Before Bell: The Roots of Error in the Scots Law of Contract

Published date01 September 2010
Pages385-417
AuthorJohn MacLeod
Date01 September 2010
DOI10.3366/elr.2010.0303
INTRODUCTION

The effect of error on contracts is a favourite topic in many legal systems. Scotland is no exception,1

J J Gow, “Mistake and error” (1952) 1 ICLQ 472; J J Gow, “Some observations on error” (1953) 65 JR 221; J J Gow, “Culpa in docendo” (1954) 66 JR 253; P Stein, Fault in the Formation of Contract in Roman and Scots Law (1958); T B Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (1962) 808–833; J M Thomson, “The effect of error in the Scots law of contract” 1978 Acta Juridica 135; W W McBryde, “Error”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol 2, 72; W W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd edn (2007) paras 15–01 ff; W M Gloag and R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland, 12th edn, by Lord Coulsfield, H L MacQueen et al (2007) paras 6.21–6.32; M Hogg, “The continuing confused saga of contract and error” (2009) 13 EdinLR 286.

the literature providing extensive discussion of George Joseph Bell's analysis2

G J Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland, 4th edn (1839) § 11. This was the last edition by Bell himself, and the edition whose account of error was endorsed by Lord Watson in Stewart v Kennedy (No 2) (1890) 17 R (HL) 25 at 28–29.

and of the case law since. The period before Bell, however, has received less attention,3

The early period is discussed by McBryde, “Error” (n 1) at 72–76.

and advantage has yet to be taken of recent research which corrects the tendency to view European legal development as a monolithic process.4

J Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (1991) and M J Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (2000) are the most significant works for present purposes.

Examination of the earlier materials in light of this research reveals an attitude to error which is quite different from that in modern European systems. While the Scottish approach was rooted in the Roman law texts and the ius commune tradition, it does not bear the marks of scholastic and natural law influences which are central to the treatment of error in Continental systems today. This suggests that it is wrong to characterise error in Scots law as a battleground between the Common Law and a single Civilian view. Differences with France and Germany are not necessarily indicative of English influence, and the choice may not be as stark as T B Smith's famous preference for “the stake with Stair” over “glory with Gloag” makes it seem.5

Smith, Short Commentary (n 1) 817.

Until the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, lawyers in Scotland tended to understand contract formation in terms of subjective consensus. Except where it described voidness for initial impossibility (usually due to the absence of an object of sale), error was merely one of the ways in which absence of consensus was explained. Error was a bit like forgery. Lawyers often talk about forgery but in most cases the fact that a document has been forged is not the really important point. The important point is that the person whose signature has been forged has not signed the document. For that reason, a doctrine of forgery is unnecessary: the results are generated by the normal rules on consent. The same was true of error.

STAIR'S APPROACH

Recent scholarship has tempered the view that Stair created a law of contract without reference to earlier native materials.6

G Lubbe, “Formation of contract”, in Reid & Zimmermann (eds), History (n 1) vol 2, 1 at 1.

Nonetheless his account remains the starting point for any discussion of error. Although the topic was mentioned in earlier Scottish materials,7

W W McBryde, “Error” (n 1) at 74. The earliest case I have found which discusses error in the relevant sense is Hay v Cockburn (1697) Mor 13328.

Stair's major influence in these matters was clearly European The <italic>ius commune</italic> background<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn8"><sup>8</sup></xref><fn id="fn8"><label>8</label><p>Here the term <italic>ius commune</italic> is used to denote mediaeval and early modern writers in the Roman law (as opposed to the canonist or natural law) tradition.</p></fn>

Broadly speaking, the European background may be said to be composed of two strands.9

For the second strand, see B.(2) below. The multifarious nature of the ius commune means that any brief account will inevitably be an oversimplification. For a more nuanced treatment, see Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) and W Ernst, “Irrtum: Ein Streifzug durch die Dogmengeschichte”, in R Zimmermann (ed), Störungen der Willensbildung bei Vertragschluss (2007) 1.

The first was rooted in the efforts of the ius commune jurists to rationalise the Digest texts on error in sale with the aid of Aristotle's theory of categories.10

Mediated through scholastic thinking: see Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) 54–55.

In Roman law,11

For present purposes, the content of the Digest texts is more important than the classical law so modern interpolation criticism can be ignored.

sale was concluded by subjective consensus on certain matters which were later classified as essentialia or substantialia negotii.12

R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations (1990) 234 and authorities cited there. Other contracts, such as lease and mandate, had different substantialia negotii.

