Allen v Anthony

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Judgment Date05 March 1816
Date05 March 1816
CourtHigh Court of Chancery

English Reports Citation: 35 E.R. 679

HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY

Allen
and
Anthony

See Penny v. Watts, 1848, 2 De G, & Sm. 520; Holmes v. Powell, 1856, 8 De G. M. & G. 580; Knight v. Bowyer, 1857-58, 23 Beav. 641; 2 De G. & J. 451.

allen v. anthony. March 5, 1816. [See Penny v. Watts, 1848, 2 De G, & Sm. 520 ; Holmes v. Powell, 1856, 8 De G. M. & G. 580 ; Knight v. Bowyer, 1857-58, 23 Beav. 641; 2 De G. & J. 451.] (Note : The Reporter did not hear the arguments of the Counsel in this case.)-The possession of a tenant is notice to a purchaser of the whole actual interest he may have in the estate ; therefore, of a right to the timber on the estate, although such right accrued by a title posterior to that on which his possession was grounded. -[See App. 1 Her. 726.] On this day, the Lord Chancellor gave Judgment as follows :-The question which arises in this case is one of great difficulty and importance. The bill is filed for an account of timber felled by the Defendant on the estate of the Plaintiff, and for an injunction to restrain him from cutting timber, or committing any other waste or destruction on the premises. For this purpose the bill states that the Plaintiffs father was seised in fee simple of the estate in question, which he purchased from a person of the name of Archer, who had purchased the same of Sarah Keir ; and that, at the time of the purchase from Archer, the estate was in the occupation of the Defendant, by virtue of some demise, or agreement for a demise, as tenant to Archer. The Plaintiff's father died on the 20th of October 1814, having by will dated the 20th of July preceding, devised to the plain-[283]-tiff all his freehold, copyhold, and leasehold estates, in fee, or as far as the nature of his respective interests in them would extend. The bill then goes on to state, that at the death of the testator, there was a considerable quantity of timber on the estate, some of which the Defendant had since cut, and threatened to cut the remainder, refusing to account for the produce ; charging that there was no exception of timber in the conveyance from Archer to the testator, or in that from Keir to Archer ; also that the testator was a purchaser without notice of any grant or conveyance to the Defendant, of the timber in question. The Defendant, by his answer, sets up the following title :-In 1799, Sarah Keir, who was then entitled to the estate in fee simple, agreed to demise to one hard for twenty-one years at a certain rent, with...

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