‘A lot of people still love and worship the monarchy’: How polarizing frames trigger countermobilization in Thailand
| Author | Janjira Sombatpoonsiri |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221142932 |
| Published date | 01 January 2023 |
| Date | 01 January 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
‘A lot of people still love and worship
the monarchy’: How polarizing frames
trigger countermobilization in Thailand
Janjira Sombatpoonsiri
German Institute for Global & Area Studies and Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University
Abstract
This article examines the interplay between nonviolent movements’use of polarizing issues for mobilization and
pro-regime countermobilization. Thailand has been chosen as an explanatory case study because it has a history of
political polarization and pro-regime mass mobilization. I focus on polarizing frames that were incorporated into
the 2020 nonviolent resistance campaigns, which addressed a taboo subject in the country: the monarchy. In
response, the regime applied various forms of repression, including the mobilization of royalists. But the assump-
tion that the regime single-handedly mobilized countermovements is only half of the story. Autonomous elements
within countermovements also joined forces when there were sufficient social conditions. By juxtaposing protest
event data with an analysis of mobilizing frames (through movements’Twitter hashtags), I shed light on a two-
pronged process that underpins the nexus between framing choice and countermobilization: (a) how a movement’s
choiceforpolarizingframessustainsexisting ideological and identity-based cleavages, antagonizing segments of
society that perceive their collective identity to be under siege and; (b) how these ideological and identity-based
cleavages also provide social sources for countermobilization. I conclude by addressing some implications of this
framing choice–countermobilization nexus on repression dynamics and suggest how we can rethink the relation-
ship between strategic framing and nonviolent resistance campaigns in divided societies.
Keywords
countermobilization, frames, nonviolent resistance, polarization, Thailand
Introduction
The increased no. of global protest events after 2010
markedly contrasts with the decreasing likelihood that
nonviolent resistance campaigns will succeed, with the
success rate dropping drastically from 65% in the 1990s
to 34% in the 2010s (Chenoweth, 2020). Scholars iden-
tify several underlying drivers for this decline, including
the elites’wealth of resources, autocratic adaptation to
nonviolent resistance repertoires, a changing global envi-
ronment pertinent to international support for resistance
campaigns, and internal dynamics of movements,
including organizational fragmentation and shifting stra-
tegic approaches (e.g. Bramsen, 2018; Chenoweth,
2020; Chenoweth & Schock, 2015; Davies, 2014;
Kirisci & Demirhan, 2019). This article builds on these
debates to demonstrate an additional challenge that
nonviolent resistance movements face: frames with
‘non-resonance problems.’Frames reflect a movement’s
embeddedness in its respective sociocultural context and
shape the public perception of its agenda (Benford &
Snow, 2000: 613). Although frames with ‘non-resonance
problems’may lower participation in campaigns (e.g.
Benford, 1987), this article sheds lighton the relationship
between polarizing frames and countermobilization.
Research has shown the importance of strategic and
tactical choices in galvanizing and sustaining mass mobi-
lization (e.g. Cunningham et al., 2017) conducive to,
among others, movement resilience in the face of repres-
sion (e.g. Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Nepstad, 2011).
Corresponding author:
janjira.s@chula.ac.th
Journal of Peace Research
2023, Vol. 60(1) 88–106
ªThe Author(s) 2023
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433221142932
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However, only a few existing studies (e.g. Schock, 2015:
97–101; MacLeod, 2012) explore the relevance of
framing choices to nonviolent resistance campaigns;
systematic analyses of what frames work and do not work
in a given context remain scant. I contribute to this
burgeoning literature by focusing on how movements’
use of polarizing frames encourages countermobilization.
