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Case: Issues. Case ID: UKSC 2023/0033
Issues: UKSC 2023/0033: Is it possible to make a person liable as a party to the carrying on of a business for fraudulent purposes (under Section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986) if they did not exercise management or control of the company in question? UKSC 2023/0034: Where a claimant company has been struck off and then subsequently restored to the register of companies, what is required for the limitation period to be extended (pursuant to Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980) on the basis that it could not with reasonable diligence have discovered a fraud during the period it was dissolved?Facts:These appeals relate to a claim regarding a form of VAT fraud known as missing trader intra-community fraud ("MTIC Fraud"). MTIC fraud involves companies importing goods VAT-free from another EU country, selling them with VAT, incurring enormous VAT liabilities and then becoming insolvent. The claim involved trading in carbon credits under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in 2009, which at the time attracted VAT. The claimants in this case are five companies (Nathanael Eurl Ltd ("Nathanael"), Inline Trading Ltd ("Inline"), Bilta (UK) Ltd ("Bilta"), Weston Trading UK Ltd ("Weston") and Vehement Solutions Ltd ("Vehement"), together the "Claimant Companies"), which engaged in this trading and are now in liquidation, and their respective Joint Liquidators (together the "Claimants"). In November 2017 the Claimants issued the present claim against Tradition Financial Services Ltd ("TFS"). This was on the basis that TFS brokered the trades that constituted the MTIC Fraud knowing or suspecting the trades were not legitimate. This included: (i) claims by the Claimant Companies alleging that TFS dishonestly assisted in the breach of fiduciary duty owed by the directors of the Claimant Companies; and (ii) claims by the Joint Liquidators for relief pursuant to section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 alleging TFS participated in the fraudulent trading of the Claimant Companies. There was a confidential partial settlement of the claims which provided for two issues to be determined by the High Court (on the basis of assumed facts). These issues were: (1) whether the dishonest assistance claims were time-barred; and (2) whether TFS was within the scope of Section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The High Court held that each of the dishonest assistance claims was time-barred as were the Section 213 claims brought in respect of Bilta, Weston and Vehement. The claims in respect of Bilta, Weston and Vehement failed in their entirety and no appeal was pursued in respect of them. However, the High Court held that TFS could in principle fall within the scope of Section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986. This meant that the Section 213 claims brought by the Joint Liquidators of two of the Claimant Companies (Nathanael and Inline), which were not time-barred, succeeded. TFS appealed the High Court's decision that it was within the scope of Section 213. The Claimants cross-appealed the High Court’s decision that the dishonest assistance claims by Nathanael and Inline were time-barred. There was also an appeal in respect of the costs order (which is not pursued in this application). The Court of Appeal dismissed each of the appeals and refused permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court. In UKSC 2023/0033 TFS seeks permission to appeal the decision that it is within the scope of Section 213. The Claimants oppose permission being granted on this issue. In UKSC 2023/0034 Nathanael and Inline seek permission to appeal the decision that their dishonest assistance claims are time-barred. TFS requests that the Court dismiss the appeal on this issue (although it appears to accept that if permission is granted in respect of its appeal it should also be granted in respect of Nathanael and Inline's appeal).
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Case: Issues. Case ID: UKSC 2023/0034
Issues:Where a claimant company has been struck off and then subsequently restored to the register of companies, what is required for the limitation period to be extended (pursuant to Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980) on the basis that it could not with reasonable diligence have discovered a fraud during the period it was dissolved?Facts:These appeals relate to a claim regarding a form of VAT fraud known as missing trader intra-community fraud ("MTIC Fraud"). MTIC fraud involves companies importing goods VAT-free from another EU country, selling them with VAT, incurring enormous VAT liabilities and then becoming insolvent. The claim involved trading in carbon credits under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in 2009, which at the time attracted VAT. The claimants in this case are five companies (Nathanael Eurl Ltd ("Nathanael"), Inline Trading Ltd ("Inline"), Bilta (UK) Ltd ("Bilta"), Weston Trading UK Ltd ("Weston") and Vehement Solutions Ltd ("Vehement"), together the "Claimant Companies"), which engaged in this trading and are now in liquidation, and their respective Joint Liquidators (together the "Claimants"). In November 2017 the Claimants issued the present claim against Tradition Financial Services Ltd ("TFS"). This was on the basis that TFS brokered the trades that constituted the MTIC Fraud knowing or suspecting the trades were not legitimate. This included: (i) claims by the Claimant Companies alleging that TFS dishonestly assisted in the breach of fiduciary duty owed by the directors of the Claimant Companies; and (ii) claims by the Joint Liquidators for relief pursuant to section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 alleging TFS participated in the fraudulent trading of the Claimant Companies. There was a confidential partial settlement of the claims which provided for two issues to be determined by the High Court (on the basis of assumed facts). These issues were: (1) whether the dishonest assistance claims were time-barred; and (2) whether TFS was within the scope of Section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The High Court held that each of the dishonest assistance claims was time-barred as were the Section 213 claims brought in respect of Bilta, Weston and Vehement. The claims in respect of Bilta, Weston and Vehement failed in their entirety and no appeal was pursued in respect of them. However, the High Court held that TFS could in principle fall within the scope of Section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986. This meant that the Section 213 claims brought by the Joint Liquidators of two of the Claimant Companies (Nathanael and Inline), which were not time-barred, succeeded. TFS appealed the High Court's decision that it was within the scope of Section 213. The Claimants cross-appealed the High Court's decision that the dishonest assistance claims by Nathanael and Inline were time-barred. There was also an appeal in respect of the costs order (which is not pursued in this application). The Court of Appeal dismissed each of the appeals and refused permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court. In UKSC 2023/0033 TFS seeks permission to appeal the decision that it is within the scope of Section 213. The Claimants oppose permission being granted on this issue. In UKSC 2023/0034 Nathanael and Inline seek permission to appeal the decision that their dishonest assistance claims are time-barred. TFS requests that the Court dismiss the appeal on this issue (although it appears to accept that if permission is granted in respect of its appeal it should also be granted in respect of Nathanael and Inline's appeal).
