An Analysis of China's Statements on Human Rights at the United Nations (2000–2010)

DOI10.1177/016934411203000304
AuthorKatrin Kinzelbach
Date01 September 2012
Published date01 September 2012
Subject MatterPart A: Article
Netherlands Q uarterly of Human R ights, Vol. 30/3, 299–332, 2012.
© Netherlands I nstitute of Human Ri ghts (SIM), Printed in the Net herlands. 299
WILL CHINA’S RISE LEAD TO A
NEW NOR MATIVE ORDER?
An Analysis of China’s Statements on Human
Rights at the United Nations (2000–2010)
K K*
Abstract
is article examine s whether and how the People’s Republic of China challenges
international human rights norms based on a qualitative analysis of human rights
debates at the United Nations in the period 2 000–2010. e study dierentiates between
framing and implication contests and i s focused on China’s statements on four main
issues: the validity of norm s; the UN’s monitoring of human rights compliance; the
relationship between sovereig nty and human rights; and the interaction of civil and
political with economic, social and cultural rights. China’s human rights diplomacy at
the United Nations is shown to be highly consi stent; it primarily contests implication s of
human rights rather than the norm s themselves. Although China has so far not prov ided
an alternative normative frame to human r ights, it is argued that the contestation
is nonetheless ser ious as it facilitates a gradual erosion of established norms and
instruments.
Keywords: China; counter-discourse; normative order; United Nations
1. INTRODUCTION
e rising weight of the People’s Republic of China in global politics is a dening
feature of the current international order. What is the implication of this new
geopolitical situation for the i nternational human rights regime? David Forsythe
predicted in 2006 t hat ‘Should an authoritarian C hina come to dominate international
relations, the place of human rig hts in world aairs would change’.1 While this
forecast may appear intuitive, t here remains a lack of empirical data which would
support the claim t hat China’s rise undermines the normative order. Research to date
* Katrin Ki nzelbach is a Fellow at the Glob al Public Policy Inst itute in Berlin and gr atefully
recognize s a postdoc research grant prov ided by the Fritz yssen Foundat ion. anks also go to
three anonym ous reviewers for their helpf ul and construc tive remarks on the in itial dra.
1 Forsythe, D.P., Human Rights in International Relations, Ca mbridge University Press, Ca mbridge,
2006, p.8.
Katrin Kinzelbach
300 Intersent ia
has primarily focused on how China responded to scrutiny of its domestic human
rights situation, not on whether and how Chi na has challenged the international
human rights regi me. It is generally recognized that Chi na continues to obstruct civil
and political ri ghts domestically, but to alter the role that human rights play in world
aairs is a decided ly dierent agenda. is agenda would necessitate an ability to
fundamental ly challenge the current normative order. Such a fundamental cha llenge
would require, it is posited, not only a high d egree of international inuence but also a
coherent counter-discourse. at is, Chi na would have to act as a norm entrepreneur
in coherent opposition to international human rig hts norms.
Although internationa l customary law and human rig hts treaties generate binding
obligations for States, the internationa l human rights regime c annot be conceptuali zed
as static. All normative orders are contested orders,2 this holds also tr ue for human
rights. Human rig hts norms are not only subject to continuous actuali zation and
adaptation – they are al so exposed to criticism and resista nce, not least by State actors.
What role does China play in th is process?3 Quantitative research on voting patterns
in the UN General Assembly reveals that Western nations are loosing support for
their positions on human rights. China, in contrast, has enjoyed a comparatively
high voting coincidence duri ng the last decade.4 e measure “voting coincidence”
captures how many States vote alongside with a given country; yet, to what extent
does this data foreshadow China’s ability to alter the huma n rights regime? Voting
patterns alone do not provide conclusive evidence for China’s ability to substa ntively
challenge the normative order enshrined in international human rig hts law. is is,
rst, because a State’s voting behaviou r at the UN is not only inuenced by normative
considerations but also by power politics and uti lity calculations. China’s growing
voting coincidence could, therefore, be due chiey to an increasing international
weight, and not a result of normative authority. Second, the vot ing patterns only show
who votes with whom; as such, they do not unequ ivocally demonstrate a State’s ability
to exert inuence on votes cast by others . Notwithstanding the lac k of data on China’s
actual impact on human rights-related votes at the UN, there is no doubt that it has
spectacularly gained in international power during the last decade. Inevitably, this
2 Krebs, R.R . and Jackson, P.T., ‘Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms : e Power of Political
Rhetoric’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 13, No.1, 2007, pp. 35–66; Forst , R.
