Upper Tribunal (Immigration and asylum chamber), 2026-06-23, JR-2026-LON-000743
| Court | Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) |
| Appeal Number | JR-2026-LON-000743 |
| Hearing Date | 01 May 2026 |
| Date | 23 June 2026 |
| Published date | 30 June 2026 |
Case No: JR-2026-LON-000743
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR
19 June 2026
Before:
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST
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Between:
THE KING
on the application of
(1) MXL
(2) AXL
(a child, by his litigation friend MXL)
Applicants
- and -
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
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Nicola Braganza KC and Miranda Butler
(instructed by Asylum Aid) for the Applicants
Matthew Fraser
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 1 May 2026
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J U D G M E N T
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Judge Hirst:
Introduction
1. The Applicants are Afghan nationals. In this claim they challenge the Respondent's decision dated 1 December 2025 assessing the Second Applicant as ineligible for resettlement in the UK under the Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme (‘ACRS’) (‘the eligibility decision’).
2. This claim for judicial review was issued on 27 February 2026. On 27 March 2026 the Respondent filed an acknowledgment of service and summary grounds of defence. The summary grounds of defence raised a preliminary issue of whether the Upper Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the claim, and invited the Tribunal to transfer the claim to the Administrative Court.
3. On 30 March 2026 Upper Tribunal Judge Neville directed that the claim be listed for a rolled-up hearing. On 20 April 2026 Upper Tribunal Judge Gray granted permission to the Applicants to rely on additional grounds for review and requested that the parties address the issue of jurisdiction.
4. The parties agreed that the issue of jurisdiction would be addressed at the outset of the rolled-up hearing, with submissions on the substantive issues to follow if the Upper Tribunal determined that it had jurisdiction.
5. At the hearing I determined extempore that the Upper Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the claim, for reasons set out more fully at paragraphs 7-34 below. I reserved my decision on the substantive claim.
6. I am grateful to counsel for their helpful written and oral submissions.
A. Preliminary issue: jurisdiction
7. The judicial review jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal is defined by ss15 and 18 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (‘TCEA 2007’) and is limited to claims which meet the conditions in s18(4)-(8) TCEA 2007.
8. If an application for judicial review does not meet the conditions in s18, the Upper Tribunal does not have the function of deciding it and must transfer the application to the High Court (s18(3) TCEA 2007).
9. The only condition relevant to this claim is that in s18(6) TCEA 2007, which provides that the application must fall within a class of case specified in directions given under Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The relevant direction is the Lord Chief Justice’s Consolidated Direction made on 21 August 2013 and amended on 17 October 2014 (‘the Direction’). Paragraph 1(i) of the Direction specifies the following class of case:
“1. ….any application for permission to apply for judicial review and any application for judicial review (including any application for ancillary relief and costs in such applications) that calls into question:
(i) a decision made under the Immigration Acts (as defined in Schedule 1 to the Interpretation Act 1978) or any instrument having effect (whether wholly or partly) under an enactment within the Immigration Acts, or otherwise relating to leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom outside the immigration rules; …”
10. Schedule 1 to the Interpretation Act 1978 provides that “the Immigration Acts” has the meaning given by s61 UK Borders Act 2007, which sets out a list of the relevant primary legislation.
11. The scope of paragraph 1(i) of the Direction was considered by Dove J as he then was in R (ABW) v SSHD [2025] 1 WLR 1685, in relation to a claim challenging a public order disqualification decision under s63 Nationality and Borders Act 2022. Dove J held [13] that paragraph 1(i) should not be simply interpreted literally. Instead, a more nuanced approach was required consistent with the purpose of the Direction, which is to ensure that matters which require the highly specialised expertise of judges in the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber are transferred to that jurisdiction. Dove J held [20] that the phrase “otherwise relating to leave to enter or remain” in paragraph 1(i) of the Direction was sufficiently open to include decisions which did not directly lead to a decision granting leave to enter or remain but which were decisions “in relation to preparatory stages in the process of obtaining status”. On the facts of ABW’s case, and in particular bearing in mind that the power to make public order disqualification decisions under s63 of the 2022 Act was not only exercisable in respect of individuals subject to immigration control but could also be applied to British citizens, Dove J declined to transfer ABW’s claim to the Upper Tribunal.
