After R v Kingston: Is There Scope for a New Defence of Involuntary Intoxication?
| Date | 01 August 1995 |
| Author | LM Clements |
| Published date | 01 August 1995 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002201839505900308 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
AFTER
Rv
KINGSTON:
IS
THERE
SCOPE
FOR
A
NEW
DEFENCE
OF
INVOLUNTARY
INTOXICA
TION?
LM
Clements"
INTRODUCTION
In overturning the Court of Appeal's decision in RvKingston
[1994]
QB 81
the House of Lords
([1994]
3 All ER 353) firmly rejected a defence of
involuntary intoxication where the defendant still had the necessary mental
element for the crime with which he has been charged. This means that
involuntary intoxication is no defenceat all, since if a person lacks the mens
rea, he will be acquitted on the basis that he had no criminal intent.
This distinguishes involuntary intoxication from, on the one hand, both
provocation and diminished responsibility, where the presence of mens rea
for murder does not prevent the offence being reduced to manslaughter and,
on the other hand, automatism which negatives the voluntary quality of the
act. All these defences hinge on the principle that if a defendant is not
morally blameworthy to the full extent, then he should be exculpated from
the offence
of
which he would otherwise be guilty and either convicted of a
lesser offence or acquitted.
It
is true that, at the stage of sentencing, account
can be taken of the defendant's involuntary intoxication and a lighter
sentence imposed, but that in itself would not justify their Lordships'
decision if it were wrong in principle; and discretion in sentencing does not
apply to murder, where, as Lord Mustill recognised, no discretion exists. Is
the decision of the House of Lords wrong in principle? This issue will be
addressed below.
The facts of Kingston are well known.
The trial judge had directed the jury that if they thought that Kingston
had the necessary mens rea, then they should convict, since a drugged
intent was still an intent, even when induced by involuntary intoxication.
Kingston's appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed on the ground that
even if the necessary intent was proved, Kingston did have available to him
a defence of involuntary intoxication. The reasoning of the Court of Appeal
was that the law recognised that, in exceptional circumstances, a person's
otherwise criminal intent could be negatived where he bore no moral blame
for what had happened. This principle, it was said, could be found in Hale's
Pleas
of
the Crown, in which it was stated that
'if
a person bythe unskilfulness
of his physician, or by the contrivance of his enemies, eat or drink such
thing as causes such a temporary or permanent frenzy
...
this puts him into
the same condition, in reference to crimes, as any other phrenzy, and equally
•Lecturer in Law, University of Hull.
305
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