Wright v Croydon London Borough Council
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice Jacob,Lord Justice Hughes,Lord Justice Tuckey |
| Judgment Date | 10 April 2008 |
| Neutral Citation | [2008] EWCA Civ 607 |
| Date | 10 April 2008 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Docket Number | Case No: B5/2008/0089 |
[2008] EWCA Civ 607
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE EADY)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Tuckey
Lord Justice Jacob
Lord Justice Hughes
Case No: B5/2008/0089
Mr J Holbrook (instructed by the Housing Legal Team) appeared on behalf of the Appellant
Mr A Lane (instructed by Wandsworth & Merton Legal Centre) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
This is a second appeal by permission of Chadwick LJ who said, and I agree, that it raises an important point of principle. The facts giving rise to the point are simple and will not be uncommon.
On 5 September 2003 the appellant council, Croydon, provided accommodation to the appellant, a single mother with two children, pursuant to its homelessness duties to provide her with secure accommodation; see section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996. The appellant did not have the status of a secure tenant by virtue of the provisions of Schedule 4, paragraph 4 of the Housing Act 1985.
On 23 April 2004 District Judge Eady granted a possession order against the respondent by reason of rent arrears. The order required the appellant to give possession on or before 8 May 2004. It provided the appellant should pay £73.64 per week for use and occupation until possession was given. However, as is common in this sort of situation, the order was not enforced at the time because payments were more or less kept up for some time. But they fell behind again so that by August 2007 the appellant owed just over £1,000.
Croydon decided to enforce the possession order for that reason. It is not suggested that in so doing it treated this particular tenant differently from any other tenant in the same or a similar position. Croydon did not “pick on” this tenant for any reason of actual or perceived disability.
Croydon's entitlement to enforce the order is said to stem from section 89 of the Housing Act 1980. It is not necessary to set out the terms of that Act for present purposes. What is said is that under the Act the giving up of possession cannot be postponed beyond the period of six weeks.
Acting on the basis of this provision, Croydon obtained a warrant for possession. The response of the tenant was an application to suspend the warrant. It was based on the provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. On 28 September last year District Judge Fink dismissed that application and refused permission to appeal. On the same day HHJ Atkins heard an application for permission to appeal, which he refused.
Some further orders suspending the warrant until a further application for permission to appeal (technically an application to appeal from the refusal for an adjournment) were made by HHJ Seymour and King J. That application for permission to appeal was heard by Eady J who allowed the appeal but remitted the case back to Croydon County Court for determination. He held that there was a potentiality for the Disability Discrimination Act to apply and accordingly that whether the tenant's disability was causative of the failure to pay the rent was a question of fact to be tried.
What the tenant says is that, although she was admittedly in arrears, this was due to her disabilities consisting of dyslexia and diabetes. Croydon dispute that in fact there is any sufficient nexus between the failure to pay rent and these disabilities but, more significantly, they say it does not matter. Even if the appellant is right that the reason the rent was not paid was due to her disabilities or was connected with her disabilities, that is not enough.
Obviously the question is of major importance. Mummery LJ actually considered this very case in S v Floyd & Anr [2008] EWCA Civ 201, decided only on the 18 March. He was concerned with a situation where a tenant was in breach of his lease, having sublet contrary to the terms of the lease. The details for present purposes do not matter but it is important to note how significant Mummery LJ thought this particular case with which we are concerned is. He said:
“63. The third of the trio, Wright v. Croydon LBC [2007] All ER (D) 95 (Eady J), is a striking illustration of the reach of the 1995 Act, as interpreted and applied by these authorities in possession cases. In that case a possession order had been obtained by the local authority. The tenant later produced evidence that she was a diabetic dyslexic. The local authority originally decided not to enforce the possession order, but the rent arrears increased after the order was obtained. The local authority then decided to enforce it and obtained a warrant of execution. The tenant's application for a stay of the warrant was refused by the District Judge. On the appeal to the Circuit...
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