Approaches to Concept Analysis
| Author | Felix Berenskoetter |
| Published date | 01 January 2017 |
| Date | 01 January 2017 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0305829816651934 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829816651934
Millennium: Journal of
International Studies
2017, Vol. 45(2) 151 –173
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0305829816651934
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1. Stefano Guzzini, ‘The Ends of International Relations Theory: Stages of Reflexivity and
Modes of Theorizing’, European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 521–41.
Approaches to Concept
Analysis
Felix Berenskoetter
SOAS, University of London, UK
Abstract
This article takes as its point of departure Stefano Guzzini’s recent call for ‘ontological theorizing’
as a reflexive engagement with central concepts. In an attempt to advance this agenda, the article
presents an accessible overview of different approaches to concept analysis to stake out the
field for a discussion of what ontological theorising might entail. The article advances the notion
of concepts as ‘basic’ and lays out the parameters through which they obtain meaning, followed
by a discussion of three approaches, which tackle the multifaceted nature of basic concepts
within and across different contexts. These approaches are labelled ‘historical’, ‘scientific’ and
‘political(critical)’ and presented through the work of Reinhart Koselleck, Giovanni Sartori and
Michel Foucault, respectively. The article notes that concept analysis, as discussed here, stands in
tension with modern forms of theory building yet is a creative source for theorising that accepts
the unstable, political and context-bound nature of ontology.
Keywords
Concepts, theorising, history, comparison, genealogy
In a recent contribution to a discussion about the state of International Relations (IR)
theory, Stefano Guzzini calls for what he termed ‘ontological theorizing’, namely a
reflexive engagement with central concepts.1 Guzzini argues that such an engagement is
necessary, indeed inevitable, for two reasons. First, concepts give the field of IR its
Corresponding author:
Felix Berenskoetter, Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of London,
Thornhaugh Street, London WC1H 0XG, UK.
Email: fb12@soas.ac.uk
651934MIL0010.1177/0305829816651934MillenniumBerenskoetter
research-article2016
Article
152 Millennium: Journal of International Studies 45(2)
2. Ibid., 534.
3. Ibid., 535.
4. Guzzini, ‘The Ends of International Relations Theory’, 534–37.
5. Stefano Guzzini, ‘Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis’, International
Organization 47, no. 3 (1993): 443–78; Stefano Guzzini, Power, Realism and Constructivism
(London: Routledge, 2013); Stefano Guzzini, ‘Power’, in Concepts in World Politics, ed.
Felix Berenskoetter (London: Sage Publications, 2016).
ontology. They provide analysts with an understanding of what is ‘out there’ and in doing
so help to grasp relevant phenomena by naming and giving meaning to its features. Thus,
Guzzini writes ‘one could also call it “constitutive” [theorizing] since it is mainly about
theorizing the central phenomena that constitute the field of inquiry’.2 Second, concepts
are needed to construct theories: they not only provide the ontological building blocks of
a theory, often in the form of basic assumptions, but also the components out of which
theorists generate their arguments. As such, concepts are ‘co-constitutive of theories;
they are the words in which…our theorizing is done’.3 In other words, concepts give us
the language both for formulating the phenomena we seek to explain/understand and the
frameworks we build to explain/understand them. Given this, calling on theorists to pay
attention to key concepts and reflect on their use makes sense, especially in the wake of
the so-called Third Debate, which, among other things, encouraged scholars to question
core assumptions on which theoretical arguments rest.
However, answering such a call is not an easy task and requires addressing two related
but different sets of questions. First, what exactly does paying attention to concepts entail?
How can, or should we reflexively engage with key concepts? Second, what consequences
does this have for the way we think about and ‘do’ theory? In other words, how does a
reflexive engagement with key concepts affect the practice of theorising? While these
questions might be seen as two sides of the same coin, it is useful to treat them as two
steps in the intellectual endeavour of ontological theorising because it allows becoming
familiar with specialised debates underpinning each question and, hence, helps to appreci-
ate the complexity of the task. Guzzini’s article offers pointers mainly in response to the
first set of questions (although its ambition is clearly to address the second). He suggests
that ontological theorising is, basically, a form of concept analysis. Borrowing a metaphor
from Anna Leander, he notes that it involves writing an ‘unfinished dictionary [about the
ontology] of the international’ based on ‘a much wider understanding of “conceptual anal-
ysis” than usually offered’. Yet his article does not go beyond noting that this understand-
ing involves recognising the relevance of history and philosophy for ‘thinking the
empirics’ by tracing a concept’s ‘historical anchorage’ and intellectual history.4 While
Guzzini’s formidable work on power offers specific examples in this regard,5 it is useful
to take a step back and ask what a ‘wider understanding’ of concept analysis might entail
from a broader perspective. This is the aim of the present article. Picking up Guzzini’s
thread, it addresses the first set of the above questions by presenting an overview of dif-
ferent approaches to concept analysis as the first leg of ontological theorising. That said,
the second set of questions cannot be ignored, and so this article will also offer some
thoughts on the link between concept analysis and theorising.
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