Animal Ethics, International Animal Protection and Confucianism
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12194 |
| Date | 01 May 2015 |
| Author | Benedict S. B. Chan |
| Published date | 01 May 2015 |
Animal Ethics, International Animal
Protection and Confucianism
Benedict S. B. Chan
Hang Seng Management College
In this paper, I would like to discuss an alternative nor-
mative approach to international animal protection, other
than the one discussed in Horta (2013). Horta argues for
the following two positions in his paper: (1) we should
protect animals because animals are sentient beings and
have their own interests; and (2) it is not enough to pro-
tect animals simply at the state or national level –we
should also protect animals at the international or global
level. From a Confucian perspective, I argue that one
may support position (2) without position (1). I also dis-
cuss why Confucianism is important for debates in ani-
mal ethics.
In Horta’s own words, the reason to support position
(1) can be summarized as follows: ‘I will now argue that
a sound criterion is available; one that is satisfied by all
individuals with interests, be they humans or nonhuman
animals. That criterion comprises the mere fact of being
sentient. The reason why this can be considered a sound
criterion is, to put it as simply as possible, that the capac-
ity to have positive and negative experiences is what
makes it possible that one can be positively or negatively
affected, and therefore to have interests that need to be
protected’(p. 374). We may call this an interest-based
approach to animal ethics. Peter Singer is probably one
of the most famous scholars who supports this interest-
based approach, and he explains this approach further
based on utilitarianism (e.g., Singer, 1990). Although
Horta does not discuss utilitarianism in detail in his
paper, he is a supporter of the interest-based approach.
In general, scholars in this approach believe that sen-
tience is a key to the moral status of animals. They argue
that since animals have the ability to feel pain and the
interest to avoid pain, this is already a sufficient moral
reason for us to protect animals. In other words, animals’
interests are the basis for their having a moral status.
Sentient beings, no matter humans or animals, have a
moral claim not to suffer because they can feel pain. In
this sense, animal interests are similar to human interests
and they ought to be given equal weight. This would
mean that others have a moral obligation with regard to
this claim.
There are different normative approaches other than
the interest-based approach. Do they also support state-
ment (2) even though they do not agree with statement
(1)? It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a compre-
hensive study of different approaches to animal ethics, but
I shall describe at least one approach which supports (2)
but not (1). This approach is taken from Confucianism.
Confucianism has a long history and is one of the
most important schools of thought in China and other
East Asia regions (such as Korea and Japan). In general,
Confucians do not consider interest as an important cri-
terion in ethics (e.g., The Analects, 4.16; Mencius, 1A1).
Confucians support a humane treatment of animals, and
one may develop a Confucian approach to animal ethics.
Let me use some passages in a classical Confucian text,
Mencius, to illustrate the idea.
In the book Mencius, there is a conversation between
Mencius and King Xuan of Qi (Mencius, 1A7). The King
once saw an ox that would be killed for a ritual, and
then he ordered the sacrifice of a lamb instead of the
ox. Since lambs were cheaper than oxen at that time,
the King was suspected by people of being stingy. But
Mencius explained that the motivation of the King was
simply an action of compassion; the King could not
bear the see the suffering of the ox. As Mencius said, ‘It
is the way of a benevolent man. You saw the ox but
not the lamb. The attitude of a gentleman towards ani-
mals is this: once having seen them alive, he cannot
bear to see them die, and once having heard their cry,
A response to ‘Expanding Global Justice:
The Case for the International Protection of Animals’
Oscar Horta*
*Horta, O. (2013) ‘Expanding Global Justice: The Case for the
International Protection of Animals’, Global Policy, Vol. 4, No. 4,
pp. 371–380. DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12085.
©2015 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2015) 6:2 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12194
Global Policy Volume 6 . Issue 2 . May 2015
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