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  • Case: UKSC 201X/0XXX. Type in Case name

    Issues:Type in issueFacts:Type in Facts

  • Case: UKSC 2015/0246. Miller and others (Appellants) v Ministry of Justice (Respondent)

    Issues:Where a pension is calculable by reference to service, whether the period of service prior the coming into effect of the relevant directive should be taken into account in calculating the amount of pension to be paid.Facts:Mr O’Brien was appointed as a Recorder sitting part-time on the Western Circuit on 1 March 1978, an office he held until 31 March 2005. He is entitled to a pension by virtue of the Part Time Workers Directive (97/81/EC) which the United Kingdom was required to transpose into domestic law by 7 April 2000. Mr O’Brien launched a claim in the Employment Tribunal, contending that he was entitled to have his service prior to 7 April 2000 taken into account in the calculation of the amount of his pension. The Employment Tribunal issued a decision in Mr O’Brien’s favour on this issue; on appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the Ministry of Justice’s appeal; and the Court of Appeal agreed with the Employment Appeal Tribunal and dismissed Mr O’Brien’s appeal. Mr O’Brien now appeals to the Supreme Court on this issue. Mr O’Brien, together with the Miller appellants, contended in a separate appeal that their claims of unlawful discrimination were not made out of time. The Court of Appeal held that, in view of its decision in the first O’Brien appeal, the claims were made out of time. The appellants appeal to the Supreme Court on this issue.

  • Case: UKSC 2018/0007. R (on the application of Wright) (Respondent) v Resilient Energy Severndale Ltd and Forest of Dean District Council (Appellants)

    Issues:Whether, on an application for planning permission for a wind turbine proposed to be undertaken by a community benefit society, the distribution to the local community of a community benefit fund derived from the operation of the turbine is, in the circumstances of the case, a material planning consideration which the council could lawfully take into account when considering whether to grant planning permission.Facts:The first appellant was granted planning permission for a single, community-scale wind turbine at Severndale Farm in Gloucestershire by the Forest of Dean District Council (the second appellant) on 30 September 2015. The council took into account in its determination of the planning application the proposal by the first appellant to distribute funds derived from the operation of the turbine to the local community through a community benefit society. The grant of permission was challenged by a claim for judicial review brought by the respondent, a local resident, and was quashed in the High Court on the ground that the council had unlawfully taken into account a matter which was not a material planning consideration.

  • Case: UKSC 2016/0228. Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation & Others (Respondents) v Commissioners of Inland Revenue (Appellant) (1)

    Issues: The compatibility of United Kingdom corporate taxation with certain principles of EU law and the liabilities of the Revenue to a taxpayer who has overpaid tax on the basis of incompatible United Kingdom legislation. Issues arising out of the case of Prudential Assurance Company Limited v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2018] UKSC 39 ("Prudential SC"). Facts:This is the lead case under the Franked Investment Income ("FII") Group Litigation Order ("GLO"). The respondents are the Test Claimants, whose claims concern corporation tax paid by UK resident parent companies on dividends received from their foreign subsidiaries and advance corporation tax ("ACT") typically paid by the group’s ultimate parent on dividends distributed to their shareholders, under the regime in force until 5th April 1999. The Test Claimants contend that the relevant United Kingdom tax provisions were contrary to Article 43 EC (now Article 49 TFEU) on freedom of establishment and/or Article 56 EC (now Article 63 TFEU) on free movement of capital. In consequence, they claim restitution and damages from the Revenue. The procedural history involves two Court of Appeal decisions, a decision of the Supreme Court, and three decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (FII (CJEU) 1, 2 and 3). The issues raised have been decided in favour of the Test Claimants. The Revenue now appeal against the judgments of the Court of Appeal in FII (CA) 1 [2010] EWCA Civ 103 and FII (CA) 2 [2016] EWCA Civ 1180, as regards their determinations in respect of the compatibility of the tax regime with EU law and the appropriate remedy. This application was stood out of the list pending the decision in Prudential and the parties have now submitted additional documents to address the issues which were resolved in that case.

