Plunder & Protection Inc.
| Author | HALVOR MEHLUM,RAGNAR TORVIK,KARL OVE MOENE |
| Published date | 01 July 2002 |
| Date | 01 July 2002 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0022343302039004005 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
447
Introduction
Plunder and protection are incorporated. In
weak states, violent enterprises are involved
in a wide range of activities, from small-scale
racketeering to wholesale pillage. They
include not only bandit gangs, gangsters,
warlords, guerrilla groups, and mercenaries,
but also enterprises such as private security
forces, military advisory groups, and parts of
the private protection business.
Since the Cold War, this kind of privatiz-
ation of violence and security has been
boosted by a substantial demobilization of
military personnel. In Russia, the private
protection business has exploded. In Africa,
private security is also on a sharp rise.
Security firms take on the role as a protector
of property from theft, and the production of
burglar bars has become an African growth
industry – in some countries, the only one.
Military security is no exception to the trend
towards privatization. International firms
like Sandline International, Defense Systems
Limited, Military Professional Resources
Inc., Gurkha Security Guards, and Executive
© 2002 Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 39, no. 4, 2002, pp. 447–459
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks,
CA and New Delhi)
[0022-3433(200207)39:4; 447–459; 025823]
Plunder & Protection Inc.*
HALVOR MEHLUM
Frisch Centre, University of Oslo
KARL OVE MOENE
Department of Economics, University of Oslo
RAGNAR TORVIK
Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
When the state fails to supply basic security and protection of property, violent entrepreneurs not only
seize the opportunity of plundering, but some also enter the protection business and provide protec-
tion against plunderers. This uncoordinated division of labor is advantageous for the entire group of
violent entrepreneurs. Hence, in weak states a situation may arise where a large number of violent entre-
preneurs can operate side by side as plunderers and protectors squeezing the producers from both sides.
The problem reached new levels at the end of the Cold War. As military forces were demobilized
without civilian jobs to go to, many countries got an oversupply of qualified violent people for crime,
warfare, and private protection. In this ‘market for extortion’ the entry of new violent entrepreneurs
enhances the profitability of them all. The supply of violence creates its own demand – an externality
of violence that is detrimental to the development in poor countries.
* We are grateful to S. Mansoob Murshed and to the refer-
ees for highly constructive advice. Correspondence may be
addressed to Halvor Mehlum at halvor.mehlum@
econ.uio.no.
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