Accountability and transparency: Police forces in England and Wales
| Author | Peter Eckersley,Peter Murphy,Laurence Ferry |
| Date | 01 July 2017 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0952076716671033 |
| Published date | 01 July 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Public Policy and Administration
2017, Vol. 32(3) 197–213
!The Author(s) 2016
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0952076716671033
journals.sagepub.com/home/ppa
Article
Accountability and
transparency: Police
forces in England
and Wales
Peter Murphy
Nottingham Trent University, UK
Peter Eckersley
Newcastle University, UK
Laurence Ferry
Durham University, UK
Abstract
Between 2010 and 2015, the UK’s Coalition Government introduced directly-elected
Police and Crime Commissioners to oversee English and Welsh police forces, and also
required every force to publish a range of performance and financial information online.
Together with the fact that front-line policing services have not been outsourced or
privatised, this suggests that strong ‘downwards’ mechanisms exist through which resi-
dents can hold their local force to account. However, the new arrangements are sig-
nificantly more complex than their predecessors, because many more actors are
involved – several of which assume the role of both ‘principal’ and ‘agent’ in different
accountability relationships. As a result, there is a substantial risk that the public do not
have a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities, which makes it more difficult to
hold officials to account for their actions. Such findings highlight how direct elections do
not necessarily make public officials more accountable, and therefore have implications
for other jurisdictions and sectors.
Keywords
Accountability, transparency, police and crime commisioners
Corresponding author:
Peter Murphy, Nottingham Trent University, Newton Building, Burton Street, Nottingham NG1 4BU, UK.
Email: peter.murphy@ntu.ac.uk
Introduction
England and Wales, like most advanced democratic countries, have a combination
of territorial or locally based police forces and more specialised forces. The latter
specialise in more complex and serious levels of crime and predominantly operate
on a national basis. They include the National Crime Agency, which deals with
serious and organised crime, and the National Counter Terrorist Security Office, as
well as forces such as the British Transport Police and the Civil Nuclear
Constabulary, which operate in particular areas, sectors or services. This article
focuses on how recent reforms have changed the nature of accountability arrange-
ments for the 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales that are controlled
locally and deal with the vast majority of crimes, such as robbery, burglary, arson,
theft and assault. It does not relate to the special police forces, nor to Scotland or
Northern Ireland, where similar, but different, public assurance regimes have
developed.
The article begins by exploring the conceptual nature of accountability, before
analysing the evolution of various regimes that aimed to monitor financial and
operational performance and provide public assurance in the police service. These
regimes expanded under the New Labour administrations from 1997 to 2010, but
were radically reformed by the Conservative-led coalition government that held
office between May 2010 and May 2015. It shows how these reforms sought to
improve ‘downwards’ accountability to citizens by introducing elected Police and
Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and giving the public greater access to data about
the activities of their local force as part of the government’s ‘transparency’ agenda.
Crucially, however, the changes have resulted in police accountability arrange-
ments becoming more complex and opaque. Indeed, the article will discuss two
recent cases that highlighted how both residents and local policing organisations
have struggled to understand how roles and powers are distributed within the new
system. This suggests that accountability principals may not be sufficiently
informed to hold agents to account effectively. By extension, it increases the risk
of ‘mistaken identity’, in which one actor is held responsible for the actions of
another.
Accountability and transparency in public services
Whilst recognising that excessive monitoring can harm decision-making and oper-
ational performance, it has been argued that accountability helps to ensure ‘good
governance’ and democratic control (De Fine Licht et al., 2014; Mayston, 1993).
Traditionally, accountability has been associated with a ‘higher authority’ calling
an individual or organisation ‘to account’ for their actions and having the power to
levy sanctions for misdemeanours or malpractice (Jones, 1992). This model is based
on the idea of a two-way relationship between the agent (which acts) and the
principal (on whose behalf the agent is supposed to act), and which theoretically
can hold the agent to account for its activity (Mayston, 1993; Mulgan, 2000).
198 Public Policy and Administration 32(3)
To continue reading
Request your trial