies regime elites as gatekeepers to
international influences on regime trajectories.
However, to date the role of regime elites in the effectiveness of electoral assistance has not
been systematically examined. Several studies target related topics. For example, Ludwig (2004a,
2004b) specifically assesses the UN’s role in electoral assistance but without much critical analy-
sis of its longer-term impact. Borzyskowski (2016) analyses the allocation but not the effective-
ness of technical election assistance. Kelley (2012a: 215) rightly points out that ‘[e]vidence is
insufficient to settle the debate about the merits of international involvement in elections.’ It is
highly relevant to address this research gap since electoral assistance is the backbone of interna-
tional democracy promotion activities. Between August 2007 and December 2014, the UN
assisted 37% of all elections worldwide and half of all elections outside of established
democracies.1
Electoral assistance is distinct from election observation. Electoral assistance aims at improving
elections whereas election observation missions assess elections and provide recommendations for
the future. Electoral assistance includes active logistical, technical and financial support to elec-
toral processes, such as procuring ballot boxes, training polling station staff and educating voters.
UN entities – namely the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Department
of Political Affairs (UN DPA) – are the central players in electoral assistance as they set policy
standards and often coordinate international engagement.
In this study, I move beyond assessing the direct output of UNEA and focus on its outcome and
long-term impact. Outputs refer to goods and services that UNEA provides, for example ballot
boxes or trainings of election officials. Outputs are designed to contribute towards outcomes such
as free and fair elections. In particular, I scrutinize how regime elites2 mediate the effectiveness of
UNEA and its long-term impact on democratization.
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