When identity meets strategy: The development of British and German anti-torture policies since 9/11
| Published date | 01 March 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00108367231184723 |
| Author | Janina Heaphy |
| Date | 01 March 2024 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367231184723
Cooperation and Conflict
2024, Vol. 59(1) 66 –85
© The Author(s) 2023
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DOI: 10.1177/00108367231184723
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When identity meets strategy:
The development of British
and German anti-torture
policies since 9/11
Janina Heaphy
Abstract
Since 9/11, considerable research has been done on US interrogation and detention operations,
but comparatively little is known about the involvement of other traditionally liberal states’
intelligence agencies and their evolving perspectives on torture-related policies for foreigners
abroad. Particularly, the United Kingdom and Germany provide interesting cases; despite similar
levels of public and political pressure regarding their indirect involvement in Central Intelligence
Agency’s operations, the two states took different strategic decisions in 2010 on whether to
implement new extraterritorial human rights safeguards. While the United Kingdom introduced
a new intelligence guidance for interrogations overseas, the German government opted for
policy-continuance, which raises the question why the two states embarked on different policy
trajectories, even if they found themselves in contextually similar situations and were subjected
to the comparable accountability measures. By bridging insights from Rationalist and normative
literature, the article addresses this conundrum by clearly outlining the states’ differing strategic
preferences, and by dissecting the multi-layered composition of these interests. As a result, the
article delineates how strategic constraints pertaining to the states’ national, international, or
political elite level affect decision-makers’ policy responses.
Keywords
convention against torture, counterterrorism, foreign policy, Germany, human rights, identity,
rational-choice, UK
Introduction
Why should states refrain from torturing foreigners abroad? A question seemingly easy
to answer and yet one that often sparks debates, as illustrated by the different outcomes
of British and German policymaking during the first decade of the War on Terror.
Corresponding author:
Janina Heaphy, Friedrich Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Kochstraße 4, 91054 Erlangen, Germany.
Email: janina.heaphy@fau.de
1184723CAC0010.1177/00108367231184723Cooperation and ConflictHeaphy
research-article2023
Article
Heaphy 67
Although both countries similarly pride themselves with being democratic advocates
for human rights, both states, in the aftermath of 9/11, grew complicit to the Central
Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Detention and Interrogation Program by enabling rendi-
tion flights via their respective air spaces and by providing vital information and ques-
tion sets to the US agency (European Parliament, 2006). Although individual numbers
and official accounts of breaches vary, the public and international backlash against the
states’ intelligence services manifested in similar ways: The European Union (EU)
called out both countries for their active complicity (European Parliament, 2006); both
the German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) and the British Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS) were publicly shamed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs; Amnesty
International, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2006); both states’ parliaments confirmed
indirect violations of the Convention against Torture (CAT); and both countries experi-
enced moderate waves of public protest throughout the early 2000s.
Notwithstanding the similar degrees of backlash against their intelligence agencies’
conduct, the policy reactions of each country differed greatly: While David Cameron
issued an interrogation guidance for overseas missions in 2010, the German government
withstood any demands for similar reforms. This is not to say that Cameron’s guidance
constituted a benevolent panacea against torture; in fact, it has been severely criticized as
window-dressing and has been since updated. Nonetheless, it suggests that the British
government perceived a policy-change as strategically beneficial, while its German
counterpart seemingly did not. Considering this apparent contradiction, it is necessary to
explain why the two states embarked on different policy trajectories to better understand
the effectiveness of shaming and other traditional means of accountability.
In Human Rights literature, such differences in state behavior are explained through
the actors’ degree of norm internalization (Sikkink, 2013), or the role of international
organizations in holding states accountable (Creamer and Simmons, 2019; Johansen,
2020). Intelligence Studies, however, suggest the country-specific evolution of counter-
terrorism paradigms as potential reason for divergence (Luban, 2007). In addition, schol-
ars have defined “complicity” in the context of torture as referring to any “secondary
actor [. . .] not participating directly in the crime but [making] a contribution to its com-
mission” (Gaskarth, 2011: 947), without considering the implications of such behaviors
on policymaking. Although the literature offers valuable insight into states’ motivation
for (non-)compliance with the international ban on torture, neither approach can identify
an observable cause for the countries’ diverging conclusions despite responding to simi-
lar forms and degrees of (inter-)national pressure and sharing similar norms as well as
counterterrorism paradigms.
Consequently, this article contributes to the academic debate in the following five
ways. It (1) enhances the empirical knowledge about states’ strategic policymaking pro-
cesses in the aftermath of security-related complicity in human rights violations. By
enriching rationalist insights with normative literature, the (2) article illustrates the inter-
play of a state’s identity and strategic preferences, accounting thus for country-specific
multi-layered strategic constraints. Yet, it differs from similar research by not considering
identity as one-size-fits-all approach, but rather (3) scrutinizes three different dimensions
of the concept as well as their respective impact on the state actors’ strategic calculations.
In addition, (4) the focus on the torture norm contributes to ongoing academic debates on
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