These were distinguished from terms which the law would imply (naturalia negotii) and those which might be described as optional extras (accidentalia negotii).13

The distinction between substantialia and accidentalia negotii was used by Azo, Summa Codicis (undated, reprinted in Corpus Glossatorum Juris Civilis vol 2 (1966)) on C 4.54 n°1. But the classic statement came from Baldus, Commentaria in Digestum (1599, reprinted in Commentaria omnia von Baldus de Ubaldus (2004)) on D 18.1.72pr. See Gordley, Philosophical Origins (n 4) 61–65. Stair was aware of Baldus’ work, quoting the latter's comment on D 45.1.10 in his inaugural oration before the Faculty of Advocates, reprinted in “Scotstartvet's Trew Relation” (1916) 13 Scottish Historical Review 380 at 389.

Without agreement on the substantialia there could be no sale. The classical Roman law of error and the influence of Aristotelian philosophy on it remain a matter of controversy.14

See M Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht (1971) vol 1, 238 n 25; Gordley, Philosophical Origins (n 4) 57–58; M J Schermaier, Materia: Beiträge zur Frage der Naturphilosophie im klassischen römischen Recht (1992) 105–162 esp 138–154; J D Harke, Si error aliquis intervenit – Irrtum im klassischen römischen Vertragsrecht (2005) and the review thereof by M J Schermaier in (2008) 125 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische Abteilung) 826; H H Jakobs, “D.18.1.11 nach Überwindung der Interpolationistik” (2008) 125 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische Abteilung) 375.

However, it is clear that most of the cases of relevant error identified in the Digest (error in pretio (price), corpore (object), persona (parties) and negotia (type of contract15

E.g. where one party thought it was a lease and the other thought it was a sale.

))16

F de Zulueta, The Roman Law of Sale (1945) 25; Zimmermann, Obligations (n 12) 589–592.

fit comfortably within the substantialia of sale.17

Odofredus, a contemporary of Accursius, appears to have been the first to make the connection between the categories of relevant error and the substantialia negotii in the context of Civil Law: Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) 51.

The fact that the contract was formed by subjective consensus has important consequences for our understanding of these instances of error.18

The significance and understanding of consensus in classical Roman law is contested but this at least is the traditional view. See further D Daube, “Societas as a consensual contract” (1938) 6 CLJ 381 at 395–399; F Schulz, Classical Roman Law (1951) 528; Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht (n 14) vol 1, 237–238; Zimmermann, Obligations (n 12) 563–565; M J Schermaier, “‘Nichtrömisches’ in römischen Irrtumsrecht”, in P Pichonnaz (ed), Autour du droit des contrats: Contributions de droit romain en l'honneur de Felix Wubbe (2009) 49 esp at 78–80; C Cascione, Consensus (2003); Harke, Si error aliqui intervenit (n 14) 28, 32, 348. My knowledge of Cascione is restricted to the review by P Pichonnaz in (2007) 124 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische Abteilung) 504.

First, common error in these matters was impossible because the parties’ common intention constituted and defined the contract.19

Discounting the rather unlikely case when both parties have the same incorrect belief about the identity of one party.

So if both thought the price was x, the price was indeed x; if both intended to contract regarding a certain object, that was the object of their contract; if both thought they were agreeing a sale, that is what they agreed. As the contract had no existence beyond the parties’ common intention, it followed that the common intention could not be incorrect

Secondly, unilateral error would mean dissensus: one party intended to sell while the other intended to hire; one intended to sell x while the other intended to buy y; A made an offer to B which was accepted by C. In the absence of an objective approach to contracts, unilateral error amounted to a failure to agree all that was required for a valid sale. Error, where relevant and possible, was merely the real-world explanation for the legally relevant fact: the absence of the necessary consensus. In the major Digest text on error in sale, error and dissensus appear to be equated.20

D 18.1.9 (Ulpian).

An incidental consequence is that the natural paradigm for error was unilateral rather than common

One category of error accepted in the Roman texts appears to present problems for this analysis.21

Error regarding the sex or virginity of a slave is also mentioned (D 18.1.11.1 (Ulpian)) but this was clearly of little relevance to Stair.

Error about what an object was made of (error in substantia or materi
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