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Case: Issues. Case ID: UKSC 2023/0088
Issues:(1) Does article 6(1) of the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 violate the appellant's right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights because it fails to provide for a review mechanism whereby a previous conviction can be treated as "spent" for the purposes of that order? (2) If article 6(1) is a violation, should the court make a declaration of incompatibility? (3) If article 6(1) is a violation, was the Court of Appeal wrong to uphold the High Court's refusal to award the appellant damages?Facts:When he was aged 21, the appellant (who is anonymised as JR123) was convicted of arson, possession of a petrol bomb, and two offences of burglary and theft. For these offences, he was sentenced to four concurrent terms of imprisonment of five years, four years, 12 months, and 12 months respectively. He was released from prison in 1982 and is now aged 64. Under the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978, the appellant's convictions cannot become "spent" and must generally be disclosed when, among other things, applying for employment. the appellant claims that this has had negative consequences for him. On 28 January 2020, the appellant issued proceedings in the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland challenging the compatibility of the 1978 order with his right to respect for private and family life, under article eight of the European Convention on Human Rights. On 1 November 2021, the High Court found that the 1978 order violated the appellant's right as it did not provide for any mechanism by which the status of his conviction as unspent could be reviewed. However, the High Court declined to award the appellant any damages, ruling that the declaration that the 1978 order violated his right was sufficient compensation. The Department for Justice (the respondent) appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland. The appellant also appealed the refusal to award him damages. On 3 May 2023, the High Court allowed the Department for Justice's appeal and dismissed the appellant's appeal as to damages.
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Case: Issues. Case ID: UKSC 2024/0042
Issues:Is a person with a full gender recognition certificate ("GRC") which recognises that their gender is female, a "woman" for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010 ("EA 2010")? Facts:In this appeal, the Appellant challenges the lawfulness of statutory guidance issued by the Respondent, which has the effect that a GRC recognising that a person's gender is female brings them within the EA 2010 definition of a "woman". The Gender Representation on Public Boards (Scotland) Act 2018 is an Act of the Scottish Parliament ("ASP 2018"). It sets targets for increasing the proportion of women on public boards. The original ASP 2018 definition of a "woman" included people: (i) with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment; (ii) living as a woman; and (iii) proposing to undergo / undergoing / who have undergone a gender reassignment process. In a 2022 legal challenge brought by the Appellant ("FWS1"), the Court of Session found that this statutory definition was unlawful, as it dealt with matters that fall outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. Following FWS1, the Respondent issued new statutory guidance. This is the guidance currently under challenge. It states that, under the ASP 2018, the definition of "woman" was the same as under the EA 2010. It also stated that a person with a GRC recognising that their gender is female has the sex of a woman. The Appellant challenged the lawfulness of the Respondent's statutory guidance in the Court of Session. The Appellant's arguments included that the guidance failed to respect the decision in FWS1. On 13 December 2022, the Outer House dismissed the Appellant's petition. The Appellant appealed. On 1 November 2023, the Inner House upheld the decision of the Outer House and dismissed the Appellant's appeal. The Appellant now appeals to the Supreme Court.
