Universal Credit, ‘Positive Citizenship’, and the Working Poor: Squaring the Eternal Circle?
| Published date | 01 January 2018 |
| Date | 01 January 2018 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12318 |
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LEGISLATION
Universal Credit, ‘Positive Citizenship’, and the
Working Poor: Squaring the Eternal Circle?
Philip M. Larkin∗
This article examines the potential effects of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 on the United
Kingdom social security system, and on claimants. This legislation illustrates new modes of
thought and ideology underlying the British welfare state. The introduction of the ‘Universal
Credit’ has the potential to solve the ‘poverty trap’, where claimants are better off in receipt
of welfare benefits rather than engaging with employment, and may assist low-paid individuals
into ‘positive’ citizenship. However, the practicalities of implementing Universal Credit might
undermine legislators’ ambitions. It may be that the Act attempts too much reform to the
social security system, trying to impose legislative uniformity on a highly complex set of
socio-economic circumstances which may be impervious to such rationalisation. This could
result in the scheme requiring further reform, or even abolition. The ideological and historical
underpinnings of Universal Credit are also examined to understand more clearly its nature and
structure.
INTRODUCTION
The Welfare Reform Act (WRA) 2012 aims to effect significant changes
to the social security system in the United Kingdom, building upon existing
welfare reform programmes. Specifically, the introduction of the much vaunted
(and somewhat misleadingly-titled) ‘Universal Credit’ (UC), with which this
article is largely concerned,1will reduce the number of benefits in the welfare
system, ostensibly simplifying some of its more complicated aspects. Due to
the highly technical nature of Universal Credit administration, it has been
piloted in a number of regions around the UK, with the original aim of having
the scheme fully operational by the end of 2017.2However, the emerging
∗Lecturer, Brunel Law School London. The author would like to thank Professor Neville Harris,
School of Law, University of Manchester, Professor Abimbola Olowofoyeku, School of Law, Brunel
University, Mr Wissam Abboud, School of Law, Dundee University, Professor Tanya Aplin, School
of Law, King’s College London, and the two anonymous referees for their invaluable advice and
comments on the various drafts of this article. The responsibility for any outstanding errors and the
views contained in the article are those of the author.
1 Universal Credit, outlined in Part I of the Welfare Reform Act 2012, will replace six exist-
ing benefits: income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance; Income-related Employment and Support
Allowance; Income Support; Working Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit; and Housing Benefit.
2 The scheme began on 29 April 2013 in one single Jobcentre in Ashton under Lyne,
Greater Manchester. Ian Duncan Smith has defended the decision to develop Universal
Credit on an incremental basis on the grounds of its complexity. See B. Brogan, ‘Univer-
sal Credit Blame Game Begins’ Daily Telegraph 7 November 2013. For a comprehensive list
of those areas in which Universal Credit is operational, see https://www.gov.uk/guidance/
C2018 The Author.The Moder n Law Review C2018 The Modern Law Review Limited. (2018) 81(1) MLR 114–131
Published by John Wiley& Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
Philip M. Larkin
reality that this original aim will not be met by that target date, and the well-
publicised difficulties in rendering Universal Credit operational, have made the
scheme highly topical and contentious, even though the Act has now been in
existence for over four years. Since Universal Credit was supposed to be at least
provisionally operational by 2018, it is an appropriate time to explore both its
nature and its potential socio-economic effects on recipients
The fundamental aim of Universal Credit is to assuage the historical problem
of the ‘poverty trap’, whereby it is more financially rewarding for citizens to
claim benefits than to engage in paid employment. The more punitive aspects
of the Welfare Reform Act (WRA) 2012, together with the reintroduction of
the ‘less eligibility’ principle through the ‘benefit cap’ in April 2013,3could
be portrayed as a fulfilment of the Conservative pre-2010 election pledges to
bring radical legislative changes to the welfare system. The introduction of
Universal Credit (UC) could quite easily fit within the populist narrative of
assisting the ‘strivers’ in society, those low-paid individuals and families who
seek to improve their circumstances through engagement in the labour market,
and shaming the ‘shirkers’, allegedly content to live off social security benefits.4
Examined in the context of other recent social security reforms, including the
introduction of the benefit cap5(and before this the replacement of Incapacity
Benefit by Employment and Support Allowance6), UC represents not only the
natural culmination of the tax credits policy,7but also a profound legislative
change to the welfare state, especially in administrative terms.8While there does
exist some academic literature on the technicalities of UC, surprisingly little
has been written on the potential socio-political impact of the WRA 2012,
and it is the intention of this article to help remedy this dearth of analysis.
It is a further aim of this article to evaluate UC, and examine the potential
impact of WRA 2012 on the welfare state and citizen claimants. One key
background question is whether the introduction of UC, unaccompanied by
reform in other areas such as in education and industrial training can actually
be decisive in encouraging a substantial proportion of unemployed citizens into
the labour market. As a stand-alone measure, it is hypothesised that the WRA
2012 might not achieve the results desired for it. Whatever shortcomings may
jobcentres-where-you-can-claim-universal-credit (all URLs were last accessed 15 October
2017). It is estimated that the Universal Credit scheme will not be operational until at least
March 2022. See n 130 below.
3 This was also achieved through the Welfare Reform Act 2012, s 96 and the Benefit (Housing
Benefit) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/2994.
4 These terms were first introduced to the welfare polemic by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
See, The Guardian 8 January 2013.
5 The cap of £26,000 imposed on all benefit recipients regardless of household number.
6 This reform was introduced by the last Labour government through the Welfare Reform Act
2007. See D. Bonner, ‘Employment and Support Allowance: Helping the Sick and Disabled to
Return to Work’ (2008) 15 JSSL 123, and P. Larkin, ‘Incapacity, the Labour Market and Social
Security: Coercion into “Positive” Citizenship’ (2011) 74 MLR 385.
7 Both Labour and Conservative governments in recent decades have had the longstanding am-
bition to merge the tax and benefits systems, to achieve savings on administrative costs and a
simplification of the often labyrinthine bureaucracy in both welfare and revenue systems. See
N. Harris, Law in a Complex State: Complexity in the Law & Structure of Welfare (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2013) 60 – 61.
8 See below for a full discussion of this.
C2018 The Author. The Modern Law Review C2018 The Modern Law Review Limited.
(2018) 81(1) MLR 114–131 115
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