<p>Until recently, there was little doubt over the position of Scots law in relation to an unreasonable mistake in self-defence. As <italic>Owens v HM Advocate</italic><xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1-1"><sup>1</sup></xref><fn id="fn1-1"><label>1</label><p><a href="https://vlex.co.uk/vid/owens-v-hm-advocate-804719141">1946 JC 119</a>.</p></fn> made clear, the defence of self-defence is available only where any mistake made by the accused about the existence of an imminent attack is a reasonable one.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1-2"><sup>2</sup></xref><fn id="fn1-2"><label>2</label><p>See also Hume, <italic>Commentaries</italic> i, 244; <italic>Crawford v HM Advocate</italic> <a href="https://vlex.co.uk/vid/crawford-v-h-m-807231601">1950 JC 67</a> at 72; <italic>McLean v Jessop</italic> <a href="https://vlex.co.uk/vid/kenneth-mclean-appellant-against-807105333">1989 SCCR 13</a> at 17; <italic>Jones v HM Advocate</italic> <a href="https://vlex.co.uk/vid/jones-v-hm-advocate-801933725">1990 JC 160</a> at 172; <italic>Burns v HM Advocate</italic> <a href="https://vlex.co.uk/vid/burns-v-hm-advocate-807193829">1995 JC 154</a> at 159.</p></fn> The requirement for mistakes to be reasonable remained intact even after <italic>Jamieson v HM Advocate</italic>,<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1-3"><sup>3</sup></xref><fn id="fn1-3"><label>3</label><p><a href="https://vlex.co.uk/vid/jamieson-v-advocate-hm-807340929">1994 JC 88</a>.</p></fn> where Scots law followed English law in accepting that an honest but unreasonable belief in consent can ground an acquittal on a charge of rape.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1-4"><sup>4</sup></xref><fn id="fn1-4"><label>4</label><p>This is no longer the position in England and Wales: see <a href="https://vlex.co.uk/vid/sexual-offences-act-2003-808245229">Sexual Offences Act 2003 s 1(1)</a>(c). It is unlikely to remain the position in Scotland either: see Sexual Offences (Scotland) Bill s 1(1)(b), as introduced 17 June 2008.</p></fn> In <italic>Jamieson</italic>, it was stressed by the court that this principle was not to be extended to defences:<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1-5"><sup>5</sup></xref><fn id="fn1-5"><label>5</label><p>At 93.</p></fn>
<disp-quote><p>We wish to say that we are not to be taken … as casting any doubt on the soundness of the dicta in [<italic>Owens</italic>]. Nor are we to be taken as suggesting that in any other case, where a substantive defence is based on a belief which is mistaken, there need not be reasonable grounds for that belief.</p></disp-quote> What appeared to be a settled line of authority was, however, unexpectedly called into question by the Full Bench decision of <italic>Drury v HM Advocate</italic>.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1-6"><sup>6</sup></xref><fn id="fn1-6"><label>6</label><p><a href="https://vlex.co.uk/vid/drury-v-hm-advocate-807365725">2001 SLT 1013</a>.</p></fn> Although the direct concern of <italic>Drury</italic> was provocation,<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1-7"><sup>7</sup></xref><fn id="fn1-7"><label>7</label><p>In particular the correct test to be applied in cases of provocation by infidelity. For discussion, see J Chalmers and F Leverick, <italic>Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial</italic> (2006) para 10.09.</p></fn> the court also turned its attention to the relationship between defences and the <italic>mens rea</italic> of murder. According to the then Lord Justice-General (Rodger), the latter was not, as had previously been assumed, a simple intention to kill (or the alternative of wicked recklessness).<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1-8"><sup>8</sup></xref><fn id="fn1-8"><label>8</label><p>J H A Macdonald, <italic>A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland</italic>, 5<sup>th</sup> edn, by J Walker and D J Stevenson (1948) 89.</p></fn> Rather it was a <italic>wicked</italic> intention to do so, where the term “wickedness” referred to the absence of provocation or any other applicable defence.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1-9"><sup>9</sup></xref><fn id="fn1-9"><label>9</label><p>Para 11.</p></fn></p>
<p>It did not take long for commentators to point out the potential consequences of this decision for the law relating to mistaken belief in self-defence.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1-10"><sup>10</sup></xref><fn id="fn1-10"><label>10</label><p>F Leverick, “Mistake in self-defence after <italic>Drury</italic>” 2002 JR 35; J Chalmers, “Collapsing the structure of criminal law” 2001 SLT (News) 241.</p></fn> If murder requires a wicked intention, then it is open to the accused who believes genuinely, albeit unreasonably, that he is acting in self-defence to argue that his intention lacked the necessary quality of wickedness, and thus he should not be convicted of murder. Indeed, it was feared that the court's analysis of the <italic>mens rea</italic> of murder could open up the way to all sorts of previously unrecognised defences, on the basis that the accused did not act with a wicked intent.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1-11"><sup>11</sup></xref><fn id="fn1-11"><label>11</label><p>M G A Christie, “The coherence of Scots criminal law: some aspects of <italic>Drury v HM Advocate</italic>” 2002 JR 273; V Tadros, “The Scots law of murder”, in J Horder (ed), <italic>Homicide Law in Comparative Perspective</italic> (2007) 190-192.</p></fn></p>
<p>The High Court had the opportunity to revisit its analysis in another Full Bench decision, <italic>Gillon v HM Advocate</italic>,<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1-12"><sup>12</sup></xref><fn id="fn1-12"><label>12</label><p><a href="https://vlex.co.uk/vid/gillon-v-hm-advocate-805567553">2007 JC 24</a>.</p></fn> the focus of which was also provocation. But despite the barrage of academic criticism that followed <italic>Drury</italic>,<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1-13"><sup>13</sup></xref><fn id="fn1-13"><label>13</label><p>Aside from those sources already noted (nn 10-11), see V Tadros, <italic>Criminal Responsibility</italic> (2005) 104; P R Ferguson, “Codifying criminal law (1): a critique of Scots criminal law” [2004] Crim LR 49 at 52; C H...</p></fn></p>
