Why Was There a Hard Brexit? The British Legislative Party System, Divided Majorities and the Incentives for Factionalism
| Published date | 01 February 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00323217221076353 |
| Author | Thomas Quinn,Nicholas Allen,John Bartle |
| Date | 01 February 2024 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217221076353
Political Studies
2024, Vol. 72(1) 227 –248
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00323217221076353
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Why Was There a Hard Brexit?
The British Legislative Party
System, Divided Majorities and
the Incentives for Factionalism
Thomas Quinn1, Nicholas Allen2
and John Bartle1
Abstract
The UK parliament of 2017–2019 had to decide what form of Brexit, if any, it would accept in the
government’s negotiations with the EU over a withdrawal agreement. Despite a large majority
of MPs having supported Remain in the 2016 referendum, with most opposed to a ‘hard’ Brexit
of looser ties between the UK and the EU, all attempts to pass a ‘soft’ Brexit failed. The final
withdrawal agreement reflected a hard Brexit that was closer to the preferences of a 28-strong
group of Eurosceptic Conservative MPs than to those of any other party or faction in a 650-
seat parliament. This article identifies the two-party system for government as a crucial variable
in explaining this unexpected outcome. Governments seek majorities from among their own
MPs rather than relying on the uncertain support of the opposition. This not only makes party
cohesion vital, but also creates leverage for organised factions to hold sway.
Keywords
Brexit, withdrawal agreement, parliament, two-party system, factions
Accepted: 6 January 2022
The European Union Referendum Act 2015 required the government to hold a referen-
dum on the UK’s membership of the EU by late-2017. The pre-legislative nature of the
referendum meant that, although the UK’s decision to leave the EU was taken in 2016, the
terms of exit would be settled by the government in consultation with the EU. That set the
scene for a struggle between Leavers and Remainers in the UK parliament over what type
of deal to seek from the EU. The hung parliament of 2017–2019 contained (1) a large
minority of pro-Remain opposition MPs seeking a second referendum; (2) a smaller
minority of mainly Conservative ‘hard’ Brexiteers; and (3) loyalist government MPs and
1Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester, UK
2Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK
Corresponding author:
Thomas Quinn, Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK.
Email: tquinn@essex.ac.uk
1076353PSX0010.1177/00323217221076353Political StudiesQuinn et al.
research-article2022
Article
228 Political Studies 72(1)
pragmatic opposition MPs prepared to settle for a ‘soft’ Brexit, where the UK would leave
the EU but retain strong ties (Bale, 2020; Lynch, 2020; Russell, 2021; Whitaker, 2020).
Such settings are usually ripe for a middle-ground compromise, given the lack of support
for more polarised options. Yet parliament repeatedly rejected various forms of soft
Brexit, such as former prime minister, Theresa May’s, negotiated Brexit deal, a customs-
union or continued single-market membership (Rutter and Menon, 2020). Instead, a rival
Brexit deal, negotiated by May’s successor, Boris Johnson, was notably ‘harder’ and
endorsed by parliament. How can this outcome be explained?
Existing research has detailed the chaotic events and institutional manoeuvres that
characterised the failed attempts by May’s government to pass its negotiated withdrawal
agreement (Russell, 2021). Both major and most minor parties took decisions that reduced
the possibility of soft Brexit (Rutter and Menon, 2020). This article does not contest these
arguments, but takes the explanation back one stage to the structure of the political system
and its location on the executives-parties dimension (Lijphart, 2012), which determines
how different intra- and/or inter-party preferences are resolved into government policy. In
Britain’s majoritarian democracy, power is institutionally concentrated and usually exer-
cised by single-party governments (Powell, 2000). This incentivises leaders to maintain
party cohesion and factions to exploit that fact to secure policy gains.
This article argues that the UK’s legislative party system, premised on the alternation
of single-party Conservative and Labour governments, played a decisive role in both
constraining and permitting policy outcomes. More specifically, the incentives for intra-
and inter-party competition associated with two-partism helped to foreclose a softer
Brexit. On one hand, governments in two-party systems have strong incentives to seek
majorities exclusively from among their own MPs and avoid cross-party compromises.
Doing so maintains their distinctive electoral offering, excludes other parties and helps
preserve both major parties’ alternating duopoly on power. On the other hand, factions
within governing parties can be incentivised to withhold their support and attempt to shift
policy towards their own preferred points. These incentives are always in tension because
major parties in two-party systems are ‘broad churches’ with considerable preference
heterogeneity among their MPs. These incentives were acutely in tension in the 2017–
2019 parliament, partly because of the range of preferences over Brexit within the gov-
erning Conservative Party and partly because the Conservatives governed as a minority.
Yet, it was not the absence of a majority per se that prevented May’s government passing
its Brexit deal; it was the relative size of the hard-Brexit Tory faction, which enabled it to
achieve its goal. This article uses a spatial model to show how.
The article makes four contributions. First, it adds to the literature on Brexit, one of
the major events in post-war UK politics. The process of securing Brexit has attracted
considerable comment, whether the referendum, the UK–EU negotiations, or the par-
liamentary and legal struggle (Aidt et al., 2021; Clarke et al., 2017; Matthews, 2017;
Russell, 2021; Weale, 2017). Second, the article contributes to the understanding of UK
executive–legislative relations more broadly (Benedetto and Hix, 2007; Cox, 1987;
King, 1976; Russell and Cowley, 2018; Tsebelis, 2002). The Westminster system is eas-
ily caricatured as one in which the government dominates parliament. The hung parlia-
ment of 2017 challenged that interpretation, but more fundamentally, so did the
weakened internal cohesion of the governing party (Russell, 2021; see Cowley, 2005;
Lynch and Whitaker, 2013; Norton, 1975). Third, the article illuminates the role of fac-
tions within legislative parties (Ceron, 2019; Rose, 1964). Finally, the article treats the
legislative party system (Aldrich, 2011; Dewan and Spirling, 2011; Kam, 2014; Saalfeld
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