and Günther, K., ‘Die Herau sbildung normativer Ord nungen: Zur Idee eines interdi sziplinären
Forschungsprogr amms. Normative O rders Working Paper’, University of Fra nkfur t, 2010, available
at: http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/volltex te/2010/8073/.
3 While it is reco gnized that t he human rights d ebate within C hina is multif aceted and even in oc ial
circles far f rom uniform, this a rticle is interested i n the People’s Republic as an intern ational actor.
In the context of t his article, t herefore, expressions such as “C hina’s position” or “Beijing’s line” are
used to refer to ocia l positions taken by the Pe ople’s Republic of China in intern ational fora.
4 Gowan, R. and Br antner, F., A Global Force for Human Rights?, Eu ropean Council on Foreign
Relations, London, 2 008; Gowan, R. and Brant ner, R. e EU and Human Rights at the UN: 2010
Review, European Council on Foreig n Relations, London, 2010.
Will Chin a’s Rise Lead to a New Normative Order?
Netherlands Q uarterly of Human R ights, Vol. 30/3 (2012) 301
also enhances its s tanding and inuence at the UN. It is high ti me, therefore, to take
China’s language on human rig hts seriously.
To understand whether and how China chal lenges international human rights
norms in the context of global politics, this article presents a qualitative analysis of
China’s statements in human rights debates at the UN from 2000–2010. e dataset
includes statements made in the Comm ission on Human Rights, the Human R ights
Council and the Gener al Assembly. e analysis distinguishes be tween two forms of
contestation, one which focuses on the normative f rame provided by human rights
and a second one which objects to the implicat ions that follow from these norms.
e article rst introduces the research context and design and subsequently oers
an analysis for each of t he four categories listed above. In doi ng so, the core elements
of China’s human rights diplomacy at the U N are identied. It is argued that China’s
ocial language on international human rights coherently chal lenges the current
regime despite the fact t hat Beijing’s positions remain, to a large extent, dominated by
a self-defensive approach.
2. RESEARCH CONTEXT  CHINA AS A NORM
ENTREPRENEUR?
e study of China’s statements on human rights norms at the U N links to a larger
enquiry into China’s approach to the current world order. Since the launch of its
opening and reform policy in 1978, China has not only undergone an enormous
domestic transformation, it has a lso overcome its international isolation. e scope
of China’s current role in world aairs is unprecedented in t he country’s history.
Nonetheless, it remains controversial ly debated whether China will fu lly integrate or
try to alter the current international system. Among politica l scientists, realists have
long argued that Chi na would attempt to build a new international order wit h rules and
institutions that su it China’s interests, for example Paul Kennedy already predicted at
the end of the 1980s that China would pursue this route.5 Recently, neoconservative
Robert Kagan stressed that US beliefs and interests had chiey shaped t he current
international order. Although Kaga n does not view US decline as immi nent, he argues
that the world order would change should authoritar ian countries like China come to
dominate international relations.6 Liberal institutionalists like John Ikenberry have
stressed that the current international order enjoys a never-before seen degree of
integration, i nstitutional ization and legit imacy. In his interpretation, these featu res
present great obstacles for any power that might seek to f undamentally alter the
current system.7 At the same t ime, Ikenberry concedes that ‘t he question really is
5 Kennedy, P., e Rise and Fall of the Great Pow ers, Vintage Books , New York, 1989.
6 Kagan, R., e World Am erica Made, Alf red A. Knopf, New York 2012.
7 Ikenberry, J.G., ‘e R ise of China and the Futu re of the West: Can the Liberal Sys tem Survive?’,
Foreign Aairs, Vol. 87, No.1, 2008, pp.23–37.

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