We now know … a little bit more: Canada’s Cold War defectors
| Author | Timothy Andrews Sayle |
| Published date | 01 June 2021 |
| Date | 01 June 2021 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00207020211016451 |
| Subject Matter | Lessons of History |
Lessons of History
We now know ...a little
bit more: Canada’s Cold
War defectors
Timothy Andrews Sayle
University of Toronto
Abstract
Igor Gouzenko’s defection might have been the first—and most famous—of the Cold
War in Canada, but it was hardly the last. Recently opened after Access to Information
Act requests made by the Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project, a number of
records cast brighter light on this aspect of Canada’s intelligence history. This article
offers an overview of how the Government of Canada established its policy to manage
defection and those who defected. It offers a number of possible leads for future
research projects, some, but not all, of which, will require the release of further mate-
rial, whether under the Access to Information Act or a broader declassification frame-
work from the Government of Canada.
Keywords
Defectors, espionage, Cold War, Canada, Lester B. Pearson, Joint Intelligence Bureau,
CIA, MI6, intelligence, Louis St. Laurent
The Cold War began, at least in part, with a Soviet defector seeking refuge
in Canada.
1
Igor Gouzenko’s decision to swap his allegiance, trading East for
Corresponding author:
Timothy Andrews Sayle, Department of History, University of Toronto, 100 St. George Street, Toronto,
Ontario, M5S 3G3, Canada.
Email: tim.sayle@utoronto.ca
International Journal
2021, Vol. 76(2) 298–314
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DOI: 10.1177/00207020211016451
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1. On Gouzenko’s defection and the origins of Canada’s Cold War, see Robert Bothwell, “The Cold
War and the curate’s egg,” International Journal 53, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 407–418.
West—and the documents that came with him—revealed active Soviet espionage
in Canada and elsewhere.
2
Gouzenko’s defection might have been the first—and
most famous—of Canada’s Cold War, but it was hardly the last. Recently opened
in response to Access to Information Act requests filed by the Canadian Foreign
Intelligence History Project, other records cast brighter light on this aspect of
Canada’s intelligence history. Files on individual defectors remain closed, but
piecing together recently opened material makes it possible to sketch the contours
of Canadian policy regarding defectors in the early Cold War.
3
We now know how many defected to Canada from 1945 to 1962, and from
where. We also know how many defectors to other countries, including (but not
limited to) the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), were ultimately
settled in Canada in those same years.
4
Canada developed its system for obtaining intelligence from defectors as a
“defence against help,” making sure that allied intelligence officers did not conduct
such work on Canadian soil.
5
But the most important driver of Canada’s defector
policy was to ensure that the Government of Canada had intelligence to trade with
their larger, more productive intelligence allies. Canadian diplomats identified
potential defectors abroad, and when those from Communist countries did
defect, these individuals were interrogated for intelligence information.
6
That
information was then passed to Canada’s main intelligence allies, the UK and
the US, and later, Australia. Foreign allied intelligence services helped develop
many of the questions that Canadian interrogators (or interviewers) put to defec-
tors. While the Government of Canada has always been a net recipient of intelli-
gence in allied relationships, Canada’s defector policy allowed Canadian officials
one opportunity to give, rather than take, intelligence information.
What follows is a patchwork, likely incomplete given the records that are still
inaccessible, of how the Government of Canada managed defections—and those
who defected. It outlines what we know, not from extrapolation or off-the-record
newspaper stories, but from open archival records. It offers a survey of what open
2. A set of documents related to Gouzenko, including copies of the documents he brought from the
Soviet Embassy, can be found at “The Corby Case (Igor Gouzenko),” Canada Declassified,
University of Toronto Libraries. Available at: https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/exhibits/sh
ow/gouzenko/introduction (accessed May 21, 2021).
3. All of the documents cited below with an identifier number (i.e., CDDF00001) can be found online
at Canada Declassified, University of Toronto Libraries. Available at: https://declassified.library.
utoronto.ca/exhibits/show/defectors (accessed May 20, 2021). For more information about the
Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project, contact the author or visit https://carleton.ca/
csids/canadian-foreign-intelligence-history-project/ (accssed May 21, 2021).
4. See details on defector nationalities and origins in “Interdepartmental Committee on Defectors,”
memorandum for the JIC, 2 May 1962. Library and Archives Canada, Record Group [hereafter
RG] 24, vol. 12873, file: 1216-J2-3, part 5. CDDF00005.
5. See Philippe Lagass
e’s excellent explanation of the theory in “Nils Ørvik’s ‘Defence against help’:
The descriptive appeal of a prescriptive strategy,” International Journal 65, no. 2 (June 2010): 463–
474.
6. For an overview of the Canadian Foreign Intelligence Interview Program, see Kurt Jensen,
“Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program, 1953–90,” Intelligence and National Security 19,
no. 1 (Spring 2004): 95–104.
Sayle 299
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