  • Case: UKSC 2019/0028. R v Reeves Taylor (AP) (Appellant)

    Issues:What is the correct interpretation of the term ‘person acting in an official capacity’ in section 134(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988? In particular, does it include someone who acts otherwise than in a private and individual capacity for or on behalf of an organisation or body which exercises or purports to exercise the functions of government over the civilian population in the territory which it controls and in which the relevant conduct occurs?Facts:The appellant is charged with conspiracy to torture contrary to section (1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 and torture contrary to section 134(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The Supreme Court is now asked to consider the questions above.

  • Case: UKSC 2012/0056. R (on the application of Mackay) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Justice (Respondent)

    Issues:Judicial review - prisoner's rights - re-categorisation - whether right to oral hearing Whether procedural fairness required the Category A Review Team ("CART") on behalf of the Secretary of State to convene an oral hearing before coming to a decision on the Appellant's security re-categorisation.Facts:The Appellant was convicted of murder in December 1989 and sentenced to life imprisonment with a tariff set at 20 years. In 2009, the Parole Board held an oral hearing in respect of the Appellant and noted that re-categorisation as a Category B prisoner "may be a constructive move". CART then decided, without holding an oral hearing, that the Appellant's Category A status would be maintained. The Appellant challenged this decision by way of judicial review.

  • Case: UKSC 2017/0207. Royal Mail Group Ltd (Respondent) v Jhuti (Appellant)

    Issues:The correct test to be applied when an employee (A) alleges that they have been unfairly dismissed by reason of having made a public interest disclosure. In particular, if, and in what circumstances, the actions of an employee (B) are treated as those of B, or attributed to, the employer of A and B.Facts:The Appellant was employed as a media specialist in the MarketReach unit of the Respondent’s sales division. The role involved promoting the use of mail by businesses engaged in marketing. The Appellant was initially on a trial period of 6 months. Shortly after she commenced employment the Appellant observed what she believed were irregularities in the way that colleagues were offering customers what were described as ‘tailor-made incentives’ (‘TMIs’). She believed it was a breach of OFCOM guidance for such incentives to be given in respect of ongoing business. The Appellant reported her concern that such breaches might be occurring to her immediate manager. She had a meeting with her immediate manager about this issue. The ET found that the manager put her under pressure to withdraw her allegations, with a veiled threat that if she did not do so her employment would not continue beyond the end of her probation. The Appellant asked her manager what she should do. He said that she should write to him withdrawing her allegations and saying that she had misunderstood the rules governing the use of TMIs, which she did. Over the following months the Appellant’s manager continued to criticise her performance and behaved in a way which the Appellant considered to be harsh and unreasonable. The Appellant complained to HR mentioning in emails that she had drawn attention to earlier allegations about the misuse of TMIs and eventually raised a grievance about her treatment by her manager. She was later signed off sick with stress at work by her GP and never returned. The Respondent sought to resolve the Appellant’s situation through Ms Pauline Vickers, Head of Sales Operations. Ms Vickers was sent a file by HR containing the emails passing between the Appellant and her manager but not the correspondence about the TMI allegations. The Appellant was too unwell to attend a meeting but did send Ms Vickers a series of emails which referred to making previous allegations about the misuse of TMIs. Ms Vickers asked the Appellant’s former manager to comment. He sent her an email describing how he had dealt with the Appellant’s concerns and how she had accepted that they were based on a misunderstanding. He supplied a copy of the Appellant’s email in which she said she had gotten her wires crossed, but none of the earlier correspondence. Ms Vickers accepted his account and dismissed the Appellant on the grounds of unsatisfactory performance. This was upheld on appeal.

