Agnes Heller and the Question of Humanism
| Author | John Grumley |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885107074346 |
| Published date | 01 April 2007 |
| Date | 01 April 2007 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Agnes Heller and the Question of
EJPT
Humanism
European Journal
of Political Theory
John Grumley
© SAGE Publications Ltd,
University of Sydney
London, Thousand Oaks
and New Delhi
issn 1474-8851, 6(2) 125–140
[DOI: 10.1177/1474885107074346]
a b s t r a c t : This article explores the vagaries of Agnes Heller’s relationship to
humanism. It initially outlines a brief account of both the historical adventures of
humanism and of the great debates in the middle of the 20th century that conditioned
the contemporary reception of the concept of humanism. It then analyses Heller’s
own unique intellectual formation under the tutelage of Lukács. After briefly
outlining her initial commitment to his humanist programme for the ‘Renaissance of
Marxism’, it looks in more depth at her initial critique of its humanist philosophical
anthropology and her efforts, under the auspices of Arendt, to develop a more
sophisticated account of the human condition. The analysis of Heller finally explores
the impact of a postmodern awareness of contingency, fallibility and historical
open-endedness on this account. The article concludes by pointing to both the
commonalities and differences with the contemporary critical humanism of Tzvetan
Todorov. It is argued that despite the many parallels, these differences signify Heller’s
final parting of the ways with humanism strictly speaking and also represent
unresolved issues for any reanimation of contemporary humanism.
k e y w o r d s : Arendt, contingency, critical humanism, critique of the subject, Heidegger,
Heller, human condition, humanism, Levi Strauss, Lukács, reflective postmodernism,
Renaissance of Marxism, Sartre, Todorov
It is one of the paradoxes of the life and work of Agnes Heller that the tag of
‘humanist’ Marxist that brought her to international prominence in the 1970s to
this day has remained an obstacle to an adequate reception of all her later work.
The surge of intellectual fashion that propelled The Theory of Need in Marx (1976)
to popularity with the western left just as quickly receded. As the postmodern turn
of the 1980s took the cultural centre-stage, the critique of humanism initiated by
structuralism was carried over as a central shibboleth. The fact that Heller was not
only a Marxist but also one of the humanist variety provided a double excuse for
ostracism by many in the western cultural avant-garde. However, the following
article is concerned less with the vagaries of intellectual fashion than with the
question of humanism and Heller’s relation to it. In what follows, I shall briefly
review some of the key meanings in the historical adventures of humanism before
Contact address: John Grumley, Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney,
Camperdown 2006, Australia.
Email: johgruml@arts.usyd.edu.au
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European Journal of Political Theory 6(2)
considering its resonance throughout Heller’s work. Finally, I want to suggest
that, even while the reflective postmodern phase of her philosophy takes her
beyond the orbit of humanism, it very much anticipated most of the key elements
of what today goes by the name of critical humanism and points to some remain-
ing challenges.
To this end I will commence with a few preliminary remarks about the concept
of humanism. This is easier said than done: no less an intrepid archaeologist than
Michel Foucault once remarked that the concept of humanism had such a com-
plex and chequered history that it was almost impossible to pin down in terms of
values and value judgements.1 Yet, while acknowledging Foucault’s reservations,
I still think it possible to get a real purchase on the main cultural constituents of
the concept.
The heavy cultural baggage of the concept of humanism has accrued through
repeated reappropriation by various streams within the western cultural tradition.
