Ex Turpi Causa – When Latin Avoids Liability

Published date01 May 2014
Date01 May 2014
AuthorJonathan Mance
Pages175-192
DOI10.3366/elr.2014.0203
INTRODUCTION

The maxim ex turpi causa oritur non actio (loosely, deliberate wrongdoing cannot found a cause of action) is a rule of public policy established by the courts. When I say the courts, I have not forgotten where I am, and confess at the outset that my skills and knowledge are rooted parochially south of the border, despite substantial Scottish ancestry. But I am grateful both to my Scottish colleagues and to Professor Hector MacQueen for a degree of confirmation that Scots and English law use the same Latin phrase and cite each others’ authorities in their attempts to understand its scope and operation. I appreciate that English attachment to the Latin may be more inveterate than Scots, and that Scots principles of unjust enrichment may put a different complexion on some of the issues I shall discuss. But the underlying problem of how to react to illegal behaviour is one which both legal systems appear to see in broadly similar terms, and in saying this I have in particular benefitted by the very recent Outer House decision in McLaughlin v Morrison.1

[2013] CSOH 163.

In it, Lord Jones cites considerable English as well as Scots authority. The latter includes Winnik v Dick (Winnik),2

1984 SC 48.

where Lord Hunter opined that the “brocard” could defeat a personal injuries claim, so achieving “a result the same as that reached in several cases in other jurisdictions”, a delicate reference which gave the Scots relationship with England no special priority
GENERAL SCOPE OF <italic>EX TURPI CAUSA</italic> MAXIM

The brocard, as Lord Hunter called it, is of course an invitation to fast-thinking of the type that the Nobel prize-winner Daniel Kahnemann has in his book Thinking Fast and Slow so tellingly – and, for decision-makers like myself, alarmingly – described.3

D Kahnemann, Thinking Fast and Slow (2012).

It suggests easy answers, but is entirely fallacious in so doing. The most cursory examination of case-law in which ex turpi causa is discussed leaves uncertainty about what the policy underlying it is or when it is engaged. Its deceptive simplicity hides “a wide variety of situations”, Lord Hoffmann noted in Gray v Thames Trains Ltd.4

[2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339, para 30.

Not all of them are easy to reconcile. It is an unhappy mix of rigid rules and value judgments, and its application has unpredictable and haphazard consequences

So intractable is its operation that the English Law Commission, after writing several penetrating reports, appears to have given up on reform (save in the area of trusts). It justified this by a belief that the case law already evidenced an incremental trend towards a situation in which, instead of applying rigid rules, the courts would consider each case to see whether the application of the maxim was justified on the basis of its underlying polices. The Law Commission referred in this connection to Gray v Thames Trains and Stone & Rolls v Moore Stephens.5

[2009] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 AC 1391.

It saw the latter case as “more difficult”, but “not inconsistent” with its belief6

Law Commission, Report on The Illegality Defence (Law Com No 320), para 3.38.

 – a view which I myself would question

Gray v Thames Trains certainly goes some way towards clarifying some aspects of the law. But it does not address the haphazard consequences of the maxim, where it applies, and (perhaps because of my own failure in a case called Collier v Collier7

[2002] EWCA Civ 1095.

to persuade the House of Lords to revisit the subject) I am not so optimistic that English common law can by itself achieve satisfactory overall solutions. It is of course conceivable that Scottish law would take a more flexible approach. I note that in the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia of The Laws of Scotland the application of the maxim in relation to delictual obligations is firmly based on public policy.8

B J Rodger “Defences to Delictual Liability” in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 15 (1996 and Cum Supp) para 411.

But substantial English authority is also cited there, as it was in McLaughlin v Morrison to which I have already referred. Gloag and Henderson's The Law of Scotland also treats the two legal systems as likely to attach the same significance to the maxim in the area of contract.9

W M Gloag and R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland, 13th edn, by H L MacQueen et al (2012), ch 9 passim.

Underlying the maxim is an understandable reluctance of courts to become involved in giving legal effect to illegal transactions. In Gray v Thames Trains the House of Lords identified consistency as a core element of this reluctance. Courts cannot with the one hand punish or condemn conduct as illegal and with the other hand enforce or attach legal effects to it. But in the same case Lord Hoffmann, at least, thought that consistency could not explain all the situations covered. He identified further situations in which a claim might be “so closely connected” with illegality as to be unenforceable, even though it could not be said that the court was being asked directly to attach legal effects to the illegality.

Let me at this point go back to the beginning. A good start is the case of Everet v Williams,10

(1725) 104 ER 725.

often referred to as the “Highwaymen's case”. There, a claim for an account alleged that there had been an oral partnership between the defendant and the plaintiff, who was “skilled in dealing in several sorts of commodities”; that the parties had “proceeded jointly in the said dealings with good success on Hounslow Heath, where they dealt with a gentleman for a gold watch”; and that defendant had informed plaintiff the Finchley “was a good and convenient place to deal in, and that the said commodities were very plenty at Finchley aforesaid”, and that if they were to deal there “it would be almost all gain to them”. The solicitors were fined by the court for their impertinence in presenting such a claim. The parties were duly hung in 1727 and 1730

In the Highwaymen's case the sophistry of the pleading could not hope to conceal the nature of the actual dealings. And it seems unremarkable that a claim is barred where, and to the extent that, the claimant is seeking to enforce a transaction to his profit by a positive plea of illegality in support of his claim Whatever the state of account between two highwaymen, the law must disclaim involvement. But the maxim is not limited to such extreme cases, or it would seldom trouble the courts. To take another famous example of its application, in Pearce v Brougham11

(1866) LR 1 Ex 213.

a carriage owner sued a prostitute for the hire of, as well as compensation for returning damaged, a brougham which he knew would be used for unlawful soliciting. He could not recover either the hire or any compensation. There was nothing wrong with the contract on its face, but it was unenforceable by either side because of their shared purpose. It was open to the prostitute to rely on the illegality to defeat the claim.

In the light of what I have said thus far, it is a little surprising to find the House of Lords in Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam12

[2003] 2 AC 366.

undertaking without question an exercise of determining the appropriate contributions which each of three defendant conspirators should make as between each other to their joint liability to the party whom they had conspired to defraud. The explanation is probably that the right to contribution arose under a statute, the Civil Liability (Contribution Act) 1978, framed in absolutely general terms which escaped the ambit of the common law maxim.
APPLICATION AND EFFECT OF THE MAXIM The problem of haphazard results

Turning to the effects of the maxim, a basic feature is that, whenever it applies, the law washes its hands and any loss lies where it falls. This can lead to haphazard results. The prostitute may have benefited greatly by use of the brougham, but she paid no hire. There was no question of putting the parties back in to the position in which they were in before they made the contract, or ordering restitution of any benefits received. A party may be left with a windfall; whether in the form of property or the use of property received, release from contractual performance, or the avoidance of liability for the consequences of negligence.

This was acknowledged as long ago as the eighteenth century by Lord Mansfield in Holman v Johnson,13

(1775) 1 Cowp 341.

when he said:

The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and defendant sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by accident, if I may so say. The principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur actio. No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a positive law of the country, there the Court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground the Court goes; not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff. So if the plaintiff and defendant were to change sides, and the defendant was to bring his action against the plaintiff, the latter would then have the advantage of it.

The principle therefore applies irrespective of what might otherwise appear as the equities between the parties (though even this conclusion is qualified in cases where the law regards the parties as not having been in pari delicto). And, although in the Highwaymen's case the claim necessarily gave the game away, it is clear, from what I have already said as well as from Lord Mansfield's summary, that the law is not only interested in the way in...

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