Examining “Equitable” Retention

Date01 January 2016
Published date01 January 2016
Pages18-41
Author
DOI10.3366/elr.2016.0320
INTRODUCTION

Compensation, whereby one liquid debt reduces or extinguishes another liquid debt, is well understood. Similarly, retention of a sum due under a contract on the principle of mutuality is relatively well understood. What is less well understood is the “other type of retention”1

Hume, Lectures (1786–1822) vol III, ed by G C H Paton (1952) 55.

or “equitable retention” discussed in obiter comments by Lord Rodger in Inveresk plc v Tullis Russell Papermakers Ltd.2

[2010] UKSC 19, 2010 SLT 941.

It is argued that when the legal landscape is considered in detail, compensation is a doctrine with a narrower scope than previously understood. Many cases described or pled as compensation are really cases of equitable retention.3

See discussion at pp 22–23 below. On use of the term “equitable retention” see p 24.

Equitable retention was rarely used by defenders prior to the decision in Inveresk; indeed, Lord Rodger made his comments for fear that this type of retention would continue to be overlooked.4

Inveresk para 77.

Now that the existence of the doctrine has been highlighted, it is important that we understand the extent and limits of the doctrine and its interaction with compensation and mutuality-based retention (hereinafter “mutuality retention”). It is suggested that there is some commonality between mutuality retention and equitable retention, in that both doctrines permit a party to delay performance until compensation can take place. This aspect of mutuality retention has not featured prominently in legal debate and, as a result, has caused difficulties.5

See discussion at p 27 below.

It is only when the true extent and boundaries of compensation, equitable retention, and mutuality retention are understood that the law can develop in a coherent manner, free of the confusion that has, to date, existed

Part B sets out a framework for this area of law, including discussion of the categories of retention of debts. Part C considers equitable retention in detail. Part D provides comment on the factors identified in Part C as influencing the court's discretion when considering whether equitable retention should be permitted. Conclusions are drawn in Part E.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A crucial distinction exists between compensation and retention of debts. Compensation operates to extinguish debts, retention does not. Retention operates to suspend or delay payment only.6

Stair, Inst 1.18.6 and 7; G J Bell, Prin § 1410.

It has been said that compensation, like many concepts in Scots law, suffers from the use of inconsistent terminology.7

W W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd edn (2007) para 25–32.

“Compensation” is often used synonymously with “set off”. “Set off” may have come into use via English law. However, “set off” denotes a wider principle than claims which can be set against each other in compensation in Scots law.8

W M Gloag, The Law of Contract, 2nd edn (1929) 644, fn 4.

As such, the term “set off” will not be used in this paper.9

McBryde argues that “set off” might be the better term: see Contract (n 7) para 25–33.

Another difficulty lies in the varied meanings of “retention”.10

W M Gloag and J M Irvine, Law of Rights in Security: Heritable and Moveable Including Cautionary Obligations (1897) 303; McBryde, Contract (n 7) para 25–34.

In this paper “retention” is used to mean a party delaying or suspending fulfilment of an obligation.11

This may be until performance of a counter obligation (mutuality retention) or until compensation can take place (mutuality and equitable retention): see later discussion at p 23 and pp 26–27.

The different categories of retention of debts are set out later in this part

Some of the difficulties in terminology perhaps stem from the historical development of compensation and retention of debts in Scots law. Many consider retention of debts to be an extension of compensation.12

Lords Hope and Rodger in Inveresk paras [32] and [81]. However, Bell suggests there is no link between compensation and retention of debts, but that retention of debts grew from the right to retain corporeal subjects: Bell Princ § 1410 (see in particular, the 10th edn by Guthrie). Gloag & Irvine, Rights in Security (n 10) 303, although it is difficult to reconcile this with what is said on page 304.

An extension of one doctrine from another might result in difficulties in determining the boundary between the doctrines with resultant terminological confusion. Whatever the reasons for the terminological problems, this paper aims to identify the extent of both compensation and retention of debts, taking into account their distinct effects, and the dividing line between the doctrines Compensation<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn13"><sup>13</sup></xref><fn id="fn13"><label>13</label><p>This paper considers compensation by force of law rather than contractual set off, whereby parties make express provision in their contract(s) regarding the setting of claims against each other. Parties may have expressly agreed rights that go beyond the extinction of liquid debts against each other.</p></fn>

Compensation has been known to the law of Scotland from at least 1592 (in the form of the Compensation Act of that year).14

There is some doubt as to whether compensation was part of Scots law prior to 1592. Stair states that it was not (Inst 1.18.6) as does Hume (Lectures (n 1) 28). However, Bell asserts otherwise (Comm II, 126). See Lord Salvesen's comments in Fowler v Brown 1916 SC 597 at 602–603.

