Why Does Canada Have Armed Forces?
| Author | W.A.B. Douglas |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070207503000205 |
| Date | 01 June 1975 |
| Published date | 01 June 1975 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
W.A.B.
DOUGLAS
Why
does
Canada
have
armed
forces?
Why do
peace-loving,
anti-military
Canadians
support
fairly
large
regular, voluntary,
peacetime
forces?
Some
are
unwilling
to
raise
the
question.
They
say
that
if
you
start probing
too
deeply,
you
may
find
out
you
don't
need
armed
forces
at
all.
J.L.
Granatstein,
for
instance,
in
his
comments on
Defence
in
the
7os,
the
1971
white
paper,
says:
'Our
armed
forces
are
now to
have
as
their
primary
task
the
maintenance
of
public
order
-
which
can
only
mean
the
maintenance
of
the
political
status quo
...
Better
to
have
no
armed
forces
at
all;
better
even
to
have
armed
forces
preparing
at great
expense
to
fight wars
that
will
never
come.
The
white
paper
marks
a
fateful
turn
in
our
history
as
a
nation.
But
how
awful
that
its
issuance passed
with
scarcely
a
complaint.',
This
argument,
sincere
as
it
is,
does
not
take
into
account
the
diverse
points
of
view
expressed
in
the
course
of
much
probing
which
has
taken
place
over the past
twenty-five
years.
Canada's
official
his-
torians
have
been
engaged
in
research
that
bears
directly
and
indirectly
on the
question,
why
do
we
have
-
not
why
do
we
need
but
why
do
we
have
-
armed
forces.
In
the
same
period
publica-
tions
in
history
and
the
social
sciences
have
thrown
more
light
on
Canadian
defence policies
and
problems
than
ever
before.
It
is
a
weakness
of
defence
policy
that
decisions
seem to
be
Director, Directorate
of
History,
National
Defence
Headquarters,
Ottawa;
the
author
is
at
present
working
on
the
official
history
of
the
Royal
Canadian
Air
Force.
The
author
would like
to
acknowledge
the
useful
comments
of
RA.
Preston,
C.P.
Stacey,
J.L.
Granatstein,
B.
Greenhous,
and
Norman
Hillmer
on an
earlier
draft
of
this
paper.
The
views
expressed
are those
of
the
author.
x
'Defence
in
the
7os:
Comments
on the
White
Paper,'
Behind
the
Headlines,
xxx
(October
1971),
12.
260
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
made from
crisis
to
crisis.
The
people
who
matter
in
military
policy-making often
believe
that
the
past simply
does
not
apply,
and
questions
that
scholars
ask
tend
to
be
ignored
by
men
of
action
who
demand
quick
solutions.
Quick
solutions
are
not
always
easy
to
justify,
however.
When detente
seems
to
lessen
the
apparent
military
threats
to
a
country,
when armed
forces
are
experiencing
a
significant
reduction in strength,
and
when
at
the
same
time
armed
conflict
shows
no
evidence
of
becoming
less
im-
portant
in
the
conduct
of
human
affairs,
hasty
decisions
simply
cannot
be made.
At
a
moment
like this
it is
helpful
to take
a
careful
backward look.
A
useful
point
of
departure
is
offered
by
C.P. Stacey's
claim
that
'it
has
been
mainly
through
her
armed
forces
that
Canada
has
made
her
influence
felt in
the
world
at
large.'
2
I
There
is
no
need
to
elaborate
on military
roles.
The
message
is
clear from
Defence
Committee
proceedings
and
departmental
white
papers,
as
it
has
been
since
the
end
of
the
nineteenth
cen-
tury, that
Canada
cannot
defend itself
from
direct military
attack.
Security
has
depended
on
friendship and
co-operation,
principally
with
the Commonwealth
and
the
United
States.
James
Eayrs
has
thus
poked
fun
at Colonel
J.
Sutherland
Brown's
Defence
Scheme
Number
One
which
appeared
in
the
192os. It
was
a
contingency
plan
for
a response
to
American invasion,
and
with faint
echoes
of
the
War
of
1812,
proposed
flying
columns
to
thrust
into
United
States
territory.
The
thought
may seem
amusing
or
preposterous,
but
R.A.
Preston
has
pointed
to the
existence of
discussions
of
plans
for
an
American
invasion of
Canada
in
the
193os
as
a
basis
for
American
general
mobilization.
3
It
would
be
facile
to
attribute
all
this
to
the
'military
mind'
and
its
well-known
limitations
and
2
C.P.
Stacey,
foreword
to
D.J.
Goodspeed,
ed,
The
Armed
Forces of
Canada,
1867-z967:
A
Century
of
Achievement
(Ottawa
1967).
3
James
Eayrs,
In
Defence
of
Canada,
i,
From
the
Great
War
to
the
Great
Depression
(Toronto
1964),
71-8;
R.A.
Preston,
'Buster
Brown
Was
Not
Alone:
American
Plans
for
the
Invasion
of
Canada,
1919-1939,'
Canadian
Defence
Quarterly,
in
(1974),
47-58;
private
information.
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