Anti-populism during the Yellow Vest protests: From combatting the Rassemblement National to dealing with street populists
| Author | Soraya Hamdaoui |
| Published date | 01 August 2022 |
| Date | 01 August 2022 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120974014 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120974014
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2022, Vol. 24(3) 493 –510
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148120974014
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Anti-populism during the
Yellow Vest protests: From
combatting the Rassemblement
National to dealing with street
populists
Soraya Hamdaoui
Abstract
This article analyses the anti-populist strategy of La République en marche! (LREM) during the
Yellow Vest protests by comparing it with the one used against the Rassemblement National (RN),
France’s main populist party. It argues that while the political elites of LREM have ostracised and
strongly demonised the RN to contain its progression, their reaction to the populist protest
movement was more balanced and cautious. As they were facing ordinary citizens asking for
more fiscal justice and direct democracy rather than radical right politicians of the RN, LREM
behaved in a more conciliatory way and softened their rhetoric of demonisation. Overall, the
article distinguishes two types of anti-populism: an adversarial one to face a populist party and an
accommodative one to deal with a populist social movement.
Keywords
anti-populism, elite discourse, French politics, Rassemblement National, social movement,
Yellow Vests
Introduction
Populism has been the subject of much scholarly research. Although academics have
continuously underlined its vagueness over the last decades (Anselmi, 2017; Canovan,
1981; Laclau, 1977; Taggart, 2000), some of its most prominent traits have now been
identified. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017: 5–6) whose approach to populism is
ideational provide a definition that summarises well what it consists of. They argue that it
is a ‘critique of the establishment and an adulation of the common people’ and the belief
that political decisions should be taken in consideration of ‘the volonté générale’’. Often
a top-down phenomenon embodied by a charismatic party leader that electrifies the
masses, populism is nonetheless polymorphous and can also be represented by a social
Department of Politics, University of York, York, UK
Corresponding author:
Soraya Hamdaoui, Department of Politics, University of York, York YO10 5DD, UK.
Emails: sh1812@york.ac.uk; soraya.hamdaoui@gmail.com
974014BPI0010.1177/1369148120974014The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsHamdaoui
research-article2021
Special Issue Article
494 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 24(3)
movement (Taggart and Kaltwasser, 2016: 359). Populism emerges at a more grassroots
level when citizens ask for a more bottom-up form of democracy that transcends partisan
cleavages. As explained by Aslanidis (2017: 306–307):
populist social movements can be seen as non-institutional collective mobilisation along a
catch-all political platform of grievances that divides society between an overwhelming majority
of ‘pure people’ and a ‘corrupt elite’, demanding the restoration of popular sovereignty in the
name of the former.
They, therefore, ‘mobilise against hegemonic structures by aiming to effect large-scale
social change’, seek to challenge the ‘status quo’ and are characterised by ‘broad and
heterogeneous constituencies’ (Özen, 2015: 535).
However, ‘anti-populism’ has attracted less scrutiny and as argued by Moffitt (2018:
5), ‘the few thinkers who have dedicated time and space to conceptualising the opposition
to populism have come from outside the mainstream of populism studies’. A few authors
have identified this lacuna and showed that the study of anti-populism is fundamental to
understand the (re)construction of cleavages that has been gradually underway in Western
Europe (Miró, 2018; Stavrakakis, 2014). Analysing anti-populism is also essential to
understand the dialectical relation it forms with populism as both phenomena influence
each other. Anti-populism is the political hostility to populism expressed by part of the
political and academic establishment that sees it as a threat to democracy (Baggini, 2015;
Grattan, 2016; Pappas, 2019: 259). Opponents of populism think that it ‘obstructs eco-
nomic development (. . .) and therefore is outside of the common logic and sense’
(Karavasilis, 2017: 63). Therefore, those who nowadays criticise the state of the economy
or denounce the flaws of current institutions are considered enemies by anti-populists
(Miró, 2018; Stavrakakis, 2014). More generally, the sole use of the adjective ‘populist’
by mainstream parties or the media suggests revulsion and rejection as it is usually
appended to words evoking peril or disaster (Taguieff, 2002: 39).
This article argues that anti-populism is also a critique or denigration of any actor who
seeks to put the people at the centre of the political game and contest the monopoly of
politics by professional politicians or technocrats. Anti-populists can be found among
various sectors: politics, the media, business, trade unions, academia and even the enter-
tainment industry. They are usually sceptical about the notion of ‘people’ that they see as
fraudulent or demagogical and are reluctant to let ordinary citizens be more involved in
politics on the grounds that it is too complex or that they lack expertise. For anti-popu-
lists, direct democracy is potentially dangerous, and the regular organisation of referenda
can lead to instability or the repeal of laws that are deemed unquestionable. As a result,
they see representative democracy as an impassable horizon. Another important trait of
anti-populists is the tendency to compare populists with extremists who support verbal
and physical violence.
Anti-populism is rarely called as such in the literature, but authors do discuss how
traditional parties try to derail populists’ rise. Many use the strategy of cordon sanitaire
that can take several forms. It usually means preventing mainstream parties from allying
or negotiating with their populist counterparts (De Lange and Akkerman, 2012; Lucardie
et al, 2017). It also implies ‘ignoring the radicals’, putting them in quarantine and waiting
until they disappear from the political scene (Downs, 2001: 26). At the same time, it
means ‘demonising’ the populist rival by undermining its image and creating voters’
repulsion (Saveljeff, 2011: 36). A mainstream party leader can also voluntarily embrace
the most salient issues of the populist party to court its voters (Carvalho, 2019) and
decrease its appeal. Another possible way for mainstream parties to undermine populists
is to form with them a government coalition that will expose their incompetence and lead
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