Applications of Political Theory in the Study of Politics — Introduction
| Date | 01 January 1992 |
| Author | William H. Riker |
| Published date | 01 January 1992 |
| DOI | 10.1177/019251219201300101 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
5-
Applications
of
Political
Theory
in
the
Study
of
Politics
—
Introduction
WILLIAM
H.
RIKER
Our
century
has
witnessed
a
prodigious
development
of
political
theory,
a
development
unmatched
in
any
previous
era.
Unfortunately
much
of
this
develop-
ment
has
been
classified
as
game
theory
or
social
choice
theory,
which
obscures
its
relevance
to
politics.
So
students
of
politics
have
not
always
realized that
they
could
use
these
theories
to
describe
and
explain
politics
systematically.
Thinking
that
we
ought
not
to
ignore
this
grand
opportunity,
the
editors
of
this
Review
have
asked
me
to
assemble
an
issue
wherein
the
papers
would
reveal
the
relevance
of
these
theories
to
our
science.
I
have
tried
to
do
this,
but
not
by
asking
authors
to
write
abstract
arguments
that
political
choice
is
one
kind
of
social
choice
or
that
game-like
strategic
interaction
subsumes
political
conflict.
Rather
I
have
asked
the
authors
to
use
these
theories
to
illuminate
some
well-known
political
problems.
My
hope
is
that
the
illustrations
will
demonstrate
that
the
theories
are
indeed
political
theories.
Contemporary
political
theory
started
from
two
unrelated
sources
in
the
1940s.
For
one
thing,
Duncan
Black
rediscovered
Condorcet’s
paradox
of
voting,
and
then
proved
the
median
voter
theorem
(1948).
Soon
thereafter
Arrow
proved
that
some
anomaly
like
the
paradox
was
possible
under any
non-dictatorial
method
of
amalgamating
tastes
and
values
(1951).
Subsequent
elaboration
of
these
themes
has
given
us a
much
deeper
understanding
than
was
previously
possible
of
the
complexities
of
political
decision.
Three
papers
in
this
collection
involve
application
of
this
theoretical
development:
those
by
Bueno
de
Mesquita
and
Organski,
by
Niou
and
Ordeshook,
and
the
third
by
me.
At
about
the
same
time
Von
Neumann
and
Morgenstern
elaborated
game
theory
into
a
utilitarian
foundation
for
economics
(1944).
What
served
economics
also
served
political
science,
especially
since
Von
Neumann
and
Morgenstern
modelled
not
only
two-person,
zero-sum
games
(which
abstract
parlor
games
and
sports
very
well)
but
also
non-zero
sum
and
n-person
games
(which
abstract
coalition-building,
bargain-
ing,
and
other
political
interactions
just
as
well).
Three
papers
in
this
collection
derive
from
this
tradition:
those
by
Austen-Smith
(on
rhetoric),
by
Calvert
(on
leadership)
and
by
Money
and
Tsebelis
(on
bargaining
between
legislative
houses).
In
any
science,
theory
is
essential
for
description.
For
one
thing,
when
empirically
supported
generalizations
or
descriptions
fit
into
a
consistent
theory
as
derived
propositions,
the
scientist
has
both
empirical
and
deductive
assurance
of the
probable
truth
of
these
generalizations.
The
paper
by
Money
and
Tsebelis
contains
an
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