An Alternative Approach to the Harm of Genocide
| Date | 01 October 2012 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9256.2012.01439.x |
| Author | Christopher Macleod |
| Published date | 01 October 2012 |
| Subject Matter | Research Article |
Research Article
An Alternative Approach to the Harm
of Genocideponl_1439197..206
Christopher Macleod
University of Edinburgh
It is a widely shared belief that genocide – the ‘crime of crimes’ – is more morally significant than
‘mere’ large-scale mass murder. Various attempts have been made to capture that separate evil of
genocide: some have attempted to locate it in damage done to individuals, while others have focused
upon the harm done to collectives. In this article, I offer a third, neglected, option. Genocide damages
humankind: it is here that the difference is to be found. I show that this understanding has a
venerable legal history, and argue that it has the significant benefits of legitimising intervention and
justifying universal jurisdiction.
Keywords: genocide; international ethics; international legal theory
Hannah Arendt notes that the success of the Eichmann trial was that it ‘refused to
let the basic character of the crime be swallowed up in a flood of atrocities’ (Arendt,
2006, p. 275). During the Nazi genocide, that is to say, there were a high number
of individual murders, violations of human dignity and heinous acts. But there was
also some further evil committed, over and above these individual crimes committed
on individual people.
Political philosophers have, of late, shown interest in attempting to capture this
peculiar evil of genocide (Card, 2003; Lee, 2010; May, 2010). I do not wish to take
issue with any of these interpretations directly. Rather, in this article I will suggest
that there remains a conception of genocide that has been undeservedly neglected.
In the literature, there exists general consensus that genocide’s distinctive harm
should be characterised either in terms of damage to individuals or damage to groups
targeted by genocide. I wish to suggest, however, that we should give attention to the
claim that genocide’s special status derives from damage done to humankind itself.
Although this account has been neglected by theorists, it has a venerable legal
history, and given that the term is a primarily legal one, it deserves our attention.
Moreover, characterising the crime in this way offers significant political benefits. I
begin, in Section 1, by showing that this account has a number of proponents
within law. In Section 2, I show that this understanding of the crime is profitable in
terms of explanation: it can show why there are legal obligations concerning
prevention that exist for few other crimes, and why the crime is subject to universal
jurisdiction.
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POLITICS: 2012 VOL 32(3), 197–206
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9256.2012.01439.x
© 2012 The Author.Politics © 2012 Political Studies Association
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