Admission of Telephone Intercepts
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002201839906300616 |
| Published date | 01 December 1999 |
| Date | 01 December 1999 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The Journalof
Criminal
Law
language to freedom from disease or infection. Thus,
'the
language of
the section does
not
justify drawing any distinction by reference to
how
the injury occurs or the kind of injury suffered'. Buxton LJ, having cited
Richards J's finding that as a matter of language alone the statutory
formula could extend to a case in which the state of the premises was
likely to cause an accident resulting in physical injury, added 'I do
not
agree', for such use of language would be 'unnatural', as one would
not
normally 'describe a physical accident as injury to health'. Hirst U said
no more
than
'I
agree with both judgments' (referring, no doubt, to the
ratio
decidendi,
below). As
the
disagreement
upon
the literal meaning of
the
terms used may recur in circumstances outside s 79, it may be
worth
remarking that normal usage, if an accident were confined to purely
physical injury, might support Buxton
U's
refusal to accept this as (in
ordinary language) affecting 'health',
but
the same would probably
not
be so if the accident affected his mental condition, for in that case a
reference to the victim's 'mental health' would seem to be in accordance
with normal usage. This disagreement as to the literal meaning of the
words
of
the subsection did
not
affect the unanimity of the court's
decision (see below).
HELD,
DISMISSING
THE
APPEAL,
the state of
the
premises did
not
come
within s79 of the 1990 Act, either as a statutory nuisance, or in any
other
way.
COMMENTARY
The unanimous
ratio
decidendi
was that
what
used to be called 'sanitary
statutes' are
not
concerned with accidents: see
Great
Western
Railway
Co
v
Bishop
[1872]LR 7 QB 550;
Coventry
City
Council
v
Cartwright
[1975] 1
WLR 845. All members of the court agreed that the statute
had
to be
looked at in the light of the whole range of legislation dealing with
health
and
safety
and
accidents, although Buxton Uconcluded
that
this
merely confirmed the 'ordinary meaning' of the words used in s 79. The
court's conclusion was
that
an accident arising out of the state of the
premises does
not
fall within Part III of the 1990 Act.
It
was unnecessary, in view of this decision, that
the
court decide the
two additional issues which had been raised, namely
whether
the notice
to abate issued by the local authority was a nullity
and
whether
the
authority could lawfully withdraw
the
notice. The court nevertheless
expressed its opinion on both issues, holding that the notice was a
nullity
and
that, in
any
event, the authority could lawfully withdraw
it.
Admission of Telephone Intercepts
R v
Owen
[1999] 1 WLR 949
The appellant,
when
on remand in prison awaiting trial, telephoned
his wife, to whom he allegedly admitted committing the robbery with
which he was charged. That telephone conversation was intercepted by
540
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