Compensation operates where claims are liquid15

A liquid debt is a debt which is presently due and payable. As such, the sum due must be ascertained or immediately ascertainable. Conversely, an illiquid debt is not presently due and payable. Indeed, an illiquid debt may not yet be ascertained, such as where damages are sought; the court must determine that damages are payable and the amount due by way of damages.

and of the same nature: where A has a liquid claim against B for £100, and B has a liquid claim against A for £50, the claims can be set against each other so that B pays the balance of £50 to A. In general an illiquid claim cannot be set off against a liquid claim.16

Gloag & Irvine, Rights in Security (n 10) 304; Gloag, Contract (n 8) 624; Munro v MacDonald's Executors (1866) 4 M 687 per the Lord President at 688; Ross v Ross (1895) 22 R 461 per Lord Adam at 463; Grewar v Cross (1904) 12 SLT 84 per Lord Pearson at 85; M'Connell & Reid v W & G Muir (1906) SLT 79 per the Lord Justice Clerk at 82; Hopkirk v Pirie 1958 SLT (Sh Ct) 9 at 9; Niven v Clyde Fasteners Ltd 1986 SLT 344 per Lord Jauncey at 345.

A pursuer with a liquid claim should be paid without having to await the outcome of an illiquid claim by the defender against him.17

Pegler v Northern Agricultural Implement and Foundry Co (Ltd) (1877) 4 R 435 per Lord Deas at 439.

Compensation must be pled and sustained.18

Stair stated that compensation would arise ipso jure (Inst 1.18. 6), but it is clear that that is not the case: see Sir William Maxwell of Monreith v Creditors of Sir Godfrey McCulloch (1738) Mor 2550; Bankton, Inst 1.4.23; Bell, Princ § 575; Gloag, Contract (n 8) 644.

The doctrine is based on utility: the result of allowing claims to be extinguished against each other is that fewer claims have to be raised.19

Bell, Princ § 572; Hume (n 1) 28

In our example, B need not raise an action against A to recover the £50 due to him. It is also based on equitable principles:20

Ibid.

A should not be paid the sum due to him by B if he has not paid the sum he owes B.

In cases decided shortly after the 1592 Act, the rule that compensation only applied to liquid debts was strictly adhered to. In three early seventeenth century cases21

Earl of Linlithgow v Laird of Airth (1616) Mor 2564; Lady Balbengo v Lord Lauriston (1626) Mor 2564; Campbell v Lord Kinclaiven (1626) Mor 2656.

compensation was refused on the basis that the debt due to the defender by the pursuer was not liquid, despite the defenders seeking to refer their claims for victual22

Any sort of grain or corn: see Watson, Bell's Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland, 7th edn (1890; repr 2012) 1110.

to the pursuer's oath.23

There appear to have been other issues preventing the pursuer's oath from determining the matter in Lady Balbengo and Campbell.

These cases seem to run counter to the terms of the Act, which allows debts instantly verified by writ or oath to be set against liquid sums claimed by the pursuer.24

Comments in the report of Ross v Magistrates of Tayne (1711) Mor 2568 suggest that the 1592 Act did not allow claims instantly offered to be liquidated by oath to be compensated.

By the late 1600s this stance relaxed and defenders’ claims that could be verified instantly by writ or oath were permitted.25

Stuart v MacDuff (1674) Mor 2565.

By the mid 1700s the practice had relaxed further, with Bankton noting that, while the Act required compensation to be instantly verified, if the pursuer took a day to prove his claim, the defender was allowed that day to liquidate his grounds of compensation “even by witnesses in matters capable of that mean of proof”.26

Bankton, Inst 1.24.28.

Erskine's Institute appears to go further still, stating that

our uniform practice for near a century, which seems grounded on the Roman law, … if a debtor in a liquid sum shall plead compensation upon a debt due by his creditor to him, which requires only a short discussion to constitute it, sentence is delayed ex equitate against the debtor in the clear debt, that he may have an opportunity of making his ground of compensation according to the rule, quod statim liquidari potest pro jam liquid habetur.27

Erskine, Inst 3.4.16.

This maxim is defined as “that which can at once be rendered liquid is held as liquid”.28

J Trayner, Trayner's Latin Maxims, 4th edn (1894; repr 1993) 534.

Some of the cases cited by Erskine29

Erskine, Inst 3.4.16.

in which this maxim was said to be operating appear to go beyond defenders’ claims that could at once be rendered liquid and
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