  • Case: UKSC 2013/0200. Sapporo Breweries Limited (A company incorporated under the laws of Japan) (Respondent) v Lupofresh Limited (Appellant)

    Issues: The proper interpretation of Article 8(2) of the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations; in particular, whether duress is relevant to establishing whether a party has consented to a contract. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the applicable law of the relevant contracts was the law of Japan rather English law. Facts:Lupofresh, an English company that trades in hops, entered into a series of contracts with Sapporo, a Japanese brewing company, for the supply of hop extract by Sapporo. The contracts for hop extract from the 2007 and 2008 crops were ultimately renegotiated and performed on terms substantially less favourable to Lupofresh than those of the original contract. Lupofresh did not pay when payment fell due for the hop extract delivered under the 2008 contract. Sapporo commenced proceedings for the amount outstanding. Lupofresh issued a counterclaim alleging that, amongst other things, the renegotiated contracts for the 2007 and 2008 crops were entered into under duress. The trial judge held that the contracts were governed by the laws of Japan which did not recognise a right to rescind for duress and ordered Lupofresh to pay the outstanding amount. The Court of Appeal upheld the judge’s order.

  • Case: UKSC 2012/0104. Taylor and another (FC) (Appellants) v Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd and another (Respondents)

    Issues:Under an equity release scheme, does the mortgagee’s right to possession have priority over any right of the Appellant to remain in occupation of the mortgaged property, in circumstances where the right asserted by the Appellant is prohibited by the terms of the mortgage? Facts:These appeals concern "equity release schemes". Under such schemes the owners of registered land sell their homes to purchasers, who promise the vendors the right to remain in their homes after the sale. Each of the Appellants sold their home pursuant to such an arrangement. On the day of the sale the purchaser simultaneously executed a mortgage over the property and purported to grant a lease back to the Appellant. However under the terms of the mortgages, the purchaser was prohibited from granting the rights of occupation which they had promised to the Appellant. The purchasers defaulted on their mortgage payments and the Respondent lenders sought possession of the mortgaged properties. The question in these appeals is whether the mortgagee’s right to possession has priority over, or is subject to, any right of the Appellant to continue in occupation, in circumstances where the right asserted by the Appellant is prohibited by the terms of the mortgage. In November 2010 the High Court held that the Respondents’ rights to enforce their security had priority over the rights of the Appellants to remain in occupation of their homes. In these circumstances, there is no legal defence to the Respondents’ claims for possession. In January 2012 the Court of Appeal upheld that decision.

  • Case: UKSC 2018/0039. Singularis Holdings Ltd (In Official Liquidation) (A Company Incorporated in the Cayman Islands) (Respondent) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Ltd (Appellant)

    Issues:The appeal concerns whether the dishonest state of mind of the sole shareholder and a director of a company is attributable to the company for the purposes of a claim in negligence against a third party bank or broker and, if so, what the consequences are of that attribution.Facts:The Appellant is the London subsidiary of a Japanese investment bank and brokerage firm. At the material time, the Respondent was wholly owned by an individual called Maan Al Sanea ("Mr Al Sanea"), who was the company’s Chairman, President, Director and Treasurer. The Respondent had six other directors but Mr Al Sanea effectively controlled the company and the other directors did not have any supervisory functions so far as the events in question are concerned. In 2007, the Appellant entered into a stock financing arrangement with the Respondent. In early June 2009, that arrangement was closed out. Between 12 June and 27 July 2009 the Appellant was instructed by the Respondent to pay funds which it held on behalf of the Respondent to or for the account of other companies owned and/or controlled by Mr Al Sanea. Mr Al Sanea had the authority to give instructions to the Appellant for the making of the payments. The Appellant made the payments in accordance with its instructions. On 18 July 2014 the Respondent (acting through its joint official liquidators) brought a claim against the Appellant for the full amount of those payments (less any amounts received in relation thereto from Mr Al Sanea, against whom the Respondent obtained a default judgment, or from the recipients of the funds) alleging that: