Angola 1995: the Road To Peace
| Author | Joanna Lewis |
| Published date | 01 April 1996 |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711789601300105 |
| Date | 01 April 1996 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
81
ANGOLA
1995:
THE
ROAD
TO
PEACE
Joanna
Lewis
On
20
November
1994,
the
government
of
Angola
and
UNITA
signed
the
UN-
brokered
Lusaka
Protocol;
the
culmination
of
two
years
protracted
peace
negoti-
ations
following
UNITA’s
rejection
of
the
1992
election
results.
During
this
time
an
estimated
100,000
Angolan
people
perished
and
the
most
wanton
destruction
reigned
down
upon
what
was
left
of
the
country’s
infrastructure.
Neither
President
Jose
Eduardo
dos
Santos,
leader
of
the
ruling
MPLA,
nor
Jonas
Savimbi,
UNITA’s
leader,
thought
it
worth
making
a
symbolic
gesture
which
might
shore
up
the
prospect
for
peace
by
being
present
at
the
signing
of
this
Protocol.
With
this
inauspicious
background,
plus
evidence
of
current
cease-fire
and
human
rights’
violations,
the
African
Studies
Centre
of
the
University
of
Cambridge
hosted
its
second
workshop
on
Angola
on
11
April
1995
at
Pembroke
College.
It
was
entitled
Angola
1995:
the
road
to
peace.
The
Centre’s
previous
workshop
in
1994,
Why
Angola
Matters,
had
brought
together
representatives
of
the
warring
parties
for
the
first
time
outside
of
official
peace
talks.
Tension
ran
high
as
participants
voiced
a
mixture
of
frustration
over
UNITA’s
rejection
of
the
country’s
first
multiparty
election
held
in
September
1992,’
anger
at
the
blatant
disregard
for
civilian
lives
so
callously
displayed
by
both
sides
and
contempt
for
an
international
community
that
had
seemingly
turned
its
back
on
the
world’s
longest
running
civil
war.2
In
contrast,
Angola
1995:
the
road
to
peace
focused
attention
on
the
future:
what
lasting
peace
in
the
country
might
require
and
what
contribution
external
agencies
might
make
towards
reconstruction
and
reconciliation.
The
mood
was
sombre,
for
while
the
peace
process
in
Angola
was
holding,
many
observers
were
doubtful
whether
the
underlying
conflict
was
permanently
resolved.’
The
conference
was
divided
into
three
sessions:
the
demilitarization
of
politics,
the
demobilization
of
soldiers
and
the
economic
reconstruction
of
society.
The
organizing
principles
were
threefold.
First,
an
end
to
violence
required
a
holistic
approach.
Political
reconciliation,
weapons’
control
and
the
return
of
soldiers
to
civilian
life
would
not
yield
lasting
peace
unless
people
had
an
economic
stake
in
a
return
to
peace.
Secondly, just
as
there
were
external
forces
involved
in
the
past
conflict,
so
external
agencies
would
be
involved
in
the
creation
of
a
transitory
framework
for
peace,
a
process
that
should
ultimately
enable
the
Angolan
people
1
For
a
concise
chronology
see
Alex
Vines,
Angola
and
Mozambique:
The
Aftermath
of
Conflict
(RISCT,
Conflict
Studies
280,
May/June
1995)
pp.1-15.
2
See
especially
Victoria
Brittain
’Violence
pays:
a
lesson
from
the
West’
and
Ahmed
Rajab,
’Under-
reporting
and
misreporting
Africa’
in
Hart
and
Lewis
(eds)
Why
Angola
Matters,
pp.67-70
and
128-30.
Events
were
compared
to
the
caricature
of
a
second
marriage,
’the
triumph
of
hope
over
experience’:
’Angola:
between
war
and
peace.
The
new
regional
order
and
economic
self-interest
is
driving
the
peace
process
but
it
still
lacks
political
commitment
on
both
sides’,leader
article,
Africa
Confidential,
vol.
36,
4
(17
February
1995)
p.1.
82
to
organize
their
own
reconstruction
and
better
mediate
external
intervention.