12. The jurisdictional question in this claim turns on whether the claim falls within paragraph 1(i) of the Direction, i.e. whether the eligibility decision under challenge was “a decision made under the Immigration Acts” or subordinate instruments, or alternatively was a decision “otherwise relating to leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom outside the Immigration Rules”.
13. The Applicants rely on R (Munir) v SSHD [2012] 1 WLR 2192 [2012] UKSC 32 as authority that the eligibility decision was made in the exercise of the Secretary of State’s powers under ss1, 3 and 4 of the Immigration Act 1971. The Applicants contend that the ACRS application process is a mechanism which is solely concerned with the entry into the UK of non-British citizens. The sole purpose of an eligibility decision is for the Respondent to determine whether an applicant meets substantive eligibility criteria for the grant of entry clearance; once eligibility is determined, the only further checks are security and identity checks. The Applicants contend that an ACRS eligibility decision is part of the process of entry clearance and therefore, following Munir, a decision made in the exercise of the Respondent's statutory powers under ss1, 3 and 4 of the 1971 Act.
14. In the alternative, the Applicants contend that an ACRS eligibility decision is one “otherwise relating to leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom outside the immigration rules” which falls within paragraph 1(i) of the Direction. In either case, they submit that the judicial review claim is one falling within the Direction and is therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal.
15. The Respondent maintains that the ACRS eligibility decision is not a decision “made under the Immigration Acts” because it is not itself a decision to grant leave to enter or remain which falls within the Secretary of State’s broad statutory powers under the 1971 Act. Instead, the Respondent contends that the eligibility decision is one made under the Crown’s prerogative powers.
16. In support of that submission the Respondent relies on the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(AFA) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 825. In that case, the court was considering challenges to decisions taken under the separate ‘Afghan Response Route’ (‘ARR’) policy on the ground that the Secretary of State had unlawfully fettered her statutory discretion. Singh LJ held (§54) that the formation and adoption of the ARR policy was properly regarded as an exercise of the prerogative. The Respondent maintains that whilst the court in AFA was not concerned with questions of jurisdiction and was considering the different procedure under the ARR policy, the reasoning applies by analogy to eligibility decisions taken under the ACRS policy and therefore to this claim. Because the eligibility decision is one made under prerogative powers, it is therefore not a decision “made under the Immigration Acts” for the purposes of paragraph 1(i) of the Direction.
17. The Respondent further submits that an ACRS eligibility decision is not a decision “otherwise relating to leave to enter or remain” within the meaning of paragraph 1(i) of the Direction because it is an entirely separate decision to the grant of entry clearance.
18. As Mr Fraser noted, with one exception all previous judicial review claims challenging decisions taken under the ACRS have to date proceeded in the Administrative Court. Those claims include R (SH) v SSFCDO [2022] EWHC 1937 (Admin); R (KA) v SSHD [2023] 1 WLR 896; R (BAL) v SSHD [2022] EWHC 2757 (Admin); R (KBL) v SSHD [2023] EWHC 87 (Admin); R (GA) v SSHD [2023] EWHC 871 (Admin); R (MTA) v SSHD [2024] EWHC 553 (Admin) and R (HR) v SSHD [2024] EWHC 786. The exception is R (Gurung) v SSHD [2025] UKUT 90 (IAC), which was brought and determined in the Upper Tribunal. However, as the issue of jurisdiction does not appear to have been raised in any of those cases they do not assist me in determining the question of jurisdiction in this claim.
Discussion
19. I have given careful consideration to the parties’ skeleton arguments and submissions on the issue of jurisdiction, and considered the authorities on which both sides rely.
20. The starting point is the Supreme Court decision in Munir. Munir was concerned with the withdrawal of a concessionary immigration policy (‘DP5/96’) which provided that deportation action should not normally be taken against parents of children who had accumulated seven years’ continuous residence. Lord Dyson, giving the judgment of the court, held (§44) that the power of the Secretary of State to make immigration rules and to grant and vary leave to enter and remain in the UK both under the rules and outside them derived from the Immigration Act 1971 and was not an exercise of the prerogative. Further, at §46 he held that the making of discretionary concessionary policies outside...
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