Alignments and Realignments in Central Asia: The Rationale and Implications of Uzbekistan's Rapprochement with Russia
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512107077098 |
| Published date | 01 June 2007 |
| Author | Matteo Fumagalli |
| Date | 01 June 2007 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Fumagalli: Alignments and Realignments in Central Asia 253
International Political Science Review (2007), Vol. 28, No. 3, 253–271
DOI: 10.1177/0192512107077098 © 2007 International Political Science Association
Sage Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, and Singapore)
Alignments and Realignments in Central Asia:
The Rationale and Implications of Uzbekistan’s
Rapprochement with Russia
Matteo Fumagalli
Abstract. The eviction of the USA from the military base at Khanabad-
Qarshi and the signing of an alliance treaty between Uzbekistan and
Russia in November 2005 marked one of the most dramatic turnarounds
in international alliances in the post-cold-war era. This article shows that
regime survival is a driving force behind Uzbekistan’s realignment. It
also argues that a full account of Uzbekistan’s turnaround needs to take
into consideration systemic factors, namely, an external environment
in which Russia provided a viable strategic and economic alternative.
The article concludes by suggesting how the “normative competition”
in the region between Russia (and China) and the USA helps account
for the timing of Uzbekistan’s realignment.
Keywords: • Alliances • Alignment • Realignment • Russia • Uzbekistan
O’zbek xalqi hech qachon, hech kimga qaram bo’lmaydi.
(The Uzbek people will never be dependent on anyone.)
(Islam A. Karimov, May 25, 2005)1
In November 2005, Uzbekistan completed a dramatic, though not unexpected, shift
in its international alignments. After a brief and controversial strategic partner-
ship with the USA,2 Uzbekistan has moved steadily closer to Russia, particularly
since 2004. This shift was initiated with the signing of a strategic partnership in
June of that year and completed on November 14, 2005, when the two countries
signed a Treaty of Allied Relations (soyuznicheskie otnosheniya) (UzA, 2005).
Ironically, that was also the day that the US personnel of the Khanabad-Qarshi
base (K2) fi nally left Uzbek territory. This signaled not only the lowest point in
US–Uzbek relations for years, but also the coziest that Moscow and Tashkent’s
relations have been since the Soviet demise (“unprecedented” in Uzbek President
Karimov’s own words) (Novosti Uzbekistana, 2005). What accounts for the recent
254 International Political Science Review 28(3)
Russian–Uzbek rapprochement? What does this tell us about international
alignments and realignments?
This article seeks to answer the questions above by looking for explanations of
the formation of and changes in international alliances. It fi nds that Steven David’s
(1991a, 1991b) omnibalancing theory provides an insightful and parsimonious
explanation of Tashkent’s recent turnaround owing to its focus on domestic factors.3
State weakness, erosion of regime legitimacy, and growing domestic unrest all
contribute to establishing regime survival as a main motive behind Uzbekistan’s
decision to turn from Washington to Moscow in search of security guarantees.
While it acknowledges the centrality of domestic factors in accounting for the
recent realignment, this article also calls for integration of systemic factors into an
adequate explanation of Uzbekistan’s turnaround. A change in the international
environment, with Russia’s energy richness (due to high oil prices) providing
critical resources to promote its foreign policy agenda and the confl ict in US
policy between continuing support for an ally in the war on terror on the one
hand and showing concern for human rights and the promotion of democracy
on the other, shape the context within which the change has occurred.4
In this article, I seek to understand the rationale of Uzbekistan’s rapprochement
with Russia, look at the implications thereof, and locate this discussion within the
theoretical debates on international realignments. In the process, I endeavor to
make a threefold contribution. First, I integrate domestic and systemic factors in the
explanation of changes in international alliances, and Uzbekistan’s international
realignment in particular. While attention has been paid to changes in international
alliances before,5 alignments and realignments in non-western states still await
closer scrutiny. Second, I suggest that the “normative competition” between the
US emphasis on democracy promotion and the status quo orientation of powers
such as Uzbekistan, Russia, and China contributes to accounting for the timing of
the change. Finally, I seek to shed light on a topic of signifi cant policy relevance
which has so far received little scholarly attention.6
A caveat is necessary here: this article does not directly discuss Russian for-
eign policy,7 but uses the case study of Russian–Uzbek relations to investigate the
causes behind Uzbekistan’s international realignment. The article is structured
as follows. First, I briefl y summarize Uzbekistan’s path to independence, paying
particular attention to its international alignment. Second, the theoretical debate
over alliance formation and (re)alignments is introduced. This section reviews
and discusses relevant theories of alliance formation and change; it also looks at
attempts to make sense of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy by considering the domestic
sources thereof. Next, I turn to examine recent developments in Russian–Uzbek
relations. Since they are the areas where the rapprochement between the two states
has manifested itself, two key dimensions of the relationship are explored here:
energy and security. While attention to these two dimensions of Russian–Uzbek
relations provides an adequate explanation of Uzbekistan’s realignment, it is only
by taking into account the normative convergence of Moscow and Tashkent (and
Beijing) that the timing of the change can be fully understood. I conclude with
remarks on the implications of Uzbekistan’s rapprochement with Russia.
Uzbekistan’s Path to Independence
The breakup of the Soviet Union did not lead to the democratization of post-
independence Uzbekistan, but to the consolidation of a new authoritarian regime
To continue reading
Request your trial