Analysing the Process of EU Legislative Decision-Making
| Author | Thomas König |
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116507085960 |
| Published date | 01 March 2008 |
| Date | 01 March 2008 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Forum Section
Analysing the Process of EU
Legislative Decision-Making
To Make a Long Story Short . . .
Thomas König
University of Mannheim, Germany
145
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116507085960
Volume 9 (1): 145–165
Copyright© 2008
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi
and Singapore
Research on factors influencing the process of European Union (EU) legis-
lative decision-making has made enormous progress in recent years. After an
early study by Krislov et al. (1986) providing descriptive statistics on 472 EU
decisions made between 1958 and 1981, Heiner Schulz and I introduced a
theoretical model to derive hypotheses on institutional and preference-related
factors influencing decision-making speed, i.e. on the application of qualified
majority voting in the Council, on the participation of the European Parlia-
ment as an additional veto player, on the relevance of EU core policy areas
as well as on the type of applied policy instrument (König and Schulz, 1997;
Schulz and König, 2000). Using a data set on 5183 Commission proposals,
which were processed in the period between 1984 and 1995, we tested these
factors by applying both parametric and non-parametric event history
analysis. We also rejected the use of Cox regression because the ‘coefficients
of the interaction variables were different from zero and highly significant,
indicating a clear violation of the proportionality assumption’ (Schulz and
König, 2000: 662). We therefore presented our results of parametric log logistic
analyses, plotting Qversus Log tto check the (linear) relationship, and found
that institutional reform may have a substantial impact on decision-making
efficiency.
Our study motivated and influenced Golub’s research (1999, 2002, 2007).
Using 1141 directives, he also began studying the decision-making process,
defined as the time lag between the Commission’s formal proposal and final
adoption of the legislative act. He investigated, in a similar way to Schulz
and me, how a diverse set of factors influences this process; i.e. Council quali-
fied majority voting (QMV) and parliamentary participation unsurprisingly
remain the significant effects (Golub, 1999: 750). Golub (1999: 733) concluded
that the ‘impact of the Luxembourg Compromise has been greatly over-
estimated, that institutional reforms actually encumbered rather than eased
the EC legislative process’. Using a Cox regression in 2002, Golub re-analysed
his initial study with a slightly larger sample of 1669 directives and reports
to confirm previous findings, even though the effects of three variables
changed their direction. Most recently, Golub (2007) repeated this analysis on
the 1669 directives, now agreeing with our original conclusion that there is a
‘trade-off between efficiency and democratic inclusiveness’. The latest version
by Golub and Steunenberg (2007) re-analyses these results and contradicts
the previous findings on QMV after the Single European Act (SEA), QMV
post Maastricht, co-decision and cooperation after Maastricht, and the
Thatcher and backlog effects. Independently of this confusion, the conclusions
on enlargement and Thatcher effects remain speculative, as the following
analysis will show, owing to the lack of estimators for preferences.
In spite of some similarities in research design, Golub (2007: 156) attracts
attention by sharply criticizing previous studies on the EU decision-making
process as ‘fundamentally suspect’. In 1999, Golub still acknowledged that
‘the most sophisticated analysis to date of EC decision making comes from
unpublished work by Thomas König and Heiner Schulz’, but contended that,
‘because the authors do not examine decision making prior to 1984, they are
in no position to draw the types of comparative conclusions necessary to
assess the impact of institutional reform’ (Golub, 1999: 737; see also Golub,
2007: 161). This is very surprising because the intensely discussed reforms in
Golub’s analyses refer to the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, which date from
1987 and 1993 respectively, and are thus clearly included in the period of our
studies. On the other hand, Golub’s widely discussed Luxembourg Compro-
mise occurred in 1966, two years before his longest study begins. But Golub
(1999: 737) continued his sharp criticism by stating that ‘König and Schulz
also lump together decisions, regulations, and directives at various points in
their analysis’. My analysis will briefly show that it is better to control for
different types of instrument than to assume that any specific type is both
better suited for and more representative of the greater body of EU legislation
in the analysis of the decision-making process.
More generally, my response attempts to settle some disagreements on
scientific grounds by seriously assessing Golub’s central and repeated
presumptions and thereby concentrates on three aspects: the research design
in terms of sample selection and period under study; the theoretical draw-
backs in terms of the explanatory variables used; and the statistical method
European Union Politics 9(1)
146
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