‘A Europe without Walls, without Fences, without Borders’: A Desecuritisation of Migration Doomed to Fail
| Author | Dimitris Skleparis |
| Date | 01 November 2018 |
| Published date | 01 November 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321717729631 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
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Article
Political Studies
2018, Vol. 66(4) 985 –1001
‘A Europe without Walls,
© The Author(s) 2017
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https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717729631
DOI: 10.1177/0032321717729631
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Borders’: A Desecuritisation of
Migration Doomed to Fail
Dimitris Skleparis
Abstract
It has been commonly argued that amid the so-called ‘migration crisis’ in 2015, Greece ignored its
Dublin Regulation obligations due to unprecedentedly high migration flows, structural weaknesses,
fears and uncertainty. However, this narrative deprives the Greek government of agency. In
contrast, this article puts forward an alternative analysis of Greece’s attitude. It argues that the
Greek government’s policy choices in the realms of border controls, migration and asylum in
2015, prior to the ‘EU–Turkey deal’, manifested a well-calculated desecuritisation strategy
with a twofold aim. In this respect, this article provides an analysis of why and how the newly
elected SYRIZA-led coalition government embarked on a desecuritising move and assesses the
success/effectiveness of this move and the desecuritisation strategy. It argues that although the
government’s desecuritising move was successful, overall, its desecuritisation strategy failed to
produce the anticipated results vis-à-vis the government’s twofold aim and intended outcomes.
Keywords
migration crisis, refugees, asylum policies, European Union, desecuritisation
Accepted: 13 August 2017
Introduction
Between January 2015 and February 2016, that is prior to the implementation of the
‘EU–Turkey deal’, close to 1 million people crossed the Greek–Turkish borders in search
of a better life. It is commonly argued that within this context the newly elected
SYRIZA-led coalition government was caught off guard and began overtly ignoring its
obligations under the Dublin Regulation (see Greenhill, 2016; Trauner, 2016). The asym-
metrical burden of Greece’s responsibility under the Common European Asylum System
(CEAS), in combination with unprecedentedly high numbers of refugees and migrants
School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
Corresponding author:
Dimitris Skleparis, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Building, 28
Bute Gardens, Glasgow G12 8RS, UK.
Email: dimitris.skleparis@gla.ac.uk
986
Political Studies 66(4)
triggered by wars and instability in neighbouring regions, and Greece’s weakened struc-
tural capacity after 5 years of austerity, led the government to allow newcomers to move
on unregistered to their preferred destination countries, mainly Germany and Sweden
(Trauner, 2016: 312). Moreover, Greece’s attitude was guided by significant migration-
related fears and anxieties, and uncertainty regarding if and when adequate European
Union (EU) assistance would be forthcoming with respect to the humanitarian emergency
that was created on the islands (Greenhill, 2016).
Although this narrative provides a convincing account of the contextual factors that
shaped Greece’s inability to respond to the refugee influx, it tends to present the Greek
government as an idle observer of unfolding developments. In other words, this narrative
deprives the Greek government of agency. Instead, we argue that the SYRIZA-led coali-
tion government made a number of bold policy choices in the realms of border controls,
migration and asylum amid the ‘migration crisis’.
This article puts forward an alternative analysis of Greece’s policy choices amid the
‘migration crisis’. Instead of conceptualising them as mere by-products of external factors,
structural inabilities, fears, anxieties and uncertainty, this article argues that the Greek
government’s policy choices in the realms of border controls, migration and asylum, prior
to the ‘EU–Turkey deal’, emanated from a well-calculated strategy with a twofold aim. On
the one hand, it aimed to reinstate the rule of law in migration and asylum management in
Greece, and liberalise the country’s border control, migration and asylum policies. On the
other hand, it aimed to ‘Europeanise’ the unfairness of the Dublin Regulation, pushing, in
this way, for a fairer CEAS based on the principle of responsibility sharing, and, ulti-
mately, for the liberalisation of border control, migration and asylum policies across
Europe. Hence, we argue that behind the headlines of Greece’s campaign for the end of
austerity throughout the 2015 bailout negotiation, another campaign, less visible, equally
persistent, and not always clearly demarcated from the former, was also taking place.
