Appeal Against Conviction And Sentence By Mohammed Abboud Against Her Majesty's Advocate
| Jurisdiction | Scotland |
| Judge | Lady Clark Of Calton,Lord Menzies,Lord Justice Clerk |
| Neutral Citation | [2016] HCJAC 124 |
| Court | High Court of Justiciary |
| Date | 20 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | HCA/2016 |
| Published date | 08 December 2016 |
APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
[2016] HCJAC 124
HCA/2016/000045/XC
Lord Justice Clerk
Lord Menzies
Lady Clark of Calton
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LADY DORRIAN, the LORD JUSTICE CLERK
in
APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION AND SENTENCE
by
MOHAMMED ABBOUD
Appellant
against
HER MAJESTY’S ADVOCATE
Respondent
Appellant: F Mackintosh, Faculty Services Limited, Edinburgh for Neil Barnes, Solicitor, Glasgow
Respondent: A Brown, QC, AD; Crown Agent
20 September 2016
[1] In this case the appellant complains that the use by the trial judge of the word “assassin” in giving an example of a deliberate intention to kill, coupled with reference to the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 September 2015, showed a lack of impartiality on the part of the trial judge and led to an unfair trial. The trial judge explained that an example of a deliberate intention to kill was “the hired assassin who goes with a loaded shotgun and deliberately shoots at someone to kill them”. He added that the terrorists in Paris who had shot people in the streets and in restaurants clearly had a deliberate intention to kill. The grounds of appeal state that (a) the word “assassin” originally referred to a member of an 11th century Islamic sect, known for murdering political and religious adversaries; and (b) that the suspected ringleader in the terrorist attacks was called Abdelhamid Abaaoud. The argument relies on the fact that the appellant is called Abboud, that he is a 57 year old bearded man of Iraqi extraction, and that the trial took place only a few weeks after the terrorist attacks in Paris, the ringleader of which shared a similar name. The use of the word “assassin” and the similarity in name (which was not mentioned in the charge) provided a linking by way of example which was likely to remind the jury of the appellant’s racial background in a potentially negative way. It was not necessary for the trial judge to give any kind of example. Notwithstanding that there was a strong evidential case against the appellant, the examples given by the trial judge were suggestive of bias, and could have been understood in that way by the jury.
[2] The passage complained of occurs where the trial judge is explaining to the jury the difference between murder arising from a wickedly deliberate intention to kill and murder arising from wicked recklessness. It is only one instance of the trial judge using an example to illustrate his meaning. At page 31 he gives an example of acts which were caused accidentally or carelessly, and thus could not constitute the crime of assault. There are others. There is...
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