Another Contradiction in the Theory of Majoritarian Democracy
| Published date | 01 November 1981 |
| Date | 01 November 1981 |
| Author | Peter Morriss |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9256.1981.tb00049.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
ANOTHER CONTRADICTION IN
THE
THEORY
OF
MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY
PETER
MORRISS
Wants Oughts Vote Number
X
X X
30
X
Y
X
5
Y
X
X
5
-
..
The reasons why people vote as they do are doubtless dauntingly diverse. How-
ever, following Wollheim (1962) we can adopt a rather crude distinction between
voting for the outcome that one wants to see adopted, and voting for the outcome
that one thinks ought
to
be adopted. This distinction is important because some
advocates of majoritarian democracy have argued for
it
on the grounds that
it
is
likely to lead to greater satisfaction of wants (utilitarians, for instance, have
argued this way), whilst others have seen
it
as the best way of deciding between
competing visions
of
what ought to be done (here Rousseau springs to mind). The
former justification depends on people voting for that policy which each of them
would want; the latter depends on people ignoring their individual wants and vot-
ing by their conception of the general good
.
the nuances
of
democratic theory
-
do not inform voters which grounds they ought
to adopt.
It
is therefore safe to assume that some voters decide to vote accord-
ing to their individual wants, whilst others vote according to their moral ideals.
(Some of my cynical friends
-
and most of my students
-
assume that virtually
everyone votes according
to
his or her wants unsullied by moral considerations;
Wolheim asserts (p.79) that voters must be swayed more by their general evalua-
tions than by their wants. This difference of opinion reinforces my belief that
some people
will
vote for what they believe ought
to
be the case, and others for
what they want to be the case.)
A
disturbing consequence of this lack of philosophical consistency in the
electorate is that a majority of votes might be cast for some outcome, even though
this outcome
is
both wanted by fewer people than some alternative outcome is,
-
and
thought morally preferable by fewer. There is not a majority that wants
it,
nor
a majority that thinks
it
ought to be the case; yet
it
can attract a majority of
votes.
hundred people have tovote between alternative
X
and alternative
Y.
way they vote, and the reasons for
it,
are as given in the following table.
It
is an unfortunate fact that Returning Officers
-
doubtless unversed in
A
simple example might illustrate how this paradoxical result can occur.
A
Suppose the
Here a majority of people
-
vote for
Y
660-40),
but a majority of people
-
want
X
(55-45)
and a majority of people think
X
ought
to
be chosen (55-45).
tunate result occurred because
it
just
so
happened that people tended to vote
for
Y
whenever wants and moral evaluations conflicted.
I
see no reason why this
should necessarily occur, but equally
I
see no reason why this sort of effect
should not, on occasion, arise.
This unfor-
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