Another Waltz? Methodological Rhetoric and Practice in Theory of International Politics
| DOI | 10.1177/0047117812466817 |
| Date | 01 December 2012 |
| Author | Adam RC Humphreys |
| Published date | 01 December 2012 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
International Relations
26(4) 389 –408
© The Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/0047117812466817
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Another Waltz?
Methodological Rhetoric
and Practice in Theory of
International Politics
Adam RC Humphreys
University of Oxford
Abstract
Although Theory of International Politics is a standard-bearer for explanatory theory in international
relations (IR), Waltz’s methodology has been subject to numerous quite disparate analyses. One
reason why it has proved hard to pin down is that too little attention has been paid to how, in
practice, Waltz approaches real-world problems. Despite his neopositivist rhetoric, Waltz applies
neorealism in a notably loose, even indeterminate, fashion. There is therefore a disjunction
between what he says and what he does. This is partly explained by his unsatisfactory attempt to
reconcile his avowed neopositivism with his belief that international politics is characterized by
organized complexity. The inconsistencies thus created also help to make sense of why competing
interpretations of his methodology have emerged. Some aspects of his work do point beyond
these particular methodological travails in ways that will continue to be of interest to IR theorists,
but its most enduring methodological lesson may be that rhetoric and practice do not necessarily
fit harmoniously together.
Keywords
IR theory, methodology, neorealism, Waltz
Theory of International Politics (hereafter TIP) has long been established as a standard-
bearer for explanatory theory in the discipline of International Relations (IR).1 Yet
despite its canonical status, the precise nature of Waltz’s methodological approach has
proved tantalizingly hard to pin down.2 Recent years have seen renewed interest in this
aspect of Waltz’s work, due partly to celebration of the 30th anniversary of TIP’s publi-
cation (and the 50th anniversary of Man, the State, and War) and partly to a broader
re-emergence of methodological debate in IR.3 Discussion of Waltz’s methodology
Corresponding author:
Adam RC Humphreys, Brasenose College, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 4AG, UK.
Email: adam.humphreys@politics.ox.ac.uk
466817IRE26410.1177/0047117812466817International RelationsHumphreys
2012
Article
390 International Relations 26(4)
tends, however, to be strangely neglectful of his substantive explanatory claims. Waltz is
unusual in devoting the first chapter of TIP to methodological issues, yet one cannot
fully understand his approach without relating what he says there both to the nature of his
actual theory and to how he proceeds when confronting real-world problems. These three
aspects of his work in fact sit rather uncomfortably together.
In chapter 1 of TIP, Waltz lays out a distinctively neopositivist account of the nature of
theory and explanation. He also specifies seven steps required to test a theory: these
include inferring hypotheses from a clearly stated theory, subjecting them to observational
tests, controlling perturbing variables, and amending the theory in light of the results in
order to improve its explanatory capacity.4 However, when he applies his theory to real-
world problems, in chapters 7–8 of TIP, Waltz does not follow this procedure. He makes
no effort to infer hypotheses from neorealism, let alone to test them against observable
patterns. In fact, it is striking how loosely neorealism appears to influence his discussions
of the nature and implications of economic interdependence (in chapter 7) and of the rela-
tive stability of bipolar and multipolar systems (in chapter 8). There is a very obvious
disjunction between what he says in chapter 1 and what he does in chapters 7–8.
Identifying this disjunction not only helps to reconcile some of the disparate analyses
of Waltz’s methodological project which have emerged over the years, but also suggests
a broader lesson: that methodological analysis must take into account actual explanatory
practices as well as rhetorical prescriptions. However, that is not the end of the story, for
it is possible to make sense of the relationship between Waltz’s methodological rhetoric
and practices by recognizing the importance he attaches to the idea that international
politics is characterized by ‘[o]rganized complexity’ and by observing how difficult he
finds it to reconcile his avowed neopositivism to that complexity.5 This difficulty under-
pins his subsequent defence of the partial, and hence unfalsifiable, nature of his substan-
tive explanatory claims.
The aim of what follows is to elucidate the disjunction between Waltz’s methodologi-
cal rhetoric and practice and to ask what lessons it may hold for methodological debate
in IR today. The first section lays out how Waltz applies neorealism to real-world prob-
lems in chapters 7 and 8 of TIP. It argues that Waltz’s neopositivist rhetoric is at odds
with the heuristic manner in which he draws on his theory. The second section suggests
that we can make sense of the disjunction between Waltz’s methodological rhetoric and
practice by drawing out the tension between his commitments to complexity and neo-
positivism. The third section explores two aspects of Waltz’s work that point beyond this
tension: first, his contention that structure is a cause, but not in the conventional neoposi-
tivist sense, and second, his contention that theory must be distinguished from analysis.
It thereby reveals how Waltz’s particular methodological travails can illuminate ongoing
debates in IR. The conclusion draws on the foregoing to contend that methodological
analysis must always encompass not only methodological rhetoric, but also the practices
of theory construction and application.
Waltz’s explanatory practices
Waltz argues, in TIP, that state behaviour and the outcomes thereof are significantly
shaped by the structure of the international political system.6 He is not a structural
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