This focus does not exclude other drivers, especially
regime orchestration and movement fragmentation, that
foster countermobilization (see Hellmeier & Weidmann,
2020; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996: 1641). Instead,
I bring to attention the contribution of polarizing
frames to countermobilization, an aspect that is still
underanalysed. I show that a movement’spolarizing
frames can bolster countermovements by deepening
ideological and identity-based cleavages into which
these movements similarly tap as a social source of
mobilization (Bessinger, 2020). Through an inductive,
case-based approach, I rely on evidence from Thailand’s
2020 online and offline protests to explore the framing
choice–countermobilization nexus.
In what follows, I first situate my argument in the
contemporary academic debates on nonviolent resis-
tance, collective action frames, and countermobilization.
The second section details explanatory case studies as the
methodological approach, scope conditions that inform
my case selection, and data collection strategies. Third,
I describe patterns of framing by the 2020 anti-
establishment movement, why the polarizing subject of
the monarchy became the movement’s central frame,
and how this framing choice aggravated parts of the
public. In the fourth section, I analyse ways in which
monarchy-related frames helped give ground to royalist
mobilization on the streets and via Twitter. Although the
regime apparatus orchestrated pro-monarchy activities
on various occasions, the grassroots, a seemingly auton-
omous element was also present, with all denouncing the
movement’s monarchy-cen tred agenda. I conclude by
highlighting some implications of these insights for
repression dynamics and strategic framing in nonviolent
resistance campaigns.
Nonviolent resistance, polarizing frames,
and countermobilization
I synthesize research on nonviolent resistance, collective
action frames, and countermovements to analyse a link-
age between a movement’s frames and countermobiliza-
tion. Key to my analytical framework is: (a) how
polarizing frames sustain or even deepen identity-based
cleavages and harden opposition by those seeing their
community under attack, and (b) how this framing
approach carries a moral undertone that casts a move-
ment’sopponentsasmorallywrong.Grassroots-
organized and regime-organized countermovements base
their activism on these ideological and identity-based
schisms (Bessinger, 2020).
Nonviolent resistance
Following Dudouet (2008) and Schock (2015), I define
nonviolent resistance as a form of collective action by
organized civic groups who, while abstaining from the
use of arms, actively pursue a political goal such as pro-
moting democracy and resisting oppression or injustice.
This works to shift power away from the bases of support
that sustain the elites’status quo while securing allies from
these bases. Thisimpact on power dynamics is mainlydue
to, among other factors, movements’strategic planning
and organizational structure that shape tactical diversity
and sustain mobilization (Cunningham et al., 2017;
Sharp, 1973). The nonviolent characteristics of resistance
campaigns tend to lower physical risks and moral bar-
riers compared to armed resistance, thus potentially
increasing and diversifying participation in the campaigns
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 39–41). Increased partic-
ipation, in turn, enhances tactical creativity which is cru-
cial for movement resilience in the face of repression
(Chenoweth & Ste phan, 2011: 39–51; Nepstad, 2011).
Despite the merits of these insights, current scholarly
works assess the tangible impact of strategies and organiza-
tionalstructure on campaignsuccesses at the expenseof less
tangible aspects such as framing choices. Existingexplana-
tions within Nonviolent Resistance Studies link a framing
process with, for instance, ‘backfire dynamics.’Martin
(2007) argues that a backfire process can occur when vio-
lence against unarmed resistance is ‘framed’in a way that
generateswidespread moral outrage againstperpetrators. If
this framinggains critical traction,movements may be able
to expand their support bases (see also Edwards & Arnon,
2021; Martin & Varney, 2002). Other works in the field
(e.g. MacLeod,2012; Sombatpoonsiri, 2015; Sørensen &
Vinthagen, 2012) examine how nonviolent movements
make use of ‘cultural capital’(e.g. symbols, language, and
historical knowledge) to advance their communication
strategies. These studies have not, however, comprehen-
sively addressedthe effects of mobilizing framesunpopular
in the view of segments of society.
Collective action frames and polarizing frames
Research within Social Movement Studies discusses
‘unpopular frames’through the lens of non-resonance.
Sombatpoonsiri 89
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