R (C) v Middlesbrough Council; A v Hoare and other appeals
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | BARONESS HALE OF RICHMOND,LORD CARSWELL,LORD BROWN OF EATON-UNDER-HEYWOOD,LORD WALKER OF GESTINGTHORPE,LORD HOFFMANN |
| Judgment Date | 30 January 2008 |
| Neutral Citation | [2008] UKHL 6 |
| Court | House of Lords |
| Date | 30 January 2008 |
and another (FC)
and others
Appellate Committee
Lord Hoffmann
Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe
Baroness Hale of Richmond
Lord Carswell
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
HOUSE OF LORDS
Appellants:
A: Alan Newman QC
Paul Spencer
(Instructed by DLA Piper UK LLP)
C: Elizabeth-Anne Gumbel QC
Henry Witcomb
(Instructed by Griffith Smith Farrington Webb)
X: Elizabeth-Anne Gumbel QC
Henry Witcomb
(Instructed by Bolt Burdon Kemp)
H: Nigel Cooksley QC
Stephen Field
(Instructed by BTMK LLP)
Young: Stuart Brown QC
Rosalind Coe
(Instructed by Sharpe Pritchard (for Jordans))
Respondents:
A: Christopher Sharp QC
Andrew McLaughlin
(Instructed by Atkins Law)
C: Kate Thirlwall QC
Steven Ford
(Instructed by Crutes)
X: Kate Thirlwall QC
Steven Ford
(Instructed by Browne Jacobson)
H: Kate Thirlwall QC
Steven Ford
(Instructed by Browne Jacobson)
Catholic Care: Edward Faulks QC
Nicholas Fewtrell
(Instructed by Hill Dickinson LLP)
Home Office: Nigel Wilkinson QC
Malcolm Sheehan
(Treasury Solicitors)
My Lords,
These six appeals all raise the question of whether claims for sexual assaults and abuse which took place many years before the commencement of proceedings are barred by the Limitation Act 1980. The general rule is that the period of limitation for an action in tort is six years from the date on which the cause of action accrues. This period derives from the Limitation Act 1623 and is now contained in section 2 of the 1980 Act. All the claimants started proceedings well after the six years had expired. It follows that, if section 2 applies, their claims are barred. But sections 11 to 14 contain provisions, first introduced by the Limitation Act 1975, which create a different regime for actions for "damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty", where the damages are in respect of personal injuries. In such cases the limitation period is three years from either the date when the cause of action accrued or the "date of knowledge" as defined in section 14, whichever is the later. In addition, section 33 gives the court a discretion to extend the period when it appears that it would be equitable to do so. The chief question in these appeals is whether the claimants come within section 2 or section 11. In the latter case, the claimants say either that the date of knowledge was less than three years before the commencement of proceedings or that the discretion under section 33 should be exercised in their favour.
In Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498 the House of Lords unanimously decided that section 11 does not apply to a case of deliberate assault, including acts of indecent assault. An action for an intentional trespass to the person is not an action for "negligence, nuisance or breach of duty" within the meaning of section 11(1). The lower courts are bound by this decision and have therefore held that the claimants are statute-barred. But the claimants submit that Stubbings was wrongly decided and that the House should depart from it in accordance with the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234.
In the context of limitation of actions, the phrase "negligence, nuisance or breach of duty" made its first appearance in the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, etc) Act 1954. The background to this enactment was the Report of the Committee on the Limitation of Actions 1949 (Cmd 7740) under the chairmanship of Lord Justice Tucker. The committee was particularly concerned with the fact that, as the law then stood, the general limitation period for tort actions (including claims for personal injuries) was six years but claims against public authorities had to be brought within one year. The committee thought that the first period was too long and the second too short. It recommended a period of two years for all personal injury claims, with a judicial discretion to extend it up to six years. In para 23 they said:
"We consider that the period of limitation we have recommended should apply to all actions for personal injuries, whether the defendant is a public authority or not. We do not think it is necessary for us to define 'personal injuries,' although this may possibly be necessary if legislative effect is given to our recommendations. We wish, however, to make it clear that we do not include in that category actions for trespass to the person, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or defamation of character, but we do include such actions as claims for negligence against doctors."
There are minor puzzles about why malicious prosecution or defamation of character were thought capable of causing personal injury or why doctors were singled out for mention, but the committee certainly seems to have intended to exclude actions for trespass to the person from their proposal. They did not explain why. The reason they gave for adopting a short period for personal injury claims ("the desirability of such actions being brought to trial quickly, whilst evidence is fresh in the minds of the parties and witnesses": para 22) would seem equally applicable to cases in which the cause of action is trespass. Perhaps they had in mind only intentionally inflicted injuries and thought that a defendant who caused deliberate injury should not have the benefit of a short limitation period.
When some years later Parliament implemented the report, it accepted the general principle of a single period of limitation for personal injury claims, whether against public authorities or private bodies. It also accepted that it should be shorter than six years. It did not however accept either the period of two years or the possibility of extension. Instead, it adopted a fixed period of three years. This was provided by section 2(1) of the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, etc) Act 1954:
"At the end of subsection (1) of section 2 of the Limitation Act 1939 (which subsection provides, amongst other things, that there shall be a limitation period of six years for actions founded on simple contract or on tort) the following proviso shall be inserted - 'Provided that, in the case of actions for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under a statute or independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to any person, this subsection shall have effect as if for the reference to six years there were substituted a reference to three years."
It will be seen that in defining the actions to which the three year period was to apply, Parliament adopted neither the simple concept of an action for personal injury (for which, as the committee had suggested, the Act provided a definition) nor the specific exclusions mentioned by the Tucker Committee, but spoke of "actions for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty…where the damages claimed…consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries".
The phrase "negligence, nuisance or breach of duty" was not entirely new. It had appeared in the Personal Injuries (Emergency Provisions) Act 1939, which had given the Minister power to make a scheme for making payments of compensation in respect of "war injuries" irrespective of fault. As the other side of the coin, section 3(1) extinguished common law claims for compensation or damages for such injuries when they were:
"on the ground that the injury in question was attributable to some negligence, nuisance or breach of duty for which the person by whom the compensation or damages would be payable is responsible."
The meaning of these words was briefly considered by the Court of Appeal in Billings v Reed [1945] KB 11, in which the plaintiff's wife had been killed by a negligently piloted RAF aeroplane. It was argued that, although this was a war injury, the language of section 3(1) did not exclude a claim based on trespass to the person. Lord Greene MR said, at p 19:
"It seems to me that in this context the phrase 'breach of duty' is comprehensive enough to cover the case of trespass to the person which is certainly a breach of duty as used in a wide sense."
Thus when Parliament used this phrase in the 1954 Act, it had already been judicially construed as having a wide meaning. Furthermore, Parliament added the parenthetical words "(whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under a statute or independently of any contract or any such provision)" which seem to stress its breadth.
A provision in words materially identical with those of section 2(1) of the 1954 Act was adopted by the legislature of the State of Victoria: see section 5(6) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Victoria). In Kruber v Grzesiak [1963] VR 621 Adam J had to consider whether the section covered an allegation of unintentional trespass to the person. The plaintiff, who had issued a writ claiming damages for personal injuries caused by negligent driving more than three years after the accident, wanted to amend the writ by adding a claim for trespass to the person based on the same facts. The judge said, at p 623:
"I would see no sufficient reason for excluding an action for trespass to the person] from the description of an action for damages for breach of duty, especially when it is provided that the duty may be one existing...
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