Verrier v DPP
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Lord Reid,Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest,Lord Pearce,Lord Upjohn,Lord Pearson |
| Judgment Date | 20 October 1966 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1966] UKHL J1020-2 |
| Date | 20 October 1966 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1966] UKHL J1020-2
House of Lords
Lord Reid
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest
Lord Pearce
Lord Upjohn
Lord Pearson
Upon Report from the Appellate Committee, to whom was referred the Cause Verrier against Director of Public Prosecutions (on Appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal), that the Committee had heard Counsel as well on Thursday the 21st, as on Monday the 25th, Tuesday the 26th and Wednesday the 27th, days of July last, upon the Petition and Appeal of Ronald Ernest Verrier, of 181 Peckham Rye East, London, S.E.15, praying. That the matter of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely, an Order of Her Majesty's Court of Criminal Appeal of the 15th of November 1965, might be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, and that the said Order might be reversed, varied or altered, or that the Petitioner might have such other relief in the premises as to Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, might seem meet; and Counsel having been heard on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Respondent in the said Appeal; and due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side in this Cause:
It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen assembled, That the said Order of Her Majesty's Court of Criminal Appeal, of the 15th day of November 1965 complained of in the said Appeal, be, and the same is hereby, Affirmed, and that the said Petition and Appeal be, and the same is hereby, dismissed this House.
My Lords,
For the reasons given by my noble and learned friend Lord Pearson I would dismiss this appeal.
My Lords,
For the reasons given by my noble and learned friend Lord Pearson I would dismiss this appeal.
My Lords,
I have had an opportunity of reading the opinion of my noble and learned friend Lord Pearson and entirely agree with it. I would dismiss the appeal.
My Lords,
I have had an opportunity of reading the opinion of my noble and learned friend Lord Pearson and entirely agree with it. I would dismiss the appeal.
My Lords,
This is an appeal with regard to the length of a sentence of imprisonment. The Appellant, having been convicted at the Central Criminal Court of conspiracy to defraud, was sentenced to imprisonment for seven years, and on appeal the sentence was upheld by the Court of Criminal Appeal. The Appellant now contends that a sentence of that length for the offence charged was unlawful or at the least improper and should be set aside or reduced.
In the indictment there was only one count, which was for conspiracy to defraud, and the Particulars of Offence were to the effect that a man named Edward Richard Anderson and the Appellant "conspired together and with one Dennis Bassett to cheat and defraud whatever insurance company might issue a policy of assurance on the life of the said Edward Richard Anderson by falsely pretending during the currency of such policy that the said Edward Richard Anderson had died at sea".
The conspiracy, of which both the accused were convicted, was broadly to the following effect. The Appellant and Anderson were both in the motor business and had transactions together in relation to cars. The Appellant, representing that the death of Anderson would cause him a very severe loss of business, insured the life of Anderson for £150,000. Then the scheme was that Bassett would take to sea a yacht called "Christine"; Anderson would go with him in the yacht, or pretend to do so, but would "disappear" and go to Ireland; the yacht would be sunk; then the Appellant would pretend to the insurers that Anderson had been drowned, and would collect the £150,000 and give a share of it to Anderson. In the event the yacht was sunk, but Bassett was drowned and his body was washed up on the Belgian coast. Anderson "reappeared" in England, and he and the Appellant were put on trial and convicted and sentenced. Anderson was sentenced to only two years' imprisonment. The jury had added to their verdict in the case of Anderson a recommendation of leniency.
In passing sentence at the Central Criminal Court the Common Serjeant described the conspiracy as "a gigantic, ambitious and indeed impudent fraud". He went on to say:
"The jury took the view, and I am in entire agreement with it, that it was you, Verrier, who was the prime mover in this proposed swindle. You having conceived your fraudulent scheme you persuaded a weaker and less intelligent man, your co-defendant, to co-operate with you."
Both the Appellant and Anderson appealed against conviction, and the Appellant appealed against sentence. In a reserved judgment, delivered by Mr. Justice Edmund Davies on the 8th October 1965, the Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed all the appeals, and said in relation to the sentence on the Appellant:
"This was a bold and wicked plot, cunningly conceived and, we entertain no doubt, frustrated only by events beyond Verrier's control. In our judgment, the sentence was not wrong in principle and it must stand."