Originally it was intimately related to the heritage of classical culture. For a long
time this remained a normative cultural standard bound to the acquisition of the
classical languages and an educational ideal that would produce the gentleman
who could write and speak well.2 However, once modernity abandoned this
measure, it became possible for humanist culture to readily serve a resistance to
key dynamics of a modern world. In the face of the dazzling richness and com-
plexity of modern civilization, its science and technology, classical culture easily
assumed the appearance of a closed garden shielding the learned individual from
the alienation and work of modern civilization. Yet, the classical heritage always
potentially signified more than a nostalgic preference for the past.3 Memory is
essential to the survival of the contemporary self and heritage implies renewal:
manners and morals must have a residual capacity for reanimation, to evoke from
contemporary values and perspectives a dynamic future, viable cultural options
and possibilities. The invitation to vital memory requires the constant encounter
with others from whom there is a real prospect of gain. This dimension of human-
ism as vital memory takes us in an activist direction indicative of the historical
confidence of the Enlightenment. This is implied in the conviction that humans
determine and choose themselves through their own theoretical and practical
activities. However, along with the aspiration to a more dynamic future and a
more humane and rational world comes the hubris of self-deification that was
subsequently to blacken the name of humanism in our own time. The classically
trained individual gentleman was constrained by his incapacity to encompass the
whole wealth of modern civilization in a personal culture. But when a collective
subject and a cumulative process of knowledge acquisition replaces that indi-
vidual, then humanity could potentially usurp the position of God and act as if it
was truly the master of creation. However, such a hyperbolic humanism has
already forgotten the Christian legacy of humanism that shatters all pretence to
mastery and absolute knowledge.4 From this perspective, the legitimate aspiration
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to confidently extrapolate tried values into the future and explore open vistas must
Grumley: Agnes Heller and Humanism
be constrained by humility. We cannot know and do everything. Knowing that
the totality always escapes us, the true humanist cautions against reckless ambi-
tion in favour of rational restraint. This restraint even encompasses claims to
scientific validation. While not groundless, the humanist credo abjures certainty
in favour of conviction. Taking all these elements together, humanism remains a
‘wager’ on the cultural function of human initiative and self-reflection, on the
human capacity for reassessment and reorientation, but this is not an investment
that can be vindicated theoretically, only practically.5
It comes as no surprise that the tensions, ambiguities and the legacies of this
humanist cultural tradition would flare up again with a new intensity in the wake
of the inhumanity that characterized the first half of the 20th century. Quite
justifiably questions about the nature and worth of the human once again re-
emerged at the top of the cultural agenda.6
The Sartre–Heidegger Debate
The manifesto that precipitated the modern battle over humanism followed
immediately after the Second World War. Inspired by the heroism of individual
action and resistance against the forces of traditionalism and totalitarian oppres-
sion, Jean-Paul Sartre confidently launched contemporary existentialism as a bold
philosophical atheism that had placed humanity in the position formerly held by
God.7 Man is the only being whose existence comes before its essence. To begin
with man is nothing, but what he will be will be the product of his own making. For
Sartre, this is the first principle of existentialism.8 But right from this first princi-
ple we can see that the logic of self-creation overreaches itself. He argued that,
because man’s existence is prior to his essence, he must also be responsible for
what he is. Yet this leaves out of account all the conditioning factors concentrated
in the idea that this prior existence was ‘thrown’ or ‘condemned’ to liberty. The
various layers of involvement in the world from embodiment to instrumentality to
derivative intellectual constructions are all indexes of assignment rather than orig-
ination. Nevertheless, despite this overextension, Sartre still is intent on providing
his idea of responsibility with an intersubjective dimension. He contends that the
deeper meaning of existentialism is one of limits: our inability to pass beyond our
humanity means that in choosing our self, we choose for all men. The act of self-
creation is an essentially creative/normative one that implicitly posits an image of
man as he ought to be.9 Certainly questions can also be raised about this supposed
Kantian moment in existentialist humanism. Characterizing this as the best
attempt to defend existentialist humanism, Robert Cohen still maintains the idea
that in choosing for your self you choose for all men is indistinguishable from the
totalitarian claim that reduces the meaning of the other to a projection of the self.10
Regardless of such later reservations, Sartre was only too willing to acknowledge
all the limitations that a priori define the fundamental situation of man in the uni-
verse. However, he rejects the idea that as a result man can be reduced to an object
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European Journal of Political Theory 6(2)
and a set of predetermined reactions and possibilities. Nor does conditionedness
signify...
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