Waters v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeLord Justice Waite,Lord Justice Swinton Thomas
Judgment Date03 July 1997
Judgment citation (vLex)[1997] EWCA Civ J0703-1
Docket NumberQBENI 95/1234/E
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
Date03 July 1997

[1997] EWCA Civ J0703-1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE

COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL AND

MR. JUSTICE WRIGHT

Royal Courts of Justice

Before:

Lord Justice Evans

Lord Justice Waite

Lord Justice Swinton Thomas

QBENI 95/1234/E

Eileen Annette Waters
Appellant
and
The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis
Respondent

MR. R. ALLEN Q.C. and MR. A. BUCHAN (instructed by Messrs Ole Hansen & Co., London, SE11) appeared on behalf of the Appellant/Plaintiff in both appeals

MR. SEABROOK Q.C. and MR. D. MACLEOD (instructed by the Solicitors' Department, Metropolitan Police) appeared on behalf of the Commissioner as Respondent/Defendant in the civil action.

MISS CARSS-FRISK (instructed by the Solicitors' Department, Metropolitan Police) appeared on behalf of the Commissioner Respondent/Defendant in the Employment Appeal Tribunal matter.

1

Evans L.J.

2

These appeals are from judgments in two separate proceedings in which the appellant, Eileen Annette Waters, is the plaintiff. She joined the Metropolitan Police as a probationer in May 1987. In February 1988 she was stationed at Harrow Road and was living at residential quarters known as the Robert Mark Section House next to Marylebone Police Sation. She was then aged 20.

3

She alleges, and for present purposes it is accepted that the allegation is correct, that in the early hours of 15 February 1988 she was visited by a police constable who was also stationed at Harrow Road. They went out for a walk together and when they returned to her room, she alleges that he raped and buggered her.

4

He plays no further part in the present story. Her claim in essence is that when she reported the matter to various of her superiors, they failed to take proper action in respect of her complaint ; that from then on she was subjected to harassment, unfair treatment and victimisation by other police officers of all ranks up to the Deputy Assistant Commissioner ; that she finally succumbed to ill-health which was directly caused by these experiences, in August 1992 ; and that the Commissioner, the respondent to the appeals, is directly or vicariously liable for this protracted period of ill-treatment. She claims both damages and an injunction which would restrain him "by officers and/or agents of the Metropolitan Police Force, or otherwise, from taking any steps that interfere with the proper course of the Plaintiff's duties as an officer of the Crown, and/or harassing or intimidating her in any way whatsoever".

5

She remains a police officer and a member of the Metropolitan Force, but she has not returned to duty since August 1992.

6

In September 1991, before she left, she commenced proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal claiming that she had been victimised and was entitled to relief under section 4 of the Sex Discrimination Act, 1975. Her claim was dismissed by the Industrial Tribunal and her appeal was dismissed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal (judgment dated 14 February 1995).

7

On 4 February 1994 she issued proceedings against the Commissioner in the High Court, claiming damages and the injunction quoted above. The Commissioner applied to have the action struck out under Order 18 Rule 19 or under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Master Prebble made such an order and the plaintiff's appeal was dismissed by Wright J. on 7 July 1995.

8

The two appeals, which we heard together, are against the E.A.T. judgment dismissing her Industrial Tribunal claim, and against Wright J's judgment striking out her common law claim. Mr Allen Q.C. appeared on behalf of the plaintiff in both appeals. Mr Seabrook Q.C. appeared for the Commissioner as respondent in the civil action, and Ms Carss-Frisk for him as respondent in the E.A.T. appeal. We are indebted to all three counsel for their helpful submissions.

9

I should describe first the facts so far as they are relevant to the E.A.T. claim. When that came before the Tribunal, counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary question of law. That was considered and decided against the appellant on the basis of an agreed statement of facts. This provides a convenient summary of the facts upon which she relies, and it is quoted in the judgment of Waite L.J.

10

In the civil proceedings, the facts are pleaded at much greater length. The bulk of the Statement of Claim, for 38 of its 41 pages, is a straightforward narrative of what, it is submitted, were the relevant events of the appellant's five-year period of service as a police constable. These pages are preceded by a summary of her claim, in paragraphs VII and VIII, which again can be quoted in full:-

11

"VII. However the Metropolitan Police and/or officers of the Metropolitan Police, both singly and/or in combination, have negligently and/or in breach of statutory duty and/or in breach of the above implied terms of her employment failed to deal properly or at all with her complaint in relation to this assault and her complaints about, subsequent matters, and have caused and/or permitted officers to maliciously criticise, harass, victimise, threaten, and assault and otherwise impress her as hereinafter set out. The Plaintiff will ask the Court to construe the facts and matters set out below as part of a course or course of conduct towards her, as well as individually.

12

VIII. Thereby they have prevented and/or limited the Plaintiff from carrying out her duties as an officer of the Crown to her fullest extent and have sought to persuade her or pressurise her into resigning from her office, and have made her ill."

