Unpicking Torts: Elements, Conditions of Actionability and Standing Rules

Published date01 November 2024
AuthorJohn Murphy
Date01 November 2024
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12899
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Modern Law Review
DOI:10.1111/1468-2230.12899
Unpicking Torts: Elements, Conditions of Actionability
and Standing Rules
John Murphy∗
There is a clear tendency among judges and scholars to regard torts like chemical compounds:as
things compr ising a xed list of elements (such as duty,breach, causation etc).But it is sometimes
said that claimants in tort cases must also demonstrate that a condition of actionability has been
met, or that a standing requirement within a par ticular tort has been satised. The use of these
other terms raises two important questions. First, how a tort’s elements may be distinguished
from (1) conditions of actionability and (2) standing rules; and secondly, why any such distinc-
tion matters. This article addresses these questions and makes three key claims. The rst such
claim is that conditions of actionability may indeed be distinguished from elements.The second
is that rules described as standing requirements within certain torts have no discrete juridical
identity.The nal claim is that appreciating the distinction between elements and conditions of
actionability is important in both practical and theoretical terms.
INTRODUCTION
There is a clear tendency these days to think abouts torts as being made up of a
xed combination of ingredients. Just as a chemist would describe, say,bleach in
terms of its being made up of one atom of sodium, one of chlorine and one of
oxygen, so will the typical tor t textbook discuss, for example, battery in terms
of its constituent elements of contact, directness, intention and the absence of
consent. Most other torts, including negligence, are also routinely dealt with
in this way (though regarding negligence, the ingredients are rather like the
ingredients of apple pie in that, as one moves from one recipe to another, there
are sometimes little adjustments made here and there).1
Whether expositors of tort law have taken their lead from the cour ts in de-
scribing torts this way, or whether it is the other way round, is unclear. But,
either way, judges are nowadays clearly as committed as jurists to this elemental
approach. In OvRhodes2(Rhodes), for example, where new life was breathed
∗Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong.I am hugely g rateful to Peter Cane who provided com-
prehensive comments on a version of this paper presented at the University of Sydney. I am also
indebted to David Ibbetson (for helpful discussion of the historical aspects of this article) as well as
Kit Barker,James Goudkamp and Craig Purshouse who all commented helpfully on various drafts.
1 Historically, it was popular to think in ter ms of four ingredients. But more recently, there has
begun to emerge a tendency to regard actionable damage as an element of negligence: see for
example Donal Nolan,‘Rights, Damage and Loss’ (2017) 37 OJLS 255 and Jane Stapleton, Three
Essays on Torts (Oxford: OUP,2021) 68-72.
2 [2016] AC 219.
© 2024 The Authors. The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2024) 87(6) MLR 1519–1541
Thisis an open access ar ticle under the terms of the CreativeCommons Attr ibution License,which permits use,distr ibution and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Unpicking Torts
into the rule in Wilkinson vDownton,3not only did Lady Hale and Lord Toul-
son in their joint speech conrm the vitality of this tort, they also said em-
phatically, ‘[i]t has three elements: a conduct element, a mental element and a
consequence element’.4Similarly, when endeavouring to disentangle inducing
breach of contract from the tort of causing loss by unlawful means in OBG
Ltd vAllan5(OBG), Lord Homann systematically set out the contents of both
actions in two sections of his speech headed, respectively, ‘Inducing breach of
contract: elements of the Lumley v Gye tort’6and ‘Causing loss by unlawful
means: elements of the tor t’.7
One would perhaps expect such an approach to promote clarity in the law.
But, sometimes, it is a source of confusion. Compare, for example,the following
two depictions of the tort of deceit. According to Rix LJ in AIC Ltd vITS
Testing Services (UK) Ltd8(AIC Ltd), ‘[t]he elements of the tort of deceit are …
(1) a representation, which is (2) false, (3) dishonestly made,[and] (4) intended
to be relied upon and in fact relied upon’.9But for Viscount Maugham, in
Bradford Third Equitable Building Society vBorders10 (Bradford Third Equitable), the
claimant in a case of deceit must also show resulting damage.He said:
First, there must be a representation of fact made by words,or, it may be, by conduct
… Secondly,the representation must be made with a knowledge that it is false …
Thirdly, it must be made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the
plainti, or by a class of persons which will include the plainti, in the manner
which resulted in damage to him … Fourthly, it must be proved that the plainti
has acted upon the false statement and has sustained damage by so doing.11
The fact that Rix LJ made no mention of damage raises the following two
questions. Is one of these depictions wrong? Or, is the dierence between the
two judges’descr iptions apparent rather than real? The second question goes to
the heart of this article which explores the matter of whether – assuming that
the court has jurisdiction – everything that C must establish in order to obtain
a remedy can be regarded as an element of a particular tort. The answer that
will be advanced is ‘No’. In the particular case of deceit it will be argued that
the actionable damage component is best regraded as a qualitatively dierent
requirement – a condition of actionability: ie, a precondition of C’s being able
to obtain a remedy that is additional to the need to show all the elements of a tort.
Attention will also be devoted to a third putative type of requirement: the so-
called standing rule. And the reason such standing rules must also be considered
3 [1897] 2 QB 57.
4Rhodes n 2 above at [73].
5 [2008] AC 1.
6ibid at [39]-[44].
7ibid at [45]-[64].
8 [2007] 1 Lloyds Rep 555 at [251].
9ibid at [251].
10 [1941] 2 All ER 205.
11 ibid, 211.
1520 © 2024 The Authors. The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2024) 87(6) MLR 1519–1541

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