Adding trade to the equation
| Author | Mwita Chacha,Szymon M Stojek |
| Date | 01 March 2015 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343314561406 |
| Published date | 01 March 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Adding trade to the equation: Multilevel
modeling of biased civil war interventions
Szymon M Stojek
Department of International Affairs, University of Georgia
Mwita Chacha
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Nazarbayev University
Abstract
Third-party interventions have long been considered one of the most important events in civil war processes, affect-
ing both duration and outcome of these conflicts. Understanding what affects probability of intervention in support
of government or rebels is thus crucial. Interestingly, comparatively little attention has been paid to explanations of
why third-party states intervene in civil conflicts of other states and even fewer studies model economic motivations
for interventions. Our study focuses on the extent to which bilateral trade ties influence states’ decisions to intervene
in conflicts of important trading partners. We model the influence of formal trade ties on the probability of pro-
government and pro-rebel interventions. The argument asserts that trade ties work in ways similar to existing stra-
tegic alliances – favoring intervention on the side of the government rather than the opposition. The analyses use a
multilevel modeling method, which enables us to appropriately model two levels of observed variables: conflict char-
acteristics, the same for all potential interveners, and dyadic ties, varying across potential interveners. The findings
support the role of bilateral trade ties in motivating interventions, and specifically in predicting interventions on the
side of the embattled government. Our contribution is especially informative given the post-WWII exponential
increase in both civil war phenomena and economic interdependence.
Keywords
bilateral trade, civil war intervention, multilevel modeling
Third-party interventions have long been considered one
of the most important events in civil war processes,
affecting both duration and outcome of these conflicts
(Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce, 2008; Gent, 2008).
While extant accounts typically assume motives such as
preference for ending the conflict or affecting its out-
come in favor of a particular side, relatively few quanti-
tative studies attempt direct modeling of factors
influencing the probability of intervention (see Kath-
man, 2011; Lemke & Regan, 2004; Aydin, 2012). If
interventions do matter for civil war processes, investiga-
tion of what makes them more or less probable is an
important antecedent to discussions of their effects –
including war duration and outcome, or even their sup-
posed peace-promoting potential (see Fortna, 2008;
Shelton, Stojek & Sullivan, 2013).
The accumulated explanations of existing literature
vary between humanitarian motivations and purely
self-interested strategic actions (Findley & Teo, 2006;
Kathman, 2011). We focus on the latter, examining one
of the most important interests of potential interveners –
economic ties with the conflict state. That economic
interests matter in decisions to intervene is commonsen-
sical given that civil conflicts have a negative effect on the
economies of conflict states and consequently on the
trade and investment flows of other countries (Collier
et al., 2003). A cursory look at the total international
trade flows of Lebanon, El Salvador, and the Democratic
Corresponding author:
sstojek@uga.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2015, Vol. 52(2) 228–242
ªThe Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343314561406
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