Aiding together? Europeans’ attitudes on common aid policy
| Author | Osman S Kiratli |
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116518794306 |
| Published date | 01 June 2019 |
| Date | 01 June 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Aiding together?
Europeans’ attitudes
on common aid policy
Osman S Kiratli
International Trade Department, Bogazici University,
Istanbul, Turkey
Abstract
This article explores the determinants of individual support for common aid policy in
the European Union, the largest multilateral contributor of foreign aid. Using the 2016
Eurobarometer survey data, I first investigate the influence of individuals’ assessments of
aid objectives on support for multilateral disbursements, and second, I explore the
effect of country-level factors, population and economic power. Multilevel regression
models reveal that those who prioritize economic infrastructural projects in developing
countries are highly negative of the utilization of EU channels. Conversely, individual
preferences for the promotion of democratic reforms and the provision of basic neces-
sities are strongly and positively associated with the dependent variable. The results also
demonstrate that individuals living in lower income and less populated polities are more
positively disposed towards common aid policy.
Keywords
European Union, foreign aid, multilateral aid, multilateralism, public opinion
Introduction
In 2016, contributions by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members
to multilateral aid institutions increased by almost 10% in real terms according to
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports.
1
Excluding multi-bi aid – or ‘earmarked non-core contributions’
2
– the share of
multilateral aid comprises almost 29% of the total Official Development
Assistance (ODA), a jump from approximately 25% measured in two-year aver-
ages over the 2008–2013 period.
3
When one includes non-core contributions,
European Union Politics
2019, Vol. 20(2) 261–281
!The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/1465116518794306
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Corresponding author:
Osman S Kiratli, Department of International Trade, Bogazici University, Bebek 34342, Istanbul, Turkey.
Email: osmansabrikiratli@boun.edu.tr
however, the share of aid provided via multilateral channels reaches approximately
50%, up from 41% in 2013 (OECD, 2015).
As the multilateral aid system develops steadily over the years, scholarly inves-
tigations on multilateral aid abound. Studies have explored the determinants and
targeting of un-earmarked contributions (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Neumayer,
2003a, 2003b; Nunnenkamp and O
¨hler, 2011; Schneider and Tobin, 2013; Thiele
et al., 2007), performance criteria and conditionality associated with multilateral
disbursements (Alesina and Weder, 2002; Nancy and Yontcheva, 2006;
Reinsberg, 2015), donor influence in multilateral aid organizations (Kilby,
2006; Mavrotas and Villanger, 2006; Neumayer, 2005), organization and operat-
ing procedures of aid agencies (Hawkins et al., 2006; Martens et al., 2002;
Michaelowa and Borrmann 2006; Milner, 2006) and the effectiveness of multilat-
eral channels in the recipient countries (e.g. Alvi and Senbeta, 2012; Christensen
et al., 2011; Dollar and Levin, 2006; Minoiu and Reddy, 2010; Okada and
Samreth, 2012).
A particular strand within this literature focuses on the question of why states
might choose multilateral aid over bilateral delivery and relinquish their autonomy,
which may be essential if donors hope to extract certain economic and political
benefits as a result of aid flows. As several studies posit, multilateral institutions
offer various advantages over bilateral channels with regard to greater information
capacity, technical base, effective enforcement mechanisms and political legitimacy
(Acharya et al., 2006; Rodrik, 1995). In turn, multilateral aid offers donors greater
cost-effectiveness and reduced fragmentation. Accordingly, drawing on the princi-
pal-agent model, Milner and Tingley (2013) conclude, states agree to delegate aid
policy to multilateral institutions if the benefits of pooling resources exceed the cost
of losing control. The greater a donor’s hopes of securing certain material benefits
from its disbursements and the less its preferences align with those of the multilat-
eral institution, the greater the cost of losing control will be and, subsequently, the
less likely the state will support multilateralism.
Despite the extensive discussion on the merits and shortcomings of multilateral
aid from the perspective of governments, with the exception of Milner and
Tingley’s (2013) investigation of Americans’ support for multilateral engagement,
there is a dearth of research on individual attitudes in donor countries.
Consequently, we are unable to ascertain if the factors that induce governments
to delegate aid policy to multilateral agencies truly resonate with their voters. Yet,
policymakers in democracies have to convince their electorate of the merits of the
policy choices they adopt if they want to get reelected. This is particularly true for
decisions with budgetary implications, such as foreign aid. The amount of limited
resources to be sent as aid to foreigners, the promoted purposes and choice of
channels are all potential issues of political contestation in policy campaigns.
Hence, studies consistently provide evidence that policymakers are sensitive to
public opinion when allocating foreign aid and that the aid budget and policies
of donor countries are closely associated with public support (e.g. Lumsdaine,
1993; Milner, 2006; Mosley, 1985; Olsen, 2001; Stern, 1998).
262 European Union Politics 20(2)
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