Y, appeal by

JurisdictionUK Non-devolved
Case OutcomeDismissed
CourtSpecial Immigration Appeals Commission
Hearing Date28 June 2006
Appeal No: SC/36/2005
Dates of Appeal:
25-28 April 2006
2-4 and 24 May 2006
28 June 2006
Date of Judgment:
24 August 2006
For the Appellant: Mr B Emmerson QC, Mr R Husain,
Mr D Friedman
Instructed by Birnberg Peirce and Partners
For the Respondent: Mr I Burnett QC and Mr R Tam
Instructed by the Treasury Solicitor for the
Secretary of State
Special Mr N Garnham QC and Ms J Farbey
Advocate: Instructed by the Special Advocates Support Office
1. Y is a citizen of Algeria born in October 1969. He left Algeria in
1999 for Spain and France. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 5
March 2000 using a false French passport, which he then
discarded. He claimed asylum on 8 March 2000, producing his
genuine Algerian passport. His application was refused on 18
January 2001, but his appeal to an Adjudicator was allowed on 1
June 2001. The SSHD did not appeal and Y was accordingly
granted indefinite leave to remain in November 2001.
2. Y was arrested on 7 January 2003 on suspicion of being concerned
in the instigation, preparation or commission of acts of terrorism
contrary to Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000, and later was
charged with three offences.
3. Y was tried with four others at the Central Criminal Court between
September 2004 and 12 April 2005. This was known as the “ricin”
or “poisons plot” trial. The indictment contained two counts:
conspiracy to murder and conspiracy to cause a public nuisance. Y
and three others were acquitted on all counts but one of them,
Bourgass, was convicted of conspiracy to cause a public nuisance.
4. The SSHD gave notice to Y of his decision to make a deportation
order against him on 15 September 2005, certifying under s97(1)(a)
of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 that his
decision was taken in the interests of national security. Hence the
appeal route lies to this Commission, and not to the AIT.
5. Y’s grounds of appeal raised potential breaches of the Refugee
Convention, and of Articles 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8 ECHR. Even if not a
breach of Article 3, his expected treatment was cumulatively said to
be sufficiently grave to cause SIAC to exercise its discretion under
the Immigration Rules differently. Y said lastly that he was not a
risk to national security.
6. The SSHD submitted, and we accept, that if the national security
case was not made out, Y’s appeal must be allowed, whatever
other routes there might be to his removal.
The National Security case
7. The SSHD’s national security case against Y as an Islamist
extremist was based on five allegations:
- Y had been the leader in the UK of the DHDS, which aimed to
be an umbrella group of Algerian Islamist terrorist organisations
and which was linked to proscribed groups such as the GIA and
- Y was linked to the conspiracy to carry out attacks in the UK,
using toxic poisons including ricin, even though he had been
acquitted of being a party to that conspiracy;
- he had had possession of false documentation including
passports and banking documents;
- in other ways he was associated with various Islamist extremists
in the UK;
- he had possibly been to training camps in Afghanistan.
8. We take those issues in turn. However, we make the point at the
outset, to which we return, that these allegations have to be viewed
in the round and cannot be judged either as factual allegations or
for their significance, in isolation. Each may offer some factual
support for another allegation or affect the significance of another in
the overall picture of Y. The Security Service witness was Witness
Groups: GIA and GSPC
9. Our conclusion on the background to the GIA and GSPC is set out
in the open generic SIAC judgment delivered in the Part 4 ATCSA
cases at paragraphs 282 to 290. It is unnecessary to repeat it
although there have been some subsequent developments in their
positions. Briefly, from 1993 the GIA had conducted a terrorist
campaign in and outside Algeria targeting both Algerian and foreign
nationals. Over recent years its activity had declined. The GSPC
split from it in early 1997 over the GIA’s policy (begun in the mid
1990s) of attacking women and children, preferring to concentrate
its actions against Algerian military and government personnel. The
GSPC was clearly aligned and linked to Al Qa’eda. Both GIA and
GSPC are proscribed organisations under the Terrorism Act 2000.
Their activities are not the real point of controversy; it is the
relationship of Y to them which is at issue.
10. The basis for the SSHD’s assessment that Y had been linked to the
GIA included Y’s own admission at his asylum interview that he had
worked for the GIA from 1992/3 until the end of 1994. In his
interview he said that he had stopped working for them because of
their policy of killing innocent civilians. Once he had left them, they
became a threat to him because they did not trust him. He had
however primarily been a leader of the FIS in Tlemcen, Western
Algeria for some years. Y’s Algerian passport showed a 2 month

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