13

The disadvantage of pleading the claim or claims in this way is that there is no clear statement of what facts are relied upon to constitute or support which cause of action. This criticism we hope is not mere pedantry, because as will appear below it is necessary for the purposes of the present application to identify what cause or causes of action the pleading does disclose. Mr Allen recognises the disadvantage, and helpfully he has produced various summaries of the factual allegations that are made. These do not go so far, however, as to link particular factual allegations with the specific causes of action that are said to be raised.

14

Mr Seabrook Q.C. submitted that in the light of Mr Allen's contentions on the appeal it appeared that the allegations of breach of statutory duty and of "breaches of implied terms of her employment" are no longer pursued, and this as we understand him Mr Allen accepts. There remain the allegations of negligence and of what may be called generally "harassment" (the second part of paragraph VII).

15

It also appears that there is a further limitation of the claim that the Commissioner and his officers acted unlawfully, and it comes about in this way. The narrative shows that an inquiry was carried out as a result of the appellant's allegations against the male police constable who, she alleges, sexually assaulted her on 15 February 1988, and that the results of the inquiry were placed before the Crown Prosecution Service, who decided not to bring criminal proceedings against him. The appellant does not allege, Mr Allen confirmed, that the Commissioner or any police officer is liable for the consequences of that decision, although she maintains her claim that the police inquiry was not properly and expeditiously carried out.

16

It now becomes necessary to summarise the 90 paragraphs of the factual narrative and to do so by reference to the pleaded allegations of negligence and/or harassment in the civil action. The most convenient sub-division is by reference to the periods during which she was stationed at different police stations. The name of each individual person, who is criticised, is underlined when first mentioned.

17

Harrow Road

18

On 3 March 1988 she complained of the alleged sexual assault to her reporting sergeant, Sgt. Griffiths. He advised her to refer herself to the Welfare Department.

19

One week later, on 10 March, she felt too distressed to attend a course training centre. She was "aggressively and wholly improperly reprimanded" by Chief Inspector Minear for failing to do so. On the next day she went to the Welfare Department and saw two civilian employees, Terry Oglethorpe and Mary Dunphy. They "failed to take her complaint seriously or deal with it properly". In particular, they did not put in train a disciplinary enquiry or call in the Complaints Investigations Bureau (CIB). She returned on 25 March and received the same "improper treatment" from Mary Dunphy. There was talk of her transferring to another station.

20

On 2 April, Chief Inspector Minear posted notice of her transfer to Gerald Road Police Station with effect from 5 April, without discussing the transfer with her and within the normal 28 day's notice. She spoke to Chief Superintendent Kruger who failed to take her complaint seriously but did call in a Home beat officer Margaret Pieters who was the Police Federation officer for Paddington. The appellant spoke to Ms Pieters about the original incident, and PC Cronin interrogated her "improperly and aggressively" about it. Chief Supt. Kruger decided that she should be medically examined.

21

Gerald Road

22

Inspector Richens told her that she was known to have made an allegation against another officer, and she was ostracised by other officers. On 9 May she saw Chief Superintendent Iles and Sgt. Edwardes who contacted the CIB and ordered her to go to the Hendon Medical Centre. She was taken there under escort and "treated like a prisoner". On the following day she was interviewed by Det. Supt. Scard (Ms. Scard) and Det.Sgt. Hole from the CIB. They were hostile and intrusive and did not interview her properly, being...

To continue reading

Request your trial
37 cases
  • Newham London Borough Council v Conwell
    • United Kingdom
    • Employment Tribunal
    • Invalid date
    ...[1981] 2 WLR 636, CA. Telephone Information Services Ltd v Wilkinson [1991] IRLR 148, EAT. Waters v Commr of Police of the Metropolis [1997] ICR 1073, AppealThe applicant appealed from a decision of an employment tribunal that a decision of his employer, a local authority, not to allow a bl......
  • A v B: 1801568/2016
    • United Kingdom
    • Employment Tribunal
    • 3 November 2021
    ...written submissions refers to Jones v Tower Boot Co Limited [1997] IRLR 168 and Waters v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] IRLR 589. In each of these cases, the issue of the meaning of the phrase “in the course of employment” in section 109(1) (or its predecessor was consi......
  • Majrowski v Guy's and St Thomas's NHS Trust
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 16 March 2005
    ...s.1. This is not an Act which, … was designed to create another level of liability in employment law where, as Lord Hutton pointed out in the Waters case, 1 employees are already adequately protected by the common law." The broad issue—whether an employer may be civilly vicariously liable f......
  • French and Others v Chief Constable of Sussex
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 28 March 2006
    ...a full hearing on the facts. This was a developing area of the law. Mr Glancy cited the observation of Lord Slynn in Waters v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 WLR 1607 at p. 1613: "It has been said many times that the law of negligence develops incrementally so that the fac......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT