Adair v Munn. Adair v Brash
| Jurisdiction | Scotland |
| Judgment Date | 06 August 1940 |
| Date | 06 August 1940 |
| Docket Number | No. 9. |
| Court | High Court of Justiciary |
HIGH COURT
Lord Justice-General. Lord Justice-Clerk. Ld. Moncrieff. Lord Mackay. Lord Wark. Ld. Jamieson.
Statutory Offences—Road Traffic Acts—Driving motor vehicle when under the influence of drink—Disqualification for holding a licence—"Special reasons" for reducing or remitting statutory period of disqualification—Road Traffic Act, 1930 (20 and 21 Geo. V, cap. 43), secs. 6 (1) and 15 (1) and (2).
The Road Traffic Act, 1930, by sec. 15, subsec. (2), enacts that a person convicted under subsec. (1) of the section of the offence of being, when in charge of a motor vehicle, under the influence of drink "shall, unless the Court for special reasons thinks fit to order otherwise," be disqualified for a period of twelve months for holding a licence.
In one of two cases, in both of which the accused pleaded guilty to a charge under sec. 15 (1), the Sheriff-substitute reduced the period of disqualification provided for by sec. 15 (2) to three months, and in the other he ordered that there should be no disqualification. His reasons in the former case were that the licence was essential to the conduct of the accused's business as an insurance broker and that the business, on which he was dependent for his livelihood, would be dissipated by the deprival of a licence for a lengthy period. In the latter case the Sheriff-substitute's reasons were that the licence was essential for the accused's business as a builder's foreman, a business of national importance in the present war.
Held (by a Court of seven judges) that in neither case was the action of the Sheriff-substitute warranted.
The ground of judgment of the Lord Justice-General, Lord Moncrieff, Lord Mackay, Lord Wark and Lord Jamieson was that considerations of hardship and similar mitigating circumstances personal to the convicted person were not "special reasons" entitling the Court to reduce or remit the sentence.
The ground of judgment of the Lord Justice-Clerk and Lord Robertson was that it was an essential condition of the remission in whole or in part of the statutory disqualification that the safety of the public on roads should not in any way be imperilled by the remission, and that the facts on which the Sheriff-substitute proceeded did not show that this condition had been satisfied.
Opinion by the Court that any considerations tending to show that the safety of the public on the roads would not be prejudiced by an order of reduction or remission were "special reasons."
Opinions by the Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord Moncrieff (in more restricted terms) and Lord Robertson that, if a reduction or remission of the period of disqualification could be granted consistently with interests of public safety, considerations of hardship might be relevant.
On the question whether some public interest other than the safety of the public, e.g., the furtherance of the national war effort, might also be a "special reason," opinions reservedby the Lord Justice-General, Lord Mackay, Lord Wark and Lord Jamieson;opinion in the negative by Lord Moncrieff.
George M'Gregor Munn, 4 Sandringham Court, Whitecraigs, and David Brash, 29 Emerson Road, Bishopbriggs, each pleaded guilty in the Sheriff Court at Glasgow to a contravention of the Road Traffic Act, 1930,1 section 15 (1), by being, when in charge of a motor car, under the influence of drink to such an extent as to be incapable of having proper control of it. In each case it was the accused's first offence under that subsection.
The Sheriff-substitute (Haldane) fined Munn seven pounds, ordered his licence to be endorsed, and reduced the period of disqualification to three months. He fined Brash ten pounds, ordered his licence to be endorsed, and ordered that he should not be disqualified for holding a licence.
At the request of the Procurator-fiscal cases were stated for the opinion of the High Court of Justiciary.
The case in which Munn was the respondent set forth, inter alia:—"The appellant was represented at the hearing by one of his deputes. The respondent was represented by an agent, who,inter alia, especially asked that the respondent should not be subjected to the disqualification provided for in subsection (2) of section 15, and in support of that request stated that the respondent's driving licence was essential for the conduct of his business as an insurance broker, that his business would be irreparably dissipated if he were deprived of his licence for a lengthy period, and that he depended on his business for his livelihood. The facts stated in support of this request were not challenged by the depute-procurator-fiscal.
"I sentenced the respondent in respect of this charge to a fine of seven pounds, with the alternative of thirty days' imprisonment, and allowed him seven days within which to pay the fine, which, in the circumstances as stated at the bar, I considered to be, along with the disqualification after mentioned, an adequate penalty, and I ordered his licence to be endorsed in pursuance of section 6 (1) (b) of the said Act; further, in consideration of the facts that his licence is essential for the conduct of his business, that his business would be dissipated if he were deprived of his licence for a lengthy period, and that he is dependent on his business for his livelihood, I thought fit to reduce the period of disqualification provided for in subsection (2) of the said section to three months, and I disqualified him accordingly for holding or obtaining a driving licence for a period of three months from the date of conviction."
The case in which Brash was the respondent set forth, inter alia:—"The appellant was represented at the hearing by one of his deputes. The respondent was represented by an agent, who,inter alia, especially asked that the respondent should not be subjected to the disqualification provided for in subsection (2) of section 15, and in support of that request stated that the respondent's driving licence was essential for the conduct of his business as a builder's foreman, and that he was at present engaged on work which is of national importance in the present war. The facts stated were not challenged by the depute-procurator-fiscal.
"I sentenced the respondent to a fine of ten pounds (which was paid), which, in the circumstances of the offence as stated at the bar, I considered to be by itself an adequate penalty, and I ordered his licence to be endorsed in pursuance of section 6 (1) (b) of the said Act; but, in consideration of the facts that his licence is essential for the conduct of his business and that his business is one of national importance in the present war, I...
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