Our aim is also twofold: first, to understand why and how the newly elected Greek
government attempted a U-turn from the previous government’s border control, migra-
tion and asylum policies in 2015; and second, to assess the level of success of this policy
shift vis-à-vis the government’s objectives and intended outcomes. In this respect, we
analyse the government’s border control, migration and asylum policies, and the state-
ments reported in the press made by government officials in 2015, by drawing on desecu-
ritisation theory (see Buzan et al., 1998) and the consequentialist evaluation of security
(see Floyd, 2007; 2010; 2011)
We argue that the government’s policy shift comprised a desecuritisation of the coun-
try’s border control, migration and asylum policies. We suggest that although the desecu-
ritising move was successful, overall, desecuritisation failed to produce the anticipated
results vis-à-vis the government’s twofold aim and intended outcomes. The argument is
structured as follows: the first section provides an overview of the restrictive border con-
trol, migration and asylum policies implemented under the previous New Democracy–led
unity government. Next, the theoretical framework of the article is put forward, namely
securitisation/desecuritisation theory and the consequentialist evaluation of security.
Then we proceed with an outline of the border control, migration and asylum policy shift
that was undertaken by the SYRIZA-led coalition government, and we identify the under-
lying aims and intended outcomes of the desecuritising move, and assess the level of its
success. The remainder of the article explores the extent to which desecuritisation suc-
ceeded in advancing the interests of the state and its elites based on the latter’s objectives
and intended results, and analyses the factors that shaped the outcome of the strategy.
Skleparis
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This article draws upon EU and migration studies (see Geddes, 2000; 2003), securiti-
sation/desecuritisation literature (see Buzan et al., 1998; Huysmans, 2006) and work on
agency, more specifically, constructivist institutionalism (see Hay, 2006; Hay and
Wincott, 1998). The latter allows for a role for agency and a plausible alternative analysis
for the interaction between agency and context, and institutional change. Constructivist
institutionalism sees actors as strategic, pursuing specific complex, contingent and
dynamic goals. Both their strategies and goals are shaped by the actors’ perceptions of the
context, which are incomplete and which may very often prove to have been ex post facto
inaccurate. Similarly, their interests and motivations are informed by the actors’ norma-
tive (moral, ethical and political) orientation towards the context. In this regard, the
actors’ perceptions about what is feasible, legitimate, possible and desirable are equally
shaped by the institutional context in which they find themselves and by existing policy
paradigms and world views (Hay, 2006). According to Blyth (2002), it is particularly in
times of crisis institutional changes take place, through short bouts of intense ideational
contestations in which actors’ perceptions of their own goals, strategies, interests and
motivations become problematised. We argue that a similar brief but intense ideational
struggle that took place amid the ‘migration crisis’ instigated a shift in border control,
migration and asylum policies in Greece and across Europe.
The New Democracy–Led Unity Government’s Border
Control, Migration and Asylum Policies: 2012–2014
Increased flows of asylum seekers from Northern Africa that followed the Arab Spring in
2011 were treated with unease by the EU, and triggered the tightening of border control,
migration and asylum policies at the outposts of the Union, including Greece
(Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, 2013). At the same time, the increasing popularity of the
extreme-right party Golden Dawn in opinion polls prior to the 2012 double legislative
elections, as well as the electoral success of the party in both May and June elections, set
the issue of ‘illegal migration’ on top of the domestic political agenda. In fear of losing
more votes to its far-right opponent and pushed by heightened migration-related anxieties
across the EU, the New Democracy–led unity government that was formed in June 2012
introduced a number of repressive measures in order to curb ‘illegal migration’ flows and
combat ‘illegal stay’ of third-country nationals in Greece (see Lazaridis and Skleparis,
2016; Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, 2013).
In August 2012, Operations Aspida (Shield) and Xenios Zeus were introduced at the
Greek–Turkish land border and in mainland Greece, respectively, in a combined attempt
to...
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