America, Brexit and the security of Europe
| Date | 01 August 2017 |
| Published date | 01 August 2017 |
| Author | Wyn Rees |
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148117711400 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles - Part One |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117711400
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2017, Vol. 19(3) 558 –572
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148117711400
journals.sagepub.com/home/bpi
America, Brexit and the
security of Europe
Wyn Rees
Abstract
The Obama administration played a surprisingly interventionist role in the UK referendum on
membership of the European Union (EU), arguing that a vote to leave would damage European
security. Yet this article contends that US attitudes towards the EU as a security actor, and the
part played within it by the United Kingdom, have been much more complex than the United
States has sought to portray. While it has spoken the language of partnership, it has acted as if the
EU has been a problem for US policy. The United Kingdom was used as part of the mechanism for
managing that problem. In doing so, America contributed, albeit inadvertently, to the Brexit result.
With the aid of contrasting theoretical perspectives from Realism and Institutionalism, this article
explores how America’s security relationship with the United Kingdom has helped to engineer a
security situation that the United States wanted to avoid.
Keywords
Brexit, European Union, security, special relationship, United States, United Kingdom
The United States watched with steadily mounting concern as the United Kingdom drew
closer to its referendum over remaining or withdrawing from the European Union (EU).
This so-called ‘Brexit’ debate had been a long-mooted possibility in British domestic poli-
tics (Glencross, 2015; Oliver, 2015: 88). It was activated by Prime Minister David
Cameron’s promise that if the Conservative Party won the General Election of May 2015,
his government would conduct a renegotiation of the terms of UK membership of the EU,
followed by a referendum on membership within two years (Cameron, 2013; see also
Cameron, 2015). The subsequent Conservative victory led the Prime Minister to undertake
a rapid renegotiation followed by the referendum on 23 June 2016. A majority of 51.9% of
the population voted for exit. Cameron duly announced that he would step down to make
way for Theresa May to negotiate the process of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal.
During the run up to the referendum, the Obama administration was unequivocal in
opposing Brexit and warning of the risks for the EU. As early as January 2013, Philip Gordon,
the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, spoke out on the subject, affirming that ‘We
welcome an outward looking European Union with Britain in it. We benefit when the EU is
University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
Corresponding author:
Wyn Rees, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, Nottingham,
NG7 2RD, UK.
Email: wyn.rees@nottingham.ac.uk
711400BPI0010.1177/1369148117711400The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsRees
research-article2017
Special Issue Article
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