Thirdly,
a
workshop
might
usefully
focus
on
outlining
a
more
positive
role
for
external
forces
in
relation
to
the
big
challenges
of
demilitarization,
demobilization
and
reconstruction,
so
that
the
enabling
process
of
self-organization
might
be
more
speedily
achieved.’
Background
t® ~ 9955
A
collection
of
kingdoms
and
diverse
polities
were
effectively
occupied .
by
the
Portuguese
in
1920,
thus
formalizing
four
hundred
years
of
extraction,
slavery
and
settlement
which
worked
to
the
benefit
of
Portuguese
imperialism
and
local
collaborators.~
Angola
remained
a
colony
until
1975
and
today,
as
the
seventh
largest
African
nation,
it
covers
the
same
territory
of
1.2
million
square
miles.
It
is
bordered
by
Namibia,
Botswana
and
Zambia
to
the
south
and
Zaire
to
the
north
and
east
and
has
a
long
coastline
facing
the
Atlantic
Ocean
to
the
west.’
Ethnically
heterogeneous,
the
main
tribal
groupings
include
the
Kimbundu
to
the
north
and
the
Ovimbundu
of
the
south
(virtually
equal
in
size),
plus
the smaller
Bakongo
people
of the
north-west
and
the
Lunda-Chokwe
group
towards
the
south-east.
Natural
resources
abound,
particularly
oil
and
diamonds.
Yet
3.2
mil-
lion
people
currently
need
humanitarian
assistance
to
survive,
infant
mortality
stands
at
195
per
thousand,
four
million
Angolans
are
displaced
and
300,000
chil-
dren
survive
as
orphans.’
The
explanation
for
these
miserable
statistics
is
simple.
Angola
has
known
only
two
years
of
peace
in
the
last
thirty
years.
Briefly,
after
fighting
a
war
against
Portuguese
occupation,
the
main
liberation
groups
fought
each
other
for
absolute
control
of
the
country.
Each
quickly
attracted
external
backers.
The
MPLA,
with
its
socialist
doctrine,
found
a
natural
ally
in
the
Soviet
Union,
and
Cuba.’
A
quick
injection
of
military
hardware
and
personnel
enabled
the
MPLA
to
rule
through
a
single-party
system
of
government.
UNITA,
on
the
other
hand,
espoused
an
anti-Marxist
and
pro-democratic
rhetoric.
This
earned
it
military
backing
first
from
South
Africa,
keen
to
destabilize
a
government
that
was
supporting
the
lib-
eration
movement
in
South
African-occupied
Namibia,
and
then
from
the
United
4
In
order
to
shake
off
the
dragging
inertia
often
produced
by
institutional
and
physical
separation
of
the
academy
and
the
subject,
the
feeling
of
being
a
helpless
bystander
to
a
large
scale
historical
tragedy
(the
’pianist
in
a
brothel’
syndrome),
we
worked
hard
to
bring
together
experts
from
the
world
of jour-
nalism,
aid
and
development,
human
rights
and
government
so
that
making
contacts
and
information
exchange
formed
an
important
part
of
our
aims,
thus
expanding
our
sense
of
subjectivity
and
agency.
5
At
the
workshop, Mr Jose
Campino,
desk-officer
for
Angola
at
the
Department
of Political
Affairs
at
the
United
Nations
in
New
York,
gave
a
summary
of
recent
political
developments,
concluding
that
Angola
was
on
’the
road
to
peace’
but
that
process
was
very
much
delayed.
6
See
W.
G.
Clarence
Smith,
Slaves
peasants
and
capitalists
in
southern
Angola,
1840-1926
(Cambridge,
1979);
Lawrence
W.
Henderson,
Angola:
Five
Centuries
of
Conflict
(Cornell,
1979).
7
To
the
north,
the
enclave
of Cabinda
also
falls
under
Angolan
sovereignty
where
factions
of
the
Front
for
the
Liberation
of Cabinda
(FLEC)
are
currently
engaged
in
a
movement
of
armed
resistance.
8
Report
of
the
Secretary-General
on
the
United
Nations
Angola
Verification
Mission
(UNAVEM
III)
S/1995/558
(17 July
1995),
para.29.
9
A
third
contender
was
the
smaller
northern-based
party
Frente
Nacional
de
Libertacao
de
Angola
(FNLA)
which
had
the
support
of
the
Zairean
government.
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