Appeals By Violeta Sadovska And Saleem Malik Against The Secretary Of State For The Home Department
| Jurisdiction | Scotland |
| Court | Court of Session |
| Judge | Lord Menzies,Lord President,Lady Clark Of Calton |
| Neutral Citation | [2016] CSIH 51 |
| Year | 2016 |
| Published date | 07 July 2016 |
| Date | 17 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | XA137/15 |

FIRST DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2016] CSIH 51
XA137/15 and XA138/15
Lord President
Lord Menzies
Lady Clark of Calton
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD CARLOWAY, the LORD PRESIDENT
in the Appeals
by
VIOLETA SADOVSKA and SALEEM MALIK
Appellants;
against
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent:
Act: Bovey QC, Byrne; Drummond Miller LLP
Alt: Webster; Office of the Advocate General
17 June 2016
Introduction
[1] These are appeals from a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), dated 6 February 2015, refusing appeals from a First Tier Tribunal decision, dated 19 August 2014, which upheld the respondent’s decision, dated 17 April 2014, ordering the removal of both appellants from the United Kingdom on the ground that they had attempted to enter into a marriage of convenience. This involved withdrawal of the right of the first appellant to remain in the UK as a European Union national under Article 35 of the Directive 2004/38/EC and a rejection of the second appellant’s claim for leave to remain based on his right to a family life. The appellants’ fundamental contention was that they had been in a genuine relationship since October 2012. Their intended marriage had not been one of convenience. The Tribunals, it is said, erred in a number of ways in determining otherwise.
The First Tier Tribunal
[2] The FTT prefaced its decision by stating that the burden of proof in immigration appeals is on the appellant and the standard is balance of probabilities. In human rights appeals, the appellant required to demonstrate an interference with a right, albeit that the respondent then required to show that it was justified.
[3] The FTT found in fact that the first appellant was aged 33 and a national of Lithuania. She had entered the UK in 2007 and, in 2011, came to live in Edinburgh, where she works as a cleaner. Her two sisters also lived in Edinburgh. The first appellant remained in the UK in exercise of her right of free movement as an European Union national. The second appellant was aged 30 and a national of Pakistan. He had entered the UK on a Tier 4 student visa in May 2011. He did not pursue his course of study. He came to Scotland. His visa required him to leave the UK in April 2013. Since that date, he has been in the UK without leave to remain.
[4] The FTT also found that the appellants had been together in the streets of Edinburgh at Hogmanay 2013. The appellants had attended the first appellant’s sister’s wedding in December 2013. The second appellant had booked a double room in a London hotel for two adults from 18 to 22 January 2014. The appellants were both in London at the same time in January 2014. On 25 March 2014, the appellants published a notice of their intention to marry on 17 April 2014 at Leith Registry Office. Notwithstanding this, on 28 March 2014, the appellants had signed a statement in the following terms:
“we have discussed the idea of living together in depth, and also have touched upon the subject of marriage, but as of yet, none of these discussions have manifested into action.”
The purpose of the document was unclear as at the hearing of the appeal.
[5] On 6 April 2014, the appellants had signed a joint lease of a flat. On 11 April 2014, the second appellant’s solicitor wrote to the respondent to advise that the appellants intended to marry on 17 April 2014, and that the second appellant was available to be interviewed before then. On 16 April 2014, at about 5.00pm, the appellants purchased two wedding rings.
[6] On 17 April 2014, the respondent’s officers interrupted the appellants’ planned ceremony at the Registry Office. They interviewed the appellants separately. Before each interview, the appellants were told that they were being investigated in relation to whether they had committed any offences under the Immigration Acts. They were cautioned that: “You are not obliged to say anything, but anything you do say will be recorded and may be used in evidence at a later stage”. They were asked whether they understood the caution. They said that they did. They were asked if they were happy to be interviewed in English. Both assented to that process and stated that they understood the officer.
[7] Both appellants were able to provide some basic information about each other. Both said that they had met in October 2012 at a named “disco”. According to the first appellant, after that they became friends. She did not provide any further information about the development of their relationship. The second appellant, on the other hand, said that the first appellant had stayed with him on the night that they had met. They had become boyfriend and girlfriend and had seen each other “every other day” since then.
[8] The first appellant was unable to say where the second appellant was from. She could not name his parents or any of his brothers and sisters. She stated that: her sisters had not attended the wedding because one had a baby and the other was working; her mother was not at the wedding because she was old (aged 59) and would have found it difficult to travel; she had not told her mother of the wedding; her mother had been at her sister’s wedding at Christmas; and she could give a name for one of the witnesses but not the other. The second appellant said that: he had met the first appellant’s mother at her sister’s wedding; her mother had been told of the wedding, but had been unable to attend because she was in Lithuania; he did not know her mother’s name, although he was able to name her sisters; and he did not know why one of her sisters had not been at the wedding, before saying that she had been busy.
[9] None of the first appellant’s relatives, notably her mother and sisters, were at the wedding. In her evidence to the FTT, she explained this by saying that it had been anticipated that the marriage would be stopped, as the second appellant was an over-stayer. The ceremony was a dry run with the appellants “trying their luck”. A bigger celebration would have been organised later.
[10] The FTT noted the discrepancies in the appellants’ interviews concerning the absence of the first appellant’s relatives and other matters. The judge commented upon the differences in the descriptions of their developing relationship. In addition, the photographs which the appellants had produced to demonstrate a continuing relationship from October 2012 had covered only the period December to January 2014. There was no reliable evidence of a romantic relationship prior to December 2013. The letters of support from friends, which had also been produced, were in similar terms and none of the authors had come to give evidence.
[11] The FTT held that the performance of the appellants at interview justified the respondent’s suspicion. Neither appellant demonstrated a knowledge of each other, which was consistent with a lifelong commitment to marriage or an intense romantic relationship for over a year. There was no evidence of any planning for the marriage. The FTT held that the appellants were not in a relationship, and certainly not a durable one. Since the first appellant was a party to a marriage of convenience, the respondent had been justified in revoking her residence card and ordering her removal. There was no family life involving the second appellant to be protected and no argument was presented on the basis of a private life.
The Upper Tribunal
[12] The appellants appealed to the UT on the ground that the FTT had based its decision on the interviews rather than the totality of the evidence as required by ECO, Nicosia v Papajorgji [2012] UKUT 38 (at para 39). Rather than look at the evidence as a whole, the FTT had taken the perceived conflicts between the interviews as a starting point and elevated their significance above all the other evidence. The FTT had not taken into account the first appellant’s view that she had been interviewed aggressively and without an interpreter. The first appellant had maintained that her English had not been of a sufficiently high standard to enable her to be interviewed. She had been scared by the hostility of the interview. This had caused her to become “very lost”. She had been “overwhelmed” and had “completely lost [her] confidence”. Her ability to converse in English and her state of mind had been “clearly of significance to the evidential weight to be placed on the interview”.
[13] The second appellant also complained about the first appellant’s interview without an interpreter. The...
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