Vietnam in Asia: Strategy and Diplomacy in a New Context
| Author | David W.P. Elliott |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070208303800206 |
| Published date | 01 June 1983 |
| Date | 01 June 1983 |
DAVID
W.P.
ELLIOTT
Vietnam
in
Asia:
strategy
and
diplomacy
in
a
new
context
Although Vietnam
conducts
its
foreign
policy
in
accordance
with
relatively
fixed
ideological
and
strategic
maxims,
these
are
more
points
of
reference
than
rigid
policy
blueprints.
However
the
out-
side
world
may
perceive
the
'Prussians
of
the
Orient,'
the
Viet-
namese
see
themselves
as
a
small state
with
limited
options in
a
geopolitical framework
dominated
by
a
confederation
of
hostile
powers.
Vietnam's
emergence
as
an
international
'problem'
has
been
more
the
result
of
the
intersection
of
its
revolution
with
larger
regional
and
global
currents
than
the
consequence
of
its
own
ac-
tions
and
aspirations
within
Indochina.
Until
1975,
the
North's
leaders
were
absorbed
with
their
main
missions,
revolutionary
victory
and
national
reunification,
and
placed
foreign
policy ob-
jectives
in
this
context.
Since
1945,
the main
obstacle to
the
ful-
filment
of
these
goals
had
been
the
intervention
of
outside
powers.
As
a
result,
Vietnam's
foreign
policy
had
tended
to
consist
of
reac-
tive
strategies
devised
to deflect
and
deter
external
pressures
in
order
to
achieve
maximum
flexibility
for the
realization
of
its
goals.
Unlike
the
pre-1975
period,
however,
when
a
consuming
vision of
national
identity
was
at
stake,
Vietnam
must
now
focus
on
defending
its
national
interests
in
a
more
conventional
diplo-
matic
framework.
This
framework
may be
pictured
as a
series
of
concentric cir-
cles,
with
Vietnam
at
the
centre
and
Indochina,
the
Association
of
South-East
Asian
Nations
(ASEAN),
Asia,
and
the
global networks
of
the
great
powers
as
the
surrounding
spheres.
During
its
pro-
Associate
Professor of
Government
and
International
Relations,
Pomona
College,
Claremont,
California;
editor
of
The
Third
Indochina
Conflict
(198i).
288
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
tracted revolutionary
struggle
Vietnam
attempted
to
compensate
for
an
unfavourable
external
balance
of
forces
both
by
achieving
a
strong enough
internal
position
to
frustrate
the
external
powers
and
by
attempting
to
use
diplomatic
means
to
keep
those
powers
off
balance.
The
current
approach
is
similar,
but
there
are
some
important
differences.
Firstly,
the
problem
now
is
not
a
direct
threat
to
the
consum-
matory value
of
the
Vietnamese
revolution.
The
main
preoccupa-
tion
of
Hanoi
is
with
a
national
security
problem
which
is
a
real
but
indirect threat
to
the
revolutionary
order
in Vietnam.
A
rea-
sonable
case
could
be
made
that
the
issues
in
Kampuchea
and
Laos
are
just
as
important
to
Vietnam
as
its
own
revolution,
with
the
consequent implication
that
Vietnam
will
pursue
its
effort
to
ensure
that
both
countries
adopt
a
system
and
pursue
policies
com-
patible
with
the
wishes
of
Vietnam.
But
while
it
is
clear
that
Vietnam
will never
rest
easy
until
it
is
certain
that
it
has
complai-
sant
neighbours
in
Indochina, it
is
necessary
to separate concep-
tually the
problem
of
dealing
with
a
potential
external
security
threat and
the
question
of
defending
the
political
order
in
Viet-
nam
itself.
It
seems
self-evident
that
Vietnam
starts
from the
pre-
sumption
that
its
internal
regime
will
be
defended
at
all
costs
and
that
all
other
priorities
must
be
subordinate
to
that
end.
The
very
frequency with
which
Vietnam
pointed
to
the
'irreversible'
nature
of
the
political
change
in
Kampuchea
suggests
that
it
is
not
quite
as
self-evident
as
the
'irreversibility'
of
the
situation
in
Vietnam.
A
second
important
aspect
of
the
current
situation
is
the
ques-
tion
of
China.
The
changes
that
China's
shift
to
open
hostility
towards
Vietnam
have
occasioned
are
as
momentuous
as
the
con-
sequences
of
its
earlier rapprochement with the
United
States;
indeed
these
were
two
stages
in
a
process
which
has
fundamentally
altered
the
strategic calculus
of
the Vietnamese
leadership.
During
the
war
years
China
served
as
a
rear
bulwark
against
the
expan-
sion
of
the
war
(though
how
seriously
this
deterrent
was
meant
to
be
taken
is
an
open
question
in the
light
of
subsequent
events).
Now
Hanoi
views
China
as
the
core
problem
to
which
all other
security
issues
are
linked.
Some
of
Vietnam's
diplomatic
antago-
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