9/11 as False Flag: Why International Law Must Dare to Care

DOI10.3366/ajicl.2017.0200
Published date01 August 2017
Date01 August 2017
Pages371-392
AuthorAmy Baker Benjamin
INTRODUCTION

No matter what one may think about the nature of the attacks that took place in the United States on September 11, 2001, one thing is beyond dispute: Those attacks have provided the legal, political and moral justification for 16 years of international war. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that, with a few notable exceptions, all use-of-force roads laid since the beginning of this century lead back to the Rome of 9/11. These would include the 2001 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan; the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq; the series of drone strikes here1 and cluster bombings there;2 the current mission to ‘degrade and defeat’ the Islamic State and affiliated terror groups in Iraq and Syria;3 and even the quietly argued need to re-intervene in Libya now that it has become a ‘failed state’ overrun by terrorists.4

Each one of these military campaigns and/or thrusts is based on the legal authorisation and moral dispensation granted by domestic and international authorities in the days following 9/11 to respond to the attacks of that day. Ask today for the legal basis of fighting a global ‘War On Terror’ against groups that were not even in existence in 2001 and you will be handed a copy of the law passed just seven days after 9/11 authorising the President to use force against the perpetrators and abettors of 9/11 (i.e. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban).5 Challenge the wisdom of fighting a War on Terror to the end of a second decade, and you will likely be chided for inviting a terror attack on a par with, or even worse than, 9/11.6 From the standpoint of international law and international political morality, then, 9/11 presumes to shoulder the heaviest of loads: a monumental amount of war to date, with apparently a good deal of war still to come.7

We would do well to remind ourselves, however, that this shouldering is only as strong and effective as the claim of self-defence on which it is based. The War on Terror is, after all, a war that is claimed to be fought in self-defence.8 Were this claim ever to be proved false – were it ever to be shown that the United States was not in fact attacked by ‘others’ on 9/11 but rather attacked itself (or let itself be attacked) for the purpose of blaming others and justifying international war – then its war would not be one of self-defence but of pre-meditated and carefully camouflaged aggression.9 In this sensitive matter especially, the obvious bears repeating: ‘[I]f 9–11 is in fact an instance of Machiavellian state terror … then any US pretence that these wars have to do with self-defense is totally unsustainable.’10

Precisely because so much is at stake, one might expect international institutions such as the United Nations to seek to satisfy themselves that the American claim of self-defence is a valid one. Yet remarkably enough they have never shown an interest in doing so. In the days and weeks following 9/11, the UN accepted without hesitation the American claim to have been attacked by elements of international terrorism.11 NATO more or less followed suit, even though the peremptory nature of its mutual-defence pact obliged it to probe the validity of the American self-defence claim, not merely rubber-stamp it.12 Over the course of the last 16 years, neither the UN nor NATO has revisited the issue of responsibility for the attacks, and this despite the fact that (1) an impressive body of literature has emerged that challenges virtually every significant aspect of the official account;13 (2) key members of the United States Congress have insisted that the domestic investigations into 9/11 were not credible and, indeed, were ‘set up to fail’ by the Bush II Administration;14 and (3) two candidates for the office of US President in 2016 – Donald Trump (Republican Party) and Jill Stein (Green Party) – publicly questioned the accuracy of the official account, with Stein going so far as to call for a new investigation.15

The reluctance to ask hard questions in the halls of international institutions charged with the duty to vet claims of national self-defence has been matched by the silence of scholars, who have almost uniformly shied away from the 9/11 controversy swirling outside their halls.16 This is not to say that scholars have avoided 9/11 as a topic of study. Quite the contrary – they have embraced it, but only so far, and only in a highly circumscribed manner. Scholars specialising in international law or international relations, for example, have generated a multitude of articles and books on 9/11, but almost all such studies assume the correctness of the core US claim of self-defence and then proceed to nibble on issues lying around its perimeter. How much should we sacrifice our civil liberties in order to better safeguard our security? Can the 9/11 attacks support a paradigm shift away from anticipatory self-defence to preventative self-defence? Might the torture of terror suspects be justified on a ‘warfare’ approach to counter-terrorism as opposed to a ‘crime’ approach (and vice versa)? These are all good and worthwhile questions, but they do exhibit a tendency to uncritically assume the accuracy of the official 9/11 account.

