- Case: B4/2020/0114. M (a child)
- Case: B4/2020/0109. L (a child)
- Case: C1/2020/0129. Starbuild Limited v The Secretary of State for Housing Communities and Local Government & Anr
- Case: B4/2020/0102. J (A Child)
- Case: A3/2020/0075. The Financial Conduct Authority v Avacade Limited & Ors
- Case: UKSC 2018/0062. Peninsula Securities Ltd (Respondent) v Dunnes Stores (Bangor) Ltd (Appellant) (Northern Ireland)
Issues:Whether the doctrine of restraint of trade applies to a restrictive covenant in a lease granted by the respondent’s predecessor in title to the appellant.Facts:Mr Shortall, the freehold owner of land in Londonderry, wished to develop a shopping centre on the land. On 2 February 1981 he granted a 999-year lease of part of the land to the appellant. The lease contained a restrictive covenant that any development on the remaining land would not contain a large unit for the purpose of trading in textiles, provisions or groceries. In 1983 Mr Shortall transferred the freehold and his interest in the lease to the respondent. In 2010 the respondent issued proceedings for, amongst other matters, a declaration that the restrictive covenant was unenforceable as an unreasonable restraint of trade. This issue was determined in the High Court as a preliminary issue.
- Case: UKSC 2019/0001. Dill (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and another (Respondents)
Issues:On an application for listed building consent, should the Planning Inspector consider whether the items listed were ‘buildings’; and(ii) what is the correct approach to determining whether the items are ‘buildings’?Facts:In 1973 the appellant’s father purchased Idlicote House, which had been designated a Grade II listed building in 1966. He brought with him from his previous residences a pair of eighteenth-century lead urns resting on limestone piers and put them in the gardens. On 30 June 1986 the urns and piers were individually listed. The appellant came into ownership of Idlicote House in 1993 but was unaware of the listing. He sold the items at public auction in 2009. In 2015 the second respondent (‘the Council’) told the appellant that listed building consent had been required for the removal of the items. The Council refused his application for consent and issued a listed building enforcement notice requiring the return of the items. The appellant appealed against both decisions, contending that there had been no breach of listed building control because the items were not buildings, that the items should be de-listed, or consent given. The Inspector dismissed his appeals.
- Case: UKSC 2019/0046. BTI 2014 LLC (Appellant) v Sequana SA and others (Respondents)
Issues: Whether an otherwise lawful dividend may nevertheless in principle be a "transaction defrauding creditors" under section 423 Insolvency Act 1986. Whether the trigger for the directors’ duty to consider creditors is merely a real risk of, as opposed to a probability of or close proximity to, insolvency. Facts:Sequana’s subsidiary was liable to indemnify BAT for costs arising from the clean-up of a polluted river. The directors of the subsidiary resolved that it should pay a substantial dividend to Sequana, without – BAT says – leaving enough money in the subsidiary to pay for the clean-up costs.
- Case: UKSC 2019/0089. R v C (AP) (Appellant)
Issues:For the purposes of section 4(1) of the Explosive Substances Act 1883, can personal experimentation or own private education, absent some ulterior lawful purpose, be regarded as a "lawful object"?Facts:C was charged with two counts of having in his possession an explosive substance in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that he had not made it for a lawful purpose, contrary to s.4(1) of the Explosive Substances Act 1883. C submits that he had manufactured the explosive substance for his own personal experimentation and education. That, C submits, is a "lawful object" and therefore a defence in law under s.4(1) of the Explosive Substances Act 1883. The Crown Court rejected that defence as untenable, holding that a lawful object is not simply the absence of criminal purpose. The Court of Appeal upheld that ruling. C now seeks permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.
- Case: UKSC 2018/0129. Public Prosecutors Office of the Athens Court of Appeal (Appellant) v O'Connor (AP) (Respondent) (Northern Ireland)
Issues:When considering section 26(5) of the Extradition Act 2003, can a distinction properly be drawn between the actions of a person who has done everything reasonably possible to give notice of the appeal and the actions of that person’s solicitor who has not?Facts:On 11 December 2015, His Honour Judge Devlin made an order for the extradition of Mr O’Connor to Greece in accordance with a European Arrest Warrant. Pursuant to section 26(4) of the Extradition Act 2003, Mr O’Connor then had seven days in which to give notice of any application for leave to appeal against this order. Mr O’Connor’s solicitor lodged this application on 16 December 2015 but failed to serve notice of the application on the Appellant until 4 January 2016 owing to an oversight. The question was whether Mr O’Connor’s appeal could nevertheless be entertained on the basis that he had done everything reasonably possibly to give notice of the appeal pursuant to section 26(5) of the Extradition Act 2003. The Divisional Court in Northern Ireland allowed the appeal to proceed, drawing a distinction between the actions of Mr O’Connor and the actions of his solicitor. The Appellant seeks to appeal against this order.