Who commits the most to NATO? It depends on how we measure commitment
| Author | Kendall W Stiles,Scott Cooper |
| Published date | 01 November 2021 |
| Date | 01 November 2021 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320980820 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Who commits the most to NATO?
It depends on how we measure commitment
Scott Cooper
Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University
Kendall W Stiles
Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University
Abstract
Studies of NATO rely heavily on military spending as a fraction of GDP as the keyindicator of members’ contribution
to the alliance,but a growing number of scholarshave challenged this approach.We suggest that each member’s public
goods provision is a better measure of commitment to the alliance. In the case of post-Cold War NATO, out-of-area
troop deployments (adjusted forpopulation) constitute oneof the strongest indicatorsof a state’s contribution to public
goods. Providing troops for NATO missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the clearest
signals of high commitment to the alliance. Using deployment data from 2004 to 2018, we show that there isevidence
of disproportionate burden-sharing within the alliance. Countries like Slovenia, Denmark, the USA and UK con-
tributed far moreto NATO deployments than otherslike Turkey, Spain, Poland, andPortugal. We also use the data to
begin examining possible causes of these disparities. We find that wealthier countries, countries that spend more on
their militaries, and newer alliance members are more likely to contribute. Our indicator and first-cut model open
avenues for further research on why some members demonstrate higher commitment to NATO than others.
Keywords
alliances, burden-sharing, NATO
Burden-sharing in NATO has been front-page news in
the USA ever since candidate Donald Trump made the
argument thatthe allies’ failure to pay their fair sharemade
the alliance a bad deal for the USA (Washington Post
Staff, 2016). While some European leadersconceded they
could increase defense spending, European Commission
President Jean-Claude Juncker pushed back: ‘If you look
at what Europe is doing in defence, plus development aid,
plus humanitarian aid, the comparison with the United
States looks rather different. Modern politics cannot just
be about raising defence spending’ (Reuters, 2017).
This current political discussion ties into longstanding
scholarly debates about burden-sharing within NATO.
For example, Sandler & Shimizu (2014) argue that in
the early 2000s burden-sharing has become less equal
and that weaker, poorer members have begun to exploit
wealthier, more powerful members. They suggest that
the United States in particular is bearing a
disproportionate load – at least in data through 2010 –
which could damage the long-term cohesion of the
alliance.
Both policy and academic debates hinge in part on
how we measure burden-sharing, the level of each mem-
ber’s contribution to the alliance. Studies of burden-
sharing in NATO rely heavily on military spending as
a fraction of GDP as the key indicator of a country’s
willingness to contribute to the alliance (Oneal, 1990;
Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994; Mihalka, 2005; Kim-
ball, 2010; Oma, 2012; Zyla, 2016). Despite frequent
scholarly critiques of the military spending indicator,
1
it
Corresponding author:
scott_cooper@byu.edu
1
See references in the next section ‘Literature review’.
Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(6) 1194–1206
ªThe Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343320980820
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