Recent developments suggest that the public at large is beginning to back away from this assumption, and that it may be time for scholars to do so as well. Bowing to public pressure, the Obama Administration declassified a 28-page excerpt from a 2002 Congressional report on the 9/11 attacks that strongly indicates that officials and operatives of the government of Saudi Arabia funded and logistically choreographed the hijackers involved in the attacks.17 Several months after this declassification, the US Congress enacted legislation that enables families of 9/11 victims to sue the Saudi government for damages for any acts of terrorism on US soil shown to have been sponsored by it.18 Given the close geostrategic alliance between the US and Saudi Arabia, as well as the lesser known but equally close historical ties between the Saudi royal family and the Bush political dynasty,19 evidence implicating elements of the Saudi government should prompt uncomfortable questions regarding the actions of Saudi-friendly elements within the US government at the time of the 9/11 attacks. At the very least, a Saudi role in the attacks would invalidate the core plank of the official account – namely the claim that a decentralised group of non-state actors, bent on the most indiscriminate kind of asymmetric warfare, perpetrated the attacks on their own and unaided by the resources of any nation state.

This belated and still-fledgling American movement toward transparency regarding 9/11 is unquestionably laudable. It is also, however, insufficient. The main contention of this Article is that international law and international political institutions have a vital role to play in ensuring that the case of 9/11 is fully and objectively investigated. My argument is based on the late Professor Thomas Franck's insistence that the core mission of the premier public international body – the United Nations – is to perform its ‘jury’ function of determining and declaring whether an act of aggression has occurred.20 Pretextual self-defence based on a false flag event is almost by definition aggression, as it constitutes an act of force resting on a spurious justification. Even if the collective-security role of the UN system – as reflected in the second half of Article 39 and Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter – seems to have withered on the vine and to be now worth little, the UN's jury role, as reflected in the first half of Article 39, remains firmly intact. (Importantly, and as I will show below, this is true regardless of whether this jury role is viewed as being rooted in the positive law of Article 39 or in pre-Charter customary international law.) For the UN's political organs21 to remain disengaged from the controversy surrounding 9/11 is to abdicate responsibility for their core mission. It is, in a very real and practical sense, to deny their own raison d’être. This, indeed, is an outcome to be avoided if at all possible.

But is it possible? Can the UN finally, after all these years, muster the will to pass judgment on the US claim to have been the victim of international terrorism on 9/11? They certainly can, but they obviously need some help: the case of 9/11-as-false-flag is so fraught with anger and ignorance as to be almost paralysing. Whether we passively listen or actively turn away, all that many of us hear are disturbing sounds and cries claiming to have evidence of unspeakable acts. Historical events that lie more deeply in the past, however, are less threatening and therefore more instructive. And so I will suggest that the first step in trying to break the 9/11 paralysis is to recognise that international law and political institutions have long been concerned with the danger of nation states committing false flags in order to both gain domestic political advantage and/or to justify (or prepare for) international war. To portions of this unsavoury history I now turn.

WHY IT IS RATIONAL TO CARE Africa's False-Flag ‘Education’

The continent of Africa regrettably needs no lessons in the reality of the false-flag tactic and of its use in the pursuit of illegitimate political aims. There is, to begin with, the unfortunate example of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, under which South African security services stealthily carried out attacks against government officials and installations for the purpose of blaming the African National Congress and thereby discrediting the anti-Apartheid movement as a whole. The routine nature of these attacks is attested to by the sheer number of times the post-Apartheid South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission had to use the term ‘false flag’ in the course of deciding the amnesty applications of white South African former officials. Consider the Commission's ruling...

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