A wider view of knowledge
| Pages | 357-363 |
| Date | 01 December 2001 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/01435120110406273 |
| Published date | 01 December 2001 |
| Author | Stuart Hannabuss |
| Subject Matter | Library & information science |
A wider view of
knowledge
Stuart Hannabuss
Introduction
People keep telling me about knowledge
management. A wide literature has grown up
around it. Companies set up new structures
(e.g. virtual teams) and systems (e.g.
groupware and collaborative decision making)
to reflect it. Books on organisational learning
are full of it. Skills audits set out to identify
the special skills needed by people who handle
it. New titles are created for them such as
``knowledge officer'' and ``knowledge
strategist''.
What strikes anyone reading and doing all
this is how rational everyone claims to be.
Rationalistic is probably a better word. This is
based on two assumptions. First, that
knowledge is some kind of growth from raw
data and systematically organised
information. Second, that organisations are
rational structures and processes engaged in
rational decision-making and problem
solving, in control and co-ordination and
profit-seeking. What we have, then, is a
pervasive belief that knowledge, as
commodity and process and activity, can be
``managed'', above all in organisations.
Beyond that is a third assumption, which I am
too modest to explore, that rationally ordered
management reflects rationally ordered
societies.
Is that all?
A hard look at this reveals how simplistic it
really is. Where, for instance, do we go after
we have got knowledge, assuming we can go
beyond it. Knowledge, of course, is not one
thing operating at one level, and many
religious systems argue that knowledge should
lead to wisdom, or why bother? Such wisdom
contains self-knowledge, and knowledge of
knowledge (or meta-knowledge). That takes
us into epistemology, the study of the grounds
of knowledge. So we have certainly got to deal
with this link between knowledge and
wisdom, if we are to arrive at a coherent
understanding of knowledge.
We then begin to ask how we know
knowledge when we meet it. Say, in a
corporate environment, where decisions are
made and problems solved: how do we find
evidence that knowledge is at work? Not just
information (masses of statistical, financial,
performance-related, in-house and external
The author
Stuart Hannabuss is Lecturer in Management,
The Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, Scotland.
E-mail: s.hannabuss@rgu.ac.uk
Keywords
Knowledge management, Information management,
Epistemology, Philosophy
Abstract
Argues that current discussion about knowledge
management begs the question as to what ``knowledge''
actually is. Suggests that definitions are usually based
upon assumptions about rationality and objectivity,
making knowledge propositional and its epistemology
non-intuitive. Highlights the way in which ends-means
and duty-based factors help to shape knowledge and give
it a strong ethical dimension. Argues that traditional
managerial paradigms benefit from a wider interpretation
of knowledge, as one where greater attention to how it is,
as well as what it is, matter to people in organisations.
Turns to Asian philosophical views of knowledge,
suggesting that knowing and being and acting come
closer together in them, and that decision making without
such wider epistemological warrants is flawed, above all
in environments claiming to exteriorise tacit knowledge
into explicit knowledge.
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357
Library Management
Volume 22 .Number 8/9 .2001 .pp. 357±363
#MCB University Press .ISSN 0143-5124
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