Subsequently the Appellant applied to the Court of Criminal Appeal for leave to appeal to your Lordships' House and for the required certificate. The Court on the 15th November 1965 gave leave to appeal and certified that a point of law of general public importance was involved in the decision to dismiss the appeal against sentence, namely:
"Whether in the proper exercise of judicial discretion, a court can pass a sentence exceeding five years' imprisonment for conspiracy to defraud by false pretences in a case where, had the conspiracy been carried out, there could only have been one charge of obtaining by false pretences",
and held that the point was one which ought to be considered by this House. The suggestion of a possible limitation of the punishment to a maximum of five years' imprisonment is based on the fact that under section 32 of the Larceny Act 1916 and section 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 1948 the maximum punishment on one charge of obtaining money by false pretences is five years' imprisonment.
In the argument of the present appeal the Appellant's counsel, in addition to relying on the point of law referred to in the certificate of the Court of Criminal Appeal, which would make the maximum term of imprisonment in a case such as this five years, also put forward a contention, which was their primary contention, that the maximum term in a case such as this is only two years. This primary contention was supported on two grounds, which I will consider separately.
It was contended that there never has been at common law, although admittedly there has been under statutes, any power to impose imprisonment (at any rate for a misdemeanour) for any longer term than two years. Counsel gave an interesting outline of the history of imprisonment. He said that in early times it was not treated as a punishment in itself but was used in aid of the execution of punishments: for instance, if the defendant was ordered to pay a fine he might be kept in prison till the fine was paid, or if he was sentenced to be put in a pillory on several specified days he would be kept in prison for that purpose. In Tudor times, however, imprisonment came to be used as a punishment both by the Court of Star Chamber, and under statutory provisions by other courts. For instance, the statute 5 Elizabeth I ch. 9 sections 4 and 6 provided for persons convicted of procuring or committing perjury being punished by imprisonment for six months and by other penalties. At a later stage the courts were imposing imprisonment as a punishment, and were doing so by virtue of assumed common law power without statutory provision. There is no authority to support the contention on behalf of the Appellant that the common law power to impose imprisonment as a punishment was limited to a maximum of two years or by any other fixed term. There is authority to the contrary, showing that the length of the term of imprisonment was at large and in the discretion of the court. In the case of Wilkes (1763-70) 19 State Trials 1075, 1127, 1132, the third question put to the judges was:
"Whether a judgment of imprisonment against a defendant, to commence from and after the determination of an imprisonment to which he was before sentenced for another offence, is good in law?"
The answer of the judges was:
"We are of opinion that the defendant, being convicted of two offences, it was necessary that two judgments should be pronounced, one upon each information. Fine and imprisonment, or other corporal punishment, may be awarded for such offences as are contained in these informations. The kind, and the quantity, are left by the law to the discretion of the Court which passes the sentence; and that discretion is regulated by the nature of the offence and the circumstances which aggravate and extenuate it; by the state and condition of the delinquent, and the imprisonment he has already suffered: and that discretion is always exercised with that lenity and compassion which do so eminently distinguish the administration of criminal justice in this kingdom."
In Blackstone's Commentaries Book IV ch. 29 page 37 it is said:
"The discretionary fines and discretionary length of imprisonment, which our courts are enabled to impose, may seem an exception to this rule. But the general nature of the punishment, viz. by fine or imprisonment, is, in these cases fixed and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
[1] Henry Liu [2] Feng Huang Appellants v [1] Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Dominica [2] DPP [3] Comptroller of Customs Respondents [ECSC]
...delivered on 17 th June 2005 applied. Bhola Nandlal v The State [1995] 45 WIR 412 and Verrier v Director of Public Prosecutions (1967) 2 AC 195 applied. (2) The cross-appeal is allowed to the extent that the name of Gene Lawrence is restored to the conspiracy charges. (3) The appellants w......
-
R v Stewart (D)
...[2000] Crim. L.R. 506, referred to. (21) R. v. Simmonds, [1969] 1 Q.B. 685; [1967] 2 All E.R. 399, applied. (22) Verrier v. D.P.P., [1967] 2 A.C. 195; [1966] 3 All E.R. 568, applied. Legislation construed: Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Law (2000 Revision) (Law 15 of 1996, revised 2000), s.2(......
- R v Field
-
[1] Henry Liu [2] Feng Huang Appellants v [1] Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Dominica [2] DPP [3] Comptroller of Customs Respondents [ECSC]
...delivered on 17 th June 2005 applied. Bhola Nandlal v The State [1995] 45 WIR 412 and Verrier v Director of Public Prosecutions (1967) 2 AC 195 applied. (2) The cross-appeal is allowed to the extent that the name of Gene Lawrence is restored to the conspiracy charges. (3) The appellants w......