Virdi v Law Society

Virdi V The Law Society.

: Mr Virdi appeals against a decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal on 26th October 2007 finding him guilty of five offences under the legislation that covers practising solicitors and ordering that he be suspended from practice for a period of 3 years from that date.

The hearing lasted over 15 days, spread over three separate weeks in May, July and October 2007. Following a lengthy retirement the Tribunal, which comprised three members, announced its decision on the concluding day of the hearing. The Chair (Miss Devenish) gave a short extempore judgment explaining the decision. Detailed reasons, running to 129 pages or thereabouts were not given until 13th October 2008, almost a year after the conclusion of the hearing. We have been given some explanation for this delay which, in my judgment, is both inordinate and inexcusable. The predominant reason for it appears to have been the illness of the clerk. A delay of this magnitude should not have occurred and reflects inadequate management of the Tribunal.

In the event I am not persuaded that the delay has caused any injustice to the appellant because he knew the decision of the Tribunal on 26th October 2007 and the basic reasons for it and his suspension still has another 20 months to run. I am quite unpersuaded that any lesser penalty should have been imposed or that he has any viable ground of appeal, whether occasioned by the delay or otherwise.

There was seven allegations against the appellant, of which five were found proved. Essentially they were that he had been guilty of conduct unbefitting a solicitor.

There was a co–defendant, Davinder Virdee (no relation), who was found guilty of one offence only and is not a party to this appeal.

Proceedings against the appellant began in August 2004. There were also proceedings against three other solicitors who had worked for the appellant, Mr Bridger, Mr Syan and, importantly, Mr Bamrah.

Everybody agreed that the hearing against Mr Bridger, Mr Syan and Mr Bamrah should take place first and the Tribunal so ordered. The cases against them were heard in 2005.

The Background

The appellant was born in 1951 and admitted as a solicitor in 1979.

At all material times the appellant and Davinder Virdee practised in partnership under the style of St Johns. The practice was founded by the appellant. The head office was at 6 Wellington Place, St John's Wood. There were also branch offices in Hounslow, Southall and St Anne's Terrace, St John's Wood.

The appellant was the sole equity partner, Davinder Virdee was a salaried partner. The practice employed a staff of 46 including five assistant solicitors. At one time there were five offices, two in Hounslow, two in St John's Wood, with the appellant operating primarily from Southall.

The Hounslow office was owned by Mr Bamrah, the appellant's nephew, the address being 686 —692 London Road, Hounslow. In late 1995 the appellant took over the premises and some files of Singh Garland & Wells of which Mr Bamrah was the sole proprietor. Thereafter Mr Bamrah worked for the appellant (as well as for his own firm) and Davinder Virdee, who had been working for Mr Bamrah's firm joined the appellant.

Mr Bamrah's practising certificate was terminated in May 1997, although he remained on the Roll of Solicitors.

The Law Society intervened into the appellant's firm of St John's on 20th March 2002. This followed two inspections of their books and documents in March 2000 and November 2001.

Mr Bamrah was found guilty of practising without a certificate and disreputable conduct and struck off the Roll of Solicitors. The Tribunal found that he had acted dishonestly.

The five allegations found proved against the appellant can be summarised as follows:

Charges (a) and (b) shutting his eyes to the realities of money laundering or other dishonest transactions that were going on through client accounts.

(c) Being a business to which the money laundering regulations applied, he failed to implement and maintain the necessary procedures.

(d) He allowed Mr Bamrah, who was his employee, to engage in transactions that had the characteristics of money laundering or financial fraud.

(e) He was grossly reckless in allowing Mr Bamrah to practice as a solicitor without a practising certificate.

At the conclusion of the hearing, in their decision, that is the extempore decision, the Tribunal said as to:

Allegation (a) There was ample documentary evidence to support the allegation which was also supported by the oral evidence of Miss Hartly, Mr Cotter and Mr Merrett.

Allegation (b) Again, there was documentary evidence. The appellant had control of accounts and must have authorised payment for such items as vehicles, school fees and cash. There was no evidence of an underlying legal transaction. Allegation (c) Procedures with regard to money laundering were implemented but not maintained. The appellant supervised Mr Bamrah whose files had not complied. He should have been alerted to what was going on and indeed he failed to act when asked by Davinder Virdee to do so.

Allegation (d) Mr Bamrah was employed in the widest sense. Allegation (e) The appellant was aware that Mr Bamrah did not have a practising certificate, following receipt of a letter from the Law Society of 14 December 1998. Furthermore Davinder Virdee raised this with him when she received a similar letter the following March. The Tribunal did not accept the appellant's evidence that he told Davinder Virdee to “sort it out”.

It was important for the Tribunal to decide whether the appellant's conduct had been dishonest or merely grossly reckless. The Tribunal said that it had grave concerns about the appellant's conduct. It did not believe him in all respects in relation to allegations (a), (b) and (d) but fell short of finding dishonesty proved. It did, however, find that he had been grossly reckless in respect of allegations (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e).

It seems to me that the findings that eventually emerged from the Tribunal, almost a year after the event, are in no way inconsistent with what the Tribunal said on 26th October 2007 but simply set out in great detail the history and background and summary of the evidence and the parties' submissions as well as fleshing out the findings of the Tribunal in greater detail at pages 117 —124.

Mr Beaumont's main ground of appeal, he having appeared for the appellant both in this court and below, which was argued first before us, relates to the Tribunal clerk, Mrs Elson. Essentially, Mr Beaumont's complaint is that she was inappropriately involved in the Tribunal's findings. The decision was not that of the Tribunal alone, he submits, but was influenced by a contribution from her.

This contention is to be found in ground (b) of the grounds which runs as follows:

“…it is understood that the judgment of the Tribunal was drafted in whole or in part by the Clerk to the Tribunal and not by the Tribunal members. This is understood to be the current practice of the Tribunal… the Clerk had no statutory or other legal power to take part in the decision-making process, still less to draft all or part of the Tribunal's judgment. The Appellant was entitled to be tried by a, 'Tribunal established by law' —(ECHR Art 6(1)). If the Clerk drafted any part of the judgment, that was a breach of… natural justice: the Appellant thought he was being tried by the Tribunal members and by no-one else. The Appellant has asked the Tribunal to confirm what part the Clerk played in the drafting of the Findings. If she played any part, the decision must be regarded as a nullity and should be quashed.”

As this ground reflects on the ordinary practice of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, leave was given to the Tribunal to intervene in the appeal and we have heard submissions from Mr Hopper QC on the issue.

We also have evidence from three witnesses, Mrs Whitfield, the deputy clerk to the Tribunal who was the clerk assigned to this case, Mrs Elson, the clerk to Tribunal and Miss Devenish, the panel member who chaired the proceedings. Mrs Whitfield explained that she had been deputy clerk to the Tribunal since 1998 having been admitted as a solicitor in 1982. Her evidence was:

“My notes from the 26th October 2007 indicate that the members were in retirement discussing their final decision in relation to liability for approximately six and a half hours. Once a consensus was reached the chairman drafted, with the assistance of the other members, a rather longer set of oral reasons to be read in open court than is normally the case. My contribution was to remind them, from my note, of comments and reasons made and given during the course of the lengthy discussion. It was this set of reasons, as should be apparent from the transcript, which formed the basis of my first draft of section 7 of the Findings. After hearing submissions in mitigation and also costs the members spent a further period of just under two...