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Case: Issues. Case ID: UKSC 2024/0061
Issues:When a state seeks to appeal a finding that it is not immune from suit under the State Immunity Act, is granted permission to appeal, and then fails to attend the appeal hearing, is the appeal court permitted to dismiss the appeal for non-appearance, or is it obliged to determine the issue in the state's absence? What is the correct approach for determining whether a state is immune from claims brought by persons employed in an administrative role in a diplomatic mission?Facts:Ms Costantine was employed by the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (Cultural Bureau) in an administrative role. She brought a claim in the Employment Tribunal for direct discrimination and harassment on the basis of her religion. The Embassy argued that it was immune from the claim under the State Immunity Act. The judge decided this question as a preliminary issue in favour of Ms Costantine. The Embassy was refused permission to appeal by the Employment Appeal Tribunal, which upheld the decision of the judge. The Court of Appeal granted the Embassy permission to appeal. Prior to the Court of Appeal hearing, the Embassy's solicitors applied for an order declaring that they ceased to act as a result of prolonged non-payment of bills. The Court of Appeal made the order requested. The Embassy was not represented at and did not attend the Court of Appeal hearing. The Court of Appeal dismissed its appeal on grounds of non-appearance. The Embassy appeals to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the Court of Appeal should not have dismissed its appeal without deciding the issue of state immunity, and that the trial judge's approach to issue of state immunity was flawed.
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Case: Issues. Case ID: UKSC 2023/0101
Issues: Is UK corporation tax payable on certain sums received by the respondent during its accounting periods ended 31 October 2008 to 2015 inclusive? Facts:Royal Bank of Canada ("RBC") (the respondent) is a bank based in Canada. In the early 1980s, RBC advanced a loan of $450 million Canadian Dollars to Sulpetro Limited ("Sulpetro"), a Canadian oil company. Sulpetro (UK) Limited ("SUKL"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Sulpetro, was granted a licence ("the Licence") by the UK government to explore and exploit the Buchan field, an oil field in the North Sea. SUKL and Sulpetro entered into an agreement which provided that Sulpetro would incur all the development and exploitation costs in relation to the Buchan field and, in return, it would receive the Licence holder's share of the oil recovered. In 1986 Sulpetro sold its interest in the Buchan field to BP Petroleum Development Limited ("BP"). As part of the sale agreement, Sulpetro transferred to BP 100% of the issued share capital of SUKL, as well as all beneficial rights and interests it held in the Licence. In return, BP agreed to, amongst other things, make a payment of a royalty to Sulpetro in respect of all oil production from the Buchan field ("the Payments"). In broad terms, the Payments were payable when the market price per barrel of oil exceeded USD $20. In 1993 Sulpetro was in financial difficulties and went into receivership. RBC, as a creditor in the receivership, was assigned by court order the right to receive the Payments. BP subsequently sold its interest in the Buchan field to Taslisman Energy Inc, which assumed the obligation to make the Payments. HMRC (the appellant) became aware of the Payments in 2013 and determined that they were chargeable to UK corporation tax. It subsequently issued assessments and closure notices to RBC for the accounting periods 2008-2015 on the basis that RBC was liable to pay corporation tax on the Payments. RBC unsuccessfully appealed against the assessments and closure notices to the First-tier Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal dismissed RBC's further appeal. RBC appealed to the Court of Appeal, which allowed its appeal. HMRC now appeals to the Supreme Court.
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Case: Issues. Case ID: UKSC 2023/0110
Issues:This appeal concerns how liability is allocated in circumstances where, as a result of allegedly negligent work undertaken by a consultant (the appellant), a property developer (the respondent) carries out remedial work on properties it no longer owns and in respect of defects for which it cannot be held liable due to the expiry of applicable limitation periods. Specifically, the appeal raises the following questions: In the circumstances set out above, has the respondent suffered actionable and recoverable damage that falls within the duty of care owed to it by the appellant? Do the retrospective extended limitation periods provided for by section 135 of the Building Safety Act 2022 apply (i) in the circumstances set out above, and (ii) to claims brought before section 135 came into force and are the subject of pending proceedings? Does section 1(1)(a) of the Defective Premises Act 1972 apply only to purchasers of properties, or does it also apply to commercial developers? Is the respondent entitled to bring a contribution claim against the appellant under section 1 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 notwithstanding that (i) there has been no judgment or settlement between the respondent and any third party, and (ii) no third party has asserted any claim against the respondent? Facts:The respondent is a property developer who had engaged the appellant as a structural design consultant in connection with certain residential building developments (namely, the building of 12 tower blocks). In March 2020, the respondent brought a claim in negligence against the appellant in relation to structural design defects it had discovered in the developments. The respondent had discovered the defects after having sold the developments to third parties. It nonetheless performed remedial works to rectify the defects, the cost of which forms the basis of the losses the respondent claims against the appellant. The Court of Appeal found in favour of the respondent in respect of Issues (1)-(4) above. The appellant now appeals to the UK Supreme Court.
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Case: Issues. Case ID: UKSC 2023/0145
Issues:What are the functions of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission ("SIAC") when it hears an appeal against the Home Secretary's decisions to deprive a person of their British citizenship and/or to refuse a person entry clearance on national security grounds? Can SIAC engage in a full merits-based review of the Home Secretary's decisions or is it confined to a more limited review of the decision on public law grounds? To what extent can SIAC interfere with the Home Secretary's assessment of the risk to national security posed by the affected person?Facts:This is an appeal against the Home Secretary's decisions to deprive the appellant, U3, of her British citizenship and to refuse her application for entry clearance to return to the UK to reunite with her children. U3 was born in the UK in 1992 and had British and Moroccan nationality. When she was 18, she married her husband, O. She had two children, U3A and U3B, born in 2012 and 2013. During their marriage, O subjected U3 to serious and sustained violence. On 24 June 2014, U3 travelled from the UK to Turkey with her children. O joined her there. On 22 August 2014, U3 and O travelled with their children from Turkey to a part of Syria then controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ("ISIL"). They remained there until November 2017. In 2016, while still in Syria, U3 had another child, U3C. All three of U3's children are British citizens. On 18 April 2017, the Home Secretary sent a letter to U3's last-known address indicating that she had decided to make an order depriving U3 of her British citizenship under section 40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981. This was because, "it is assessed that you are a British Moroccan dual national who has travelled to Syria and is aligned with ISIL. It is assessed that your return to the United Kingdom would present a risk to the national security of the United Kingdom". The order depriving U3 of her British citizenship was made on 22 April 2017. In 2019, U3's children were repatriated to the UK. On 10 August 2020, U3 applied for entry clearance to return to the UK, relying on her own and her children's rights under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. On 18 December 2020, the Home Secretary refused U3's application. Both SIAC the Court of Appeal dismissed U3's appeals against the Home Secretary's decisions to deprive U3 of her British citizenship and to refuse her entry clearance. U3 now appeals to the Supreme Court.
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Case: Issues. Case ID: UKSC 2023/0165
Issues:If the Secretary of State withdraws an order depriving a person of citizenship because they accept that the order has made the person stateless, does this mean that the original order is of no effect and the person affected has always retained their British citizenship?Facts:N3 is a British Citizen who was born in Bangladesh. In November 2017, the Secretary of State made an order depriving him of citizenship on grounds that he had travelled to Syria and aligned himself with Al-Qaeda, and that he posed a threat to national security. She considered N3 to be a dual British-Bangladeshi national and that depriving him of British citizenship would not make him stateless. N3 appealed the deprivation decision in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), which allowed his appeal. The Secretary of State appealed to the Court of Appeal, which allowed her appeal and remitted the matter to SIAC. N3 sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. However, following an SIAC decision in a separate set of appeals in British-Bangladeshi cases where it was held that the individuals had lost Bangladeshi citizenship at the age of 21, the Secretary of State wrote to N3 in April 2021 to say that she was now satisfied that the deprivation order would make N3 stateless, and withdrew the deprivation order. ZA is the child of a man in similar circumstances to N3. She was born after the deprivation order was made against her father, but before it was subsequently withdrawn. If her father had British citizenship when she was born, she would have automatic British citizenship. Both ZA and N3 sought judicial review of the refusal of Secretary of State to accept that ZA's father and N3 were British citizens in the period between the deprivation orders being made and withdrawn. Their claims were linked. Their claims were dismissed by the High Court, and their appeals were dismissed by the Court of Appeal. They now appeal to the Supreme Court.
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Case: Issues. Case ID: UKSC 2023/0133
Issues:If the Secretary of State withdraws an order depriving a person of citizenship because they accept that the order has made the person stateless, does this mean that the original order is of no effect and the person affected has always retained their British citizenship? Facts:N3 is a British Citizen who was born in Bangladesh. In November 2017, the Secretary of State made an order depriving him of citizenship on grounds that he had travelled to Syria and aligned himself with Al-Qaeda, and that he posed a threat to national security. She considered N3 to be a dual British-Bangladeshi national and that depriving him of British citizenship would not make him stateless. N3 appealed the deprivation decision in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), which allowed his appeal. The Secretary of State appealed to the Court of Appeal, which allowed her appeal and remitted the matter to SIAC. N3 sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. However, following an SIAC decision in a separate set of appeals in British-Bangladeshi cases where it was held that the individuals had lost Bangladeshi citizenship at the age of 21, the Secretary of State wrote to N3 in April 2021 to say that she was now satisfied that the deprivation order would make N3 stateless, and withdrew the deprivation order. ZA is the child of a man in similar circumstances to N3. She was born after the deprivation order was made against her father, but before it was subsequently withdrawn. If her father had British citizenship when she was born, she would have automatic British citizenship. Both ZA and N3 sought judicial review of the refusal of Secretary of State to accept that ZA's father and N3 were British citizens in the period between the deprivation orders being made and withdrawn. Their claims were linked. Their claims were dismissed by the High Court, and their appeals were dismissed by the Court of Appeal. They